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ABSTRACT
This thesis studies household welfare and financial markets and in particular em-
pirically examines access to finance, human capital, saving and risk sharing group
formation using Indonesian households as a case study. Inefficient financial markets
in developing countries lead to inefficient resource allocation, economic inequality,
and high transaction costs. Households who are marginalised from financial systems
find themselves unable to access financial services and smooth their consumption.
The first thing to consider is how credit constraint exists and how to identify it.
Credit constraints may arise from market mechanisms: demand for loans and loan
supply. In order to assess credit constraints, I use Direct Elicitation Methodology
(DEM) and then examine the gathered information and other household character-
istics using multinomial logit model. Using Access to Finance (A2F) survey, I find
that Indonesian households are likely to experience supply-side rather than demand-
side constraints. I also find that financial literacy plays vital role in accessing ser-
vices from formal financial institution. Moreover by elaborating several types of con-
straints, the welfare loss is estimated: the constrained households due to risk-related
reasons experience loss in terms of annual income between Rp. 16 millions and Rp.
19 millions.
In the second empirical study, I investigate the impacts of earnings risk on school-
ing and saving. I borrow Basu and Ghosh’s model (2001) to develop a theoretical
framework of two-period model, which depicts the relationship between earnings risk,
schooling and saving. Using the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) data set, the
decision to enter schooling is motivated by earnings risk which is measured by occu-
pational earnings risk and earnings range or the variability between maximum and
ii
minimum earnings level across the IFLS wave. This study finds that education de-
crease variability over future income. Given the results that the pure risk effect is
more dominant than utility smoothing effect, it can be said that to some extent sav-
ing is inadequate to anticipate the declining of household income due to earnings risk.
The results also show that earnings range is close to Basu and Ghosh’s predictions.
Another issue related to financial markets is the barrier to insurance for house-
holds, which also limits their capability to manage life risk. As a result, alternative
risk coping mechanisms emerge to provide these households with different ways of se-
curing insurance arrangements and in particular as risk sharing groups. In this third
empirical research, I investigate the risk sharing group formation where the group is
characterised by barriers to insurance. I use several tests to examine full risk shar-
ing hypothesis, borrowing-saving hypothesis, limited commitment, moral hazard, and
hidden income. Using the IFLS data set, this study provides evidence of the failure
of the full risk sharing hypothesis, which is mainly due to limited commitment and
moral hazard problem. Furthermore, I show that the endogenous group formation
emerges within IFLS households.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background of the Study and Motivation
Indonesia is a country with a long tradition of collective action when dealing with
social and economic issues. These collective actions are performed by households or
individuals within a community or group. The main reason why such actions exist is
because reliable financial systems are few or missing: this is particularly true, across
the country, for insurance or social protection.
The policy of the Indonesian insurance system in the modern period can be traced
back to the colonial era. During the Dutch colonial period in Indonesia, the admin-
istrator did not provide or create effective financial institutions; nor were insurance
mechanisms developed that provided adequate support for its citizens (see de Jonge,
2004). There was a discrimination in laws and policies for the Dutch and the indige-
nous people: social security was provided only for the Dutch. There was a change in
the early of 1900’s when the Dutch government enacted the Ethical Policy which was
intended to increase social welfare (volkswelvaart) and to promote the discussion of
welfare politics. The main concern was the decreasing welfare of indigenous people
which was due to the discrimination of the colonial economic policy. In terms of insur-
ance systems, the Dutch administration initiated welfare funds in particular regions.
The results however were not as effective as expected and the benefits were mostly
taken by the people who managed the funds. As a result of the Ethical Policy, there
was an improvement in institutional development and social welfare between 1901
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and 1941. This development was disrupted in 1941 by the Japanese occupation (see
Vickers, 2005).
A few years after Independence, the Indonesian government started the economic
development of the country and it has since experienced different stages of economic
growth and downturn. However, there was no significant change in terms of the so-
cial security system. Until 2004, social security was only provided to civil servants,
police and army officers, and people who work in the formal sector. This leaves two
thirds of the people in the Indonesian working force without any social security sys-
tem (see Hermanto et al., 2009). With the small penetration of formal insurance
services, the issue has become important and cannot be neglected since most of the
Indonesian population are not protected. In 2004, the Indonesian parliament passed
Law Number 40/2004 regarding National Social Security System (Undang Undang
Sistem Jaminan Sosial Nasional Nomor 40/2004), which ensures the social protec-
tion for all Indonesian citizens. However, the implementation is still far from effective
and the problems still remain due to mostly institutional problems.
Another related and important issue is the access to finance particularly in terms
of credit or loans. The Dutch administration supported pawnshops and cooperatives
which were essentially financial systems imported from Europe. The cooperatives
were mostly established by indigenous people and served as the basis of economic
activities (see Vickers, 2005). This was seen as an essential feature to build a national
character based on the principle of “mutual help” (gotong royong). This principle was
considered an ideal value of Indonesian culture and tradition. Under this principle,
many Indonesians believed that the cooperatives would enable to support economic
development and national independence.
The Dutch administration also established some banks which were nationalised
by the Indonesian government after independence. A question still remains concern-
ing the coverage of financial systems which are dominated by banking services. A
study by World Bank (2009) shows that around half of Indonesians are financially
excluded and the financial services are excessively concentrated in a few of big cities.
This study also show that many Indonesians still rely on informal institutions which
are closely associated to their community.
The role of community has become increasingly important particularly after the
1997 Asian financial crisis. There was a significant change in the political and gover-
nance systems. This leads to changes to social and economic policies and particularly
the growth of decentralisation policies where community development became a cen-
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tral part in many policy objectives and their implementation. The idea behind this
was to give people more autonomy over and responsibility for their economic develop-
ment.
Beard (2007) documented household and community contributions in economic de-
velopment in Indonesia. She concludes that household participation in economic de-
velopment is determined by three aspects which are interdependent. First, the house-
hold participation is affected by the local organisational context which comprises its
unique structure with social, political and economic systems. The local organisations
matter because they determine the role of civic participation in economic develop-
ment. In Indonesia, the civic organisations can be divided into two types. The first
type includes community organisations which are dependent on the participation of
households who live in that area. The second type is non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) which operate across the country without having any attachment to specific
communities.
Second, the participation is determined by the capacity for collective action within
a community. This capacity includes efficient allocation of households’ resources in
terms of goods and services through a community development process. Many of
community activities are decided based on consensus or mutual agreement.
The third aspect is the presence of social capital which is defined as a set of eco-
nomic benefit which is derived from collective actions within a community. The con-
cept of social capital can be divided into two concepts: networks and trust. As a part
of community, households gain social and economic benefits from the networks. And
within this community, households are able to conduct reciprocal exchange because of
mutual trust.
A classic literature on collective actions can be found in Geertz (1962) where he
studied social structure and patterns of saving behaviour in some communities in
Indonesia. The structures are known as rotating savings and credit associations or
Roscas, can be found across Indonesia in similar fashion and arrangement. Roscas can
be regarded as a community-based insurance or social security. Most of these associa-
tions are conducted in the short-term and repetitive period. Roscas that are sustained
over longer periods are able to accumulate assets and moreover evolve into more insti-
tutionalised entities. In many economic literature, this mechanism is known as risk
sharing. Such arrangements in Indonesia are based on the moral economy which is
rooted deeply in culture and tradition (see Ravallion and Dearden, 1988). Similar ar-
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rangements can be also found in credit cooperatives, informal credit, and agricultural
contracts, where they develop into informal financial institutions.
As the economy grows toward a modern structure, the role of informal institutions
usually diminishes and is replaced by modern and more formal financial institutions.
As the financial markets develop, access to finance theoretically should be accessible
to the people. In the case of Indonesia, the informal institutions have not declined as
modern institutions develop but continue to expand as people still need their accessi-
bility and flexibility. A structured and systematic study of risk sharing and its related
issues can make an important contribution to research and policy.
1.2 Research Objectives
Access to financial markets and services is considered as an important feature that
supports economic growth and development while at the same time also reducing
poverty and promoting economic equality. Limited access to financial institutions in
many developing countries impedes economic growth and economic inequality. How-
ever, factors that shape development in these countries are significantly different, his-
torically and culturally, from the advanced Western countries where many economic
theories were developed.
In developed countries, formal financial markets and institutions serve a signifi-
cant portion of the population. However, in developing and less developed countries
things are other way around. Dysfunctional financial markets have impacts on in-
efficient resource allocation, low economic growth, and greater inequality. Morduch
(1995) describes two common observations that usually exist in developing countries.
The first observation is the non existence of various markets. If the markets do exist,
they usually do not work efficiently. Secondly, market failures will constitute a set of
behavioural and institutional responses. Credit markets, which usually play a main
role in finance, is limited due to several constraints. Akerlof (1970) points out that
credit markets in underdeveloped countries are characterised by asymmetric infor-
mation. The problem rests on how to manage an “agency system”. A paradox, which
usually happens, is that moneylenders can lend and charge higher interest rate than
formal financial institutions because they can easily enforce the contract, or have
better knowledge of borrowers’ characters.
Furthermore, insurance markets in developing countries face different types of
barriers making them inaccessible for households, particularly those on low income.
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When insurance markets are limited or non existence mutual assistance between
family and friends would take place in order to form risk sharing groups. This mutual
assistance is beneficial for households. However, this mutual group is not always effi-
cient whenever moral hazards and asymmetric information problems emerge. More-
over, limited commitment and hidden income may be significant features that are
embedded in this group formation.
Risk sharing networks with their related issues and in particular group formation,
is a very important question since it is related to the impact of economic policies. Such
policies include decentralisation, financial intermediation, human capital and social
security. How groups form and are organised to conduct risk sharing arrangements
also matters.
This study focuses on credit constraints, household welfare, and risk sharing group
formation with Indonesian households as a case study. The first question is how credit
constraints can be identified and to what extent the constraints affect household wel-
fare. This also includes the characteristics that may affect households’ access to fi-
nance markets.
The second question is related to saving and education. This study departs from
a long standing view of return to education as human capital investment where this
provides incentives for individuals to undertake education. The focus here is to assess
the impact of earnings risk to education and saving.
The third is related to the type of barriers to insurance that exist in Indonesia.
If these barriers exist, then the third question is how the risk sharing group can
be formed. When constraints prevail and self-insurance is inadequate, informal in-
surance becomes important for households. These conditions may become the main
reason for households to form risk sharing coalitions within informal networks.
1.3 Research Contributions
In a broad sense, this study enriches the existing literature of household welfare with
regard to risk management at the micro level. Specifically, it has three substantive
contributions in the field of financial development with Indonesian households as a
case study.
The first contribution would be in explaining why some households have limita-
tions in accessing financial services. The implications of limited access to finance can-
not be neglected. By classifying and estimating different regimes of credit constraint,
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this study offers an approach to estimate the impact of credit constraint based welfare
loss calculations.
The second contribution is related to households as production agents. This study
contributes to the field of human capital by explaining the relationship between earn-
ings risk and education and then examines the implication to household saving in the
Indonesian context. This study provides policy insight into the incentives of human
capital investment.
The final contribution is in explaining the barriers to insurance for households
and how risk sharing group formation may exist between households. As explained
in the previous section, this study contributes to the empirical literature about com-
munity risk sharing in Indonesia. In terms of policy implications, the study provides
empirical insights into understanding household financial behaviour and the group
formation which is beneficial to community development and the local economy. Gov-
ernment’s social and economic policies which are based on community developments
such as social insurance, community assistances, and other fiscal interventions, can
benefit from this study. This may help to provide a better framework for extending
social protection and benefits to the communities.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 presents existing literature which
focus on four aspects: household welfare, consumption, financial access and risk shar-
ing. This literature provides motivation for the subsequent chapters.
Chapter 3 is a summary of financial development in Indonesia drawn from the two
main dataset used in this study. The first data set is the Indonesia Family Life Survey
(IFLS), a longitudinal study of Indonesian families conducted by RAND Corporation
in 1993, 1997, 2000 and 2007. The IFLS dataset are utilised in Chapter 5 and 6. The
second data set is the Access to Finance Survey (A2F), a financial survey of Indonesian
households in 2007 by World Bank.
Chapter 4 discusses credit constraint identification using DEM (direct elicitation
methodology) which exploits households’ opinion toward financial services using A2F
dataset. This also includes identifying households’ borrowing characteristics. The
classification, which is built on the DEM, is then examined in order to estimate wel-
fare loss using several matching models.
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Chapter 5 investigates the impact of earnings risk on saving and schooling. Saving
is considered a self-insurance or buffer against earnings risk and the decision to save
may affect the decision about education. I divide the schooling based on the Mincerian
framework: investment in schooling and post-schooling activities in terms of work
experience. I motivate the saving function based on the decision of schooling and
work which is made in the first period. This saving is then associated with earnings
risk which occurs in the second period as a result of decisions made in the previous
period.
Chapter 6 investigates different type of barriers to insurance which implies sev-
eral alternatives of risk sharing models. The testable models include full insurance,
borrowing-saving, saving only, moral hazard, limited commitment and endogenous
group formation. The empirical analysis can be divided into household and commu-
nity or village level where the endogenous group formation of risk sharing network is
investigated.
Finally, the last chapter concludes with a summary from the study and directions
for further research. I discuss several ideas to be considered as future works. These
can be subsequent studies related to the topics that are given in this thesis, particu-
larly household economics.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
Households play important roles in the body of knowledge, not only in economics but
also in other social sciences. Understanding households as economic agents is not
only looking at economic aspect but also institutional and cultural aspects, which
shape the household behaviour.
The main focus of this study is on how people can cope and manage their risk and
vulnerability, particularly those who are disadvantaged. To understand how house-
holds cope their risks, the study investigates risk sharing as a way for households to
increase their welfare. This chapter is intended to give a review of related literature
mainly in the field of household welfare in emerging countries. Furthermore, it also
presents several issues which are related to financial markets in developing countries.
The structure of this chapter is divided into four important aspects. Section 2.2
discusses households as economic agents and its role in the economy with related is-
sues in household surveys. Section 2.3 provides a review of literature on consumption,
mainly the common framework used in economic research. Section 2.4 outlines finan-
cial development in developing countries with regards to current issues on household
economy. Section 2.5 discusses household risk management with more emphasis on
risk sharing. Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Households as Economic Agents
As a starting point, household and its economy should be clearly defined and observed
in well manner. The measurement of household economy has become increasingly
important where the households are not only as consumption agents, but also as pro-
duction agents.
2.2.1 Defining Household
The common way to observe and measure household economic behaviour is by con-
ducting surveys. An ideal of household data set for economists is a long period of
longitudinal or panel which includes a number of consumer characteristics and be-
haviour such as consumption, savings, income, expenditure, and health. This also
means that the same households are retained within respective periods. However,
this kind of survey will consume a lot of time and efforts.
Household definition varies between surveys and across countries. Along with the
globalisation and the changes in economic structure, the definition departs from just
merely traditional concept of household.
A household can be defined as a group consisting a small number of people that
usually live in the same dwelling, get together and share resources to achieve the
common goals or objectives. Other definition may include that these people share
consumption in one kitchen or “cooking-pot”. These definitions may vary in terms of
different countries with different cultures and identities. Many developing countries
such as India, Indonesia, and China, households are usually perceived as nuclear
family. While in other countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, or
European countries, people who live within a household may not always represent or
resemble a nuclear family.
The official definition of household can be found in statistical bureau or agency
in one specific country. For example, U.S. Census Bureau (2003) simply defines a
household as all of the people who occupy a housing unit. The Indonesian Central
Agency of Statistics (BPS) classifies households into two categories (BPS, 1999). The
first category is regular household which is defined as an individual or a group of
individuals living together in part or the whole physical building or dwelling, and
sharing and/or using the same kitchen.
The other category is called as special household which includes a group of people
living in a dormitory where the whole daily needs are facilitated by an organisation
2.2 Households as Economic Agents 10
or institution; people living in a correctional institution, orphanage, prison; and other
groups that consist of more than ten people who share their meals.
A general definition of household can be found in United Nations (2007) referring
a household as a basic unit of analysis when assessing the economic circumstance
in a society, even tough individual data may be separately collected. United Nations
also describes a central feature of household which involves a high degree of income
and expenditure pooling. Furthermore, based on some statistical definitions, it distin-
guishes definition between household and family. Household refers to private hous-
ing or household dwelling concept where family definition includes not only common
dwelling but also ties or relationship based on blood, marriage or adoption.
However, in some countries, using household as a unit of analysis may become
difficult. In Africa, households usually comprise of more than one family and person
with or without kinship. The family members may also live separately, for example a
married young woman may live with her parents while her husband live in another
house (see United Nations, 2007).
To summarise, there are three common components that exist across definition of
a household. The definition includes residential requirement, shared consumption,
and joint production.
2.2.2 Policy Implications and Consequences
Household survey data give direct measures of the social and economic policy effects,
particularly when the policy changes take place. The effects can be observed through
the changes in prices or the changes in the provision of public services. Therefore,
the definition of household is very important particularly for policy implication and
consequences.
Beaman and Dillon (2012) argue that the implications significantly influence in
assessing household composition, production and poverty measures. They assess dif-
ferent definition types of household in Mali. They found that additional keywords
in definition increase household size and change household composition, mainly by
joint consumption or production, which lead to different level of household asset and
consumption measures. Beaman and Dillon also point out two important and yet con-
flicting implications. First, the household definition should be consistent in a given
population and across populations. Secondly, the definition should be able to iden-
tify relevant economic or decision making unit, which may vary based on research
question.
2.2 Households as Economic Agents 11
However, since markets do not operate efficiently and contracts cannot be enforced
by well-defined state, government policy through any kind of institutional arrange-
ment economic activity entails high transaction costs. Then, households utilise infor-
mal alternatives and institutions which allow them to fulfil their needs. This is one of
the distinctive features in many developing economies. The need to understand the
rationalities of these households along with their conditions and context of their en-
vironment may serve better policy formulation in order to enhance productivity and
promote sustainable growth.
Complexity may arise in calculating household income and assets, which includes
for example remittances from other household members abroad. Along with definition
problem, these make some difficulties in comparing household survey results, which
in turn will affect empirical assessment and analysis. However, the consequences of
definition variation within countries and between countries are yet much known in
terms of household statistics.
Another debate in household concepts is household headship that refers to house-
hold economic provider, primary decision maker, breadwinner, or a person who is
designated as the head by other members. The main premise of this is that there
exist perceived differences in terms of households lead by women and those by men.
To some extent, if a household is headed by a woman then the household becomes
more “vulnerable” than others. Budlender (2003) discusses definition use by central
statistical agencies in the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom. She
argues that different type of household head definition may cause difficulties particu-
larly when the measures are taken into economic policy making. She proposes broad
range of criteria to determine the dominant person within a household which allow
flexible definition of household head and determining household vulnerability.
2.2.3 Household Welfare
An interesting debate on household welfare is how to define and measure welfare.
Welfare is related to utility concept though not identical concepts. In many household
surveys, welfare can be derived from household consumption of goods (see Grootaert,
1983). The core debate of welfare measurement is between income against expendi-
ture approach. According to Grootaert (1983), there are three alternative approaches
to measure household welfare. Each approach will be discussed as follows.
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2.2.3.1 True Index of Welfare
The first approach is derived from the preference parameters, which are estimated
within an integrated model of household consumption and unemployment. This ap-
proach is known as true indices of welfare. This approach is based on the premise
that welfare is determined by goods, household composition, leisure, and access to
public services. When a household maximises welfare subject to budget constraints,
the household needs to consider input prices, output prices, time endowment, wealth
accumulation and market wage rate. Using simultaneous equations from observable
cross-section data, welfare levels can be estimated, calculated, and compared. The
results can be also converted into monetary equivalents using a reference price and
wage vector.
2.2.3.2 Expenditure Perspective
The second approach is called total household expenditures approach where the mea-
surement depends on the estimation of total household consumption. The approach
is based on the assumption that household preference patterns are shown by goods
and services purchased by the household which implies many variables in the wel-
fare function such as decision to bear children, health expenditure, leisure choice,
and dwelling decision. In this approach, the household consumption function is a
one-equation model which welfare is a function of goods and services consumed by
the household.
In many cases, expenditure is often seen as consumption. Consumption is simply
defined as resources, which are consumed or expended by households. However, ex-
penditure refers to consumption that is based on market transactions. In other words,
expenditure is defined as household purchase of specific goods and services.
As a part of core welfare measurement, expenditures usually can be ranked based
on their total expenditures with respect to baseline period. The expenditures usually
consist of human development dimension for example health, education, nutrition,
family planning and dwelling. Therefore, reliable expenditure or consumption data
are important to measure welfare and engage in meaningful interpretation.
Expenditure is directly related to current living standards since the periodic flow
of expenditure is able to indicate the level of consumption for a given period such as
within a month or a full year. For the case in developing countries where informal
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workers are common, it is much easier to use this approach to measure household
welfare.
2.2.3.3 Full Income Perspective
The third approach is full income concept where based on the premise that full in-
come is a total of monetary income, in-kind, and the imputed value derived from
endowments and assets including durables and time. This approach relates a mone-
tary value to leisure based on household behavioural decision to equate the utility of
time spent on corresponding household activities.
Income usually refers to earnings from productive activity such as labour supply
and transfers from other parties. Some part of income will be saved and accumulated
as household assets. Sources of income and assets are considered as main point in
welfare causal analysis. Information on income and assets can be used to distinguish.
Income can be separated into two parts: earned and unearned income. Earned
income comes from labour salary and wages while unearned income can be derived
from the information about the supply of land, capital or other household assets. For
example, unearned income in urban area in many developing countries can be ob-
served from rented housing. This information is important to estimate hedonic rent
equations, which comprise tenure arrangement, location, physical characteristics of
building and utility availability.
One important aspect of households’ income is the proportion of cash income where
this varies according to socio-economic groups or regions. The change of monetary
income to non monetary income overtime can be used to analyse households’ lifes-
pan. Household surveys, which contain information about households’ income, edu-
cation, and demographic characteristics, are very useful in analysing the supply side
of labour markets. This will also enable to get insight on the dynamics of household
welfare analysis.
2.2.3.4 Comparison Between True Index, Expenditure and Income Approach
From a conceptual point of view, the true indices of welfare approach is considered
superior than the other approaches due to a complete set of behavioural equations
which comprises households’ consumption and labour supply. This approach also em-
ployes preference order inferences of the observed variables to produce a computable
scalar measure of welfare. The last two approaches are much simple without re-
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stricting specific assumptions and use monetary value on the observed behavioural
variables. Both approaches also require deflation measures with a price index and an
adult equivalence scale.
In terms of practical viewpoint, all these approaches may suffer potential bias
whenever adequate data are unavailable. True indices and full income approach are
sensitive to opportunity set selection. Therefore, correct identification of this set is
necessary to prevent imputation, selectivity and self-response biases. Full income
and expenditure approaches are used to complement in measuring household welfare.
However, income is often significantly different than expenditure or consumption be-
cause of saving and borrowing. In the end, these welfare measures give important
information about living standards in a particular economy.
The expenditure approach can be used when strong relative prices exist and homo-
geneous goods are considered. In many studies, the expenditure approach seems to be
used because expenditures are relatively accurate and easier to compute (for example
see Deaton, 1997; Nguyet and Mangyo, 2010; Thomas and Frankenberg, 2007; Witoe-
lar, 2013; ?). In the context of permanent income and life cycle models, expenditures
can be also used as a proxy for income since they are less influenced by fluctuations.
In summary, it can be inferred that expenditure approach has more advantage in
terms of practicality and assumptions used in measuring household welfare.
2.3 Consumption
Consumption is a central issue in macroeconomics, which is typically part of a house-
hold decision problem. Consumption decisions are closely related to wealth, saving
decisions, uncertainty and risk attitude. It also refers to the process of acquiring and
utilising goods and services, and to some extent disposing the residuals in the end.
Magrabi et al. (1991) state there are two types of output as result of household
consumption. The first is the satisfaction and well-being experienced by household
members and the second is the use of productive resources such as labour supply,
engagement with higher level of society and public decision making. In this context,
consumption is not merely satisfaction, but also developing household capacity for the
betterment of households and society in larger scale.
The first issue of consumption with respect to household welfare is the determi-
nants of household consumption patterns. The second issue is consumption smooth-
ing or how households are able to find stable path of their consumption. The path is
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highly related to the concept of time, which is also another dimension of household
welfare. The relevant issue here is how consumption and income fluctuate in short
time and over the lifespan in order to find the stable path of consumption.
2.3.1 The Determinants of Household Consumption
Household consumption behaviour is influenced by a set of relevant factors such as
income, household characteristics, food and non food consumption (see Magrabi et al.,
1991). In many cases, multivariate analysis is utilised to estimate different factors
that determine household consumption pattern. The most common method is to mea-
sure arc elasticity e which is computed as the percentage change of consumption
expenditure level (C1−C2) and the percentage change of income levels (Y1−Y2) as
follows
e= C1−C2
C1+C2
/
Y1−Y2
Y1+Y2
.
Using household data on income and consumption, the arc elasticity, e, can be also
empirically derived as follows
e=φ Y¯
C¯
where Y¯ and C¯ denote actual values of average income and consumption respectively
and φ denotes the regression slope of the term (C1−C2) / (Y1−Y2).
However, this method does not accurately explain the relationship between con-
sumption and other household characteristics that is not linear such as age. The
other limitation include the type of income and household life cycle. The complexity
also arises when the structure of data is longitudinal or panel which usually contain
effects from previous periods.
2.3.2 Permanent Income and Life Cycle Hypothesis
The welfare approach that emerged in economic discussions in 1940s and 1950s mainly
focus on the permanent income ideas. The phenomenon of “regression toward the
mean” idea has also played a significant contribution to this field (see Mayer, 1972).
The well-known study of stable path in consumption is proposed by Brumberg and
Modigliani (1954), followed by Friedman (1957) and Ando and Modigliani (1963).
These works are also known as approach to wealth theory and collectively provide
foundations for the “modern consumption theory”.
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The theories which are proposed by Ando and Modigliani (1963) and Brumberg
and Modigliani (1954) in explaining consumption behaviour are collectively known as
life cycle models. Assuming the markets are perfect, life cycle models predict that
households consume their expected income at all point of their life. When income is
low, households tend to borrow against their future income. They prefer to save more
when their income is high in particular during their productive working years. During
the retirement, they will consume their accumulated assets and savings. Therefore,
the consumption profile over their live stage would be relatively flat.
The main idea of life cycle hypothesis lies on the link between a lifetime budget
constraint and consumption at various life cycle periods. The slope of the budget con-
straint is given by − (1+R) where R denotes the real interest rate which households
lend and borrow. The slope indicates the trade-off between consumption at date t and
t+1. The present value of human wealth or lifetime earnings determines the position
of the budget constraint. In terms of utility optimisation problem, this can be written
as
A = F0+
T∑
t=0
Yt
(1+R)t (2.1)
where A is the initial wealth includes both financial and human wealth, F0 denotes
financial wealth, and Yt denotes the expected value of human wealth for each date t.
Friedman (1957) discusses the household problem in more general terms. He ar-
gues that the households’ decision making toward their consumption pattern is sig-
nificantly determined by changes in their “normal” level of expected income (or per-
manent income) than the deviations or fluctuations from “normal” level of income (or
transitory income), which are caused by business cycle, life cycle, or other factors.
Friedman also uses the similar terms to distinguish consumption where perma-
nent consumption is defined as part of consumption which is expected and steady and
transitory consumption is defined as irregular household expenditure or spending.
The permanent consumption will be proportional to permanent income, and a frac-
tion of average lifetime income that will be spent by households. The consumption in-
cludes planned consumption that depends on permanent income while the unplanned
consumption is independent of income.
The main idea of permanent income lies in the estimation of the relationship be-
tween consumption and permanent income, which can be written as
T∑
t=0
Y p
(1+R)t = F0+
T∑
t=0
Yt
(1+R)t (2.2)
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where Y p denotes permanent income. The relationship between life cycle and perma-
nent income can be shown by left-hand side of equation (2.1) and (2.2) where Y p = rA
where 1/(1+R)t converges to 1/r. This implies that for permanent income hypothe-
sis, consumption is determined by permanent income while for life cycle hypothesis,
consumption is determined by wealth. Therefore, these theories are often referred as
permanent income/life cycle hypothesis (or PIH/LCH).
Critics on these theories are mainly based on the assumptions and empirical tests
particularly for various countries. Early life cycle theorists generally assume that
households consume over their lifespan, not for example sharing consumption to oth-
ers or distributing it to the heirs. Secondly, this theory assumes that consumption
over time is independent to the level of income. The permanent income theory it-
self is similar to life cycle theory. The main characteristic which distinguishes these
theories lies on the exposition of the theory. For example, the exposition can be in
terms of utility function specification and explicit use of financial term, which is fre-
quently mentioned as non human capital. Since this theory places more emphasis on
permanent income, then it is inadequate to address household welfare issue.
2.3.3 Neoclassical Consumption
The key idea of the Neoclassical approach to consumption is households’ ability to
decide their consumption that involves two periods: present and future. The income
can be earned in the present time and the future as well as the consumption. However
they have to decide to consume today or in the future. This means that they have to
find time path to smooth their consumption.
Let U denote household utility and the optimisation problem for this household
can be written as
max
{c}
U =U (ct)+βU (ct+1) (2.3)
subject to
ct+ ct+11+R = A (2.4)
where ct and ct+1 denote consumption at date t and t+1 respectively, β denotes the
discount factor, and R denotes the real interest rate. A denotes household’s total
wealth that includes financial wealth Ft and human wealth yt+ (yt+1) / (1+R).
By solving (2.3) and (2.4), the optimal condition can be written as follows:
U ′ (ct)=β (1+R)U ′ (ct+1) . (2.5)
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Equation (2.5) is called as the consumption Euler equation which implies that the
household is indifferent between consumption today and consumption in the future.
Since the Euler equation is written in terms of consumption growth, it gives insight
into how interest rates are closely related to growth rates.
This Neoclassical consumption model has several implications on households’ de-
cision making on savings and consumption. According to this model, consumption
is proportional to total wealth which is partially determined by the present value of
household income. As the marginal utility is diminishing, households must receive
positive interest rate so that their consumption is not constant. Other implications
include tax role on consumption, access to borrowing facility and savings related to
consumption smoothing.
2.4 Access to Finance in Developing Countries
Households have to face with various constraints when they have to make economic
decisions. Constraints on consumption can be classified into labour, income, wealth,
price and environmental constraint (see Magrabi et al., 1991). Most of these factors
are highly associated with financial markets. In terms of income, households receive
their income in the forms of earnings, interest, rent, pension, dividend through finan-
cial system, which correlated highly with financial policy such as savings rate and
interest rates. Financial institutions also facilitate households to accumulate their
wealth through financial assets, which increase their consumption during their lifes-
pan.
Many consumption theories such as permanent income and life cycle hypothesis
heavily rely on the households’ ability to access financial markets where borrowing
and lending activities exist to facilitate consumption smoothing. The existence of fi-
nancial markets and institutions in an economy is also necessary to reduce and lessen
the effects of asymmetric information and transaction costs. Therefore, households
and other economic agents have benefitted from using financial services by channel-
ing funds for productive activities. Further, this will boost economic growth, lessen
poverty and improve income equality.
There is a difference between developed countries and the rest of world mainly
developing countries in terms of income and consumption. Moreover, it is important to
define developing countries. Since welfare is also closely related to household income,
it is much easier to classify countries based on national income. According to World
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Bank (2012), developing countries include low- and middle-income economies. For
year 2010, low- and middle-income countries are those with a gross national income
(GNI) per capita of $1,005 or less and of more than $1,005 but less than $12,276
respectively.
In order to improve household welfare and income equality, access to finance is
very essential for households. Access to finance, which is also referred as financial
inclusion, can be interpreted as the accessibility and utilisation of financial resources
in economy by households and other economic agents in the absence of price and non-
price barriers. The fact is the access to finance varies across countries where most
obstacles to finance access can be found in developing countries. It is necessary to
gain an adequate understanding about social, economic and financial environments
which will help to gain deeper comprehension on household welfare. This section aims
is to provide an understanding about social and economic features that characterise
many developing countries with regard to financial development.
2.4.1 Inefficient Financial and Labour Markets
Nowadays, the number of financial services through private sector such as microfi-
nance institutions is increasing. Microcredit markets, which are served by this kind
of institution, are growing in many developing countries. This shows that there is de-
mand of financial market for poor people. For example in India and Bangladesh, cred-
its or loans are given mainly to women and micro entrepreneurs who work on joint
liability between group members. Fernando (2007) argues that there are five aspects
that are demanded by households on access and services from the financial markets:
(1) safe and convenient deposit facilities, (2) credit with lower transaction costs and
at reasonable prices for different product needs, (3) payment and money transfer, (4)
microinsurance products, and (5) financial literacy services for low-income people.
Ljungqvist (1993) argues that the underdevelopment in low income and develop-
ing countries is also characterised by a low ratio of physical capital stock, a low level
of gross domestic product, a high ratio of unskilled labour, a high return on human
capital, and large wage discrepancy between unskilled and skilled labour. The last
three aspects are related to labour market. Since households have no or small sur-
plus from their labour income, people get involved in a trade or exchange to market
their farming or home production surplus. However, this occurs at irregular periods
and in a small scale.
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Households also make investment in various types, which often constitute low
capital, for example livestock breeding or self establishment of house for dwelling.
These investments may include no or small amount of monetary expenditure which
may sometimes be ignored in some economic surveys which may in turn ignored by
some policy makers and economists in dealing with poverty reduction.
Furthermore, the problem faced by households in developing countries mainly re-
lated in three problems: poor health and education, social exclusion, and insecurity.
Health and education are important factors that pin down the opportunity of employ-
ment, which in turn related to labour wage and income determination. Ranis et al.
(2000) find that human development which include expenditures on public health and
education have a significant relationship with economic growth.
Households may also experience social exclusion. Social exclusion can be defined
to those people who have disadvantage in accessing social institutions and relations,
which detach them from normal participation in the society or community. Akerlof
and Kranton (2000) argue that social exclusion is close to poverty. The difference is
that social exclusion focuses on the relational issues, while poverty is related to dis-
tributional problems. Social exclusion can take place in two forms: access to labour
market, and opportunity for social services and participation. Moreover, social ex-
clusion affects a person’s identity which in turn alter the economic outcome. This
implies that households who are socially excluded may not be able to easily inter-
act with other households, particularly activities which are related to monetary or
financial transactions.
2.4.2 Financial Contracting
In credit markets, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) initiate credit rationing analysis in gen-
eral equilibrium framework. Rationing in a simple understanding is a condition
where price mechanism does not prevail to drive the supply and demand equilibrium.
In many developing countries, informal financial institutions engage in financial con-
tracting with mostly low-income households due to comparative advantage in terms
of monitoring and enforcement capacity. The monitoring is known as peer monitoring
where it exploits information between individuals or households. Since it is based on
well-informed group interactions, contracts can be enforced between group members
where any breaches in contracts may results in social pressures or sanctions.
Furthermore, a study by Townsend and Urzua (2009) show the relationship be-
tween contract theory and financial intermediation through econometric policy eval-
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uation, particularly alleviation of credit constraints based on occupational choice and
risk allocation. This paper shows how contract theory can be analysed empirically
under different economic models. They argue that economic researchers and decision
makers need to make a clear understanding on the role of unobserved heterogene-
ity and underlying assumptions on individual endogenous decisions. Because various
economic models available are related to financial and economic policy, a careful se-
lection and meticulous interpretation on the models would result to better economic
policy formulation.
2.4.3 Transaction Costs
Whenever households enter financial contracts, transaction costs such as exchang-
ing goods and services, information costs, and contract enforcement, incur. However,
the transaction cost as an approach goes beyond costs. Transaction cost framework
puts more emphasis on the role of institutions in complex and long-term relationship
arrangement which focuses on three dimensions: asset specificity, uncertainty and
frequency (see Steer and Sen, 2010). This approach is widely used to analyse the
theory of production and firm behaviour, yet there is a few attention on household
behaviour.
Pollak (1985) argues that there are two implications when this approach is used
to analyse households and families. First, the transaction cost approach elucidates
activities conducted by households given their incentives to perform efforts and mon-
itoring issue. Second, it clarifies allocation and distribution of resources within and
between households when they enter binding contract with institutions.
There are two competing view with regard to high transaction costs in financial
markets (see Henley and Boomgaard, 2009). The first view argues that informal fi-
nancial arrangement mostly from moneylenders provides efficient financial services.
The high interest rate is a result due to high uncertainty and transaction costs for
small loans for poor households. This explains why some microfinance institutions
are able to succeed because they are not constrained by their access to capital com-
pare to formal financial institutions.
On the contrary, a high interest rate is an implication of the fact that informal
financial providers behave under “monopolistic competition”. The advantage is due to
trusted borrower history, well-informed and exclusive transactions. Therefore under
these conditions, these institutions are able to charge high interest rates to house-
holds.
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In doing financial transactions, households may engage in two different types of
contracts, which have different implications. Short-term contracts may be benefi-
cial in a short period but may put households in a hazardous state. In this context,
short-term contracts refer to contracts with short duration which also require fre-
quent renegotiation (see Pollak, 1985). It is difficult for households to accumulate
capital under this contract and therefore discourage investment in specific capital.
Renewing the contracts or writing long-term contracts can solve such problem.
However, contract renewal may also give other problems such as negotiation and mon-
itoring. Complete long-term contracts may also be costly since it is impossible to write
under perfect information. Having these difficulties, the incomplete contracts arise,
transaction costs become very essential feature to write these contracts and influence
household decisions on savings and investment (see Levine, 1997).
In summary, transaction costs as a part of market frictions can bring difficulties
for households to smooth their consumption. Furthermore, this will impede finan-
cial markets and intermediaries particularly formal institutions, which in turn affect
capital accumulation and technological innovation.
2.4.4 Savings and Liquidity Constraints
Levine (1997) defines liquidity as the ease and speed where households or any eco-
nomic agents are able to convert their assets into purchasing power at specific price.
However, due to asymmetric information and transaction costs, households may find
these factors restrain their liquidity and therefore amplify the liquidity risk. By of-
fering a contract, financial institutions ideally facilitate households to reduce the liq-
uidity problems.
In developing countries, this condition is also followed by low opportunity of good
saving instruments (Besley, 1995). This facility is restricted because of price fluctua-
tions in many basic foods and commodities, which implies that the price has become
a source of risk. In economic terms, this will make monetary savings difficult. As a
result, the holding of household assets has become an alternative for saving instru-
ments.
Another possible explanation of low level of savings is the social issue such as
family and social obligation, which makes savings in formal institutions unattractive.
However, it cannot be said that savings are no longer important. Savings are still able
to provide limited protection for potential risk events.
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2.5 Household and Risk Management
Each and every household have different ways to protect themselves against risk and
uncertainty in their life. However, this is heavily affected by various social and eco-
nomic characteristics. Besley (1995) argues that the main difference between people
in rich and developing countries is the importance of risk for their daily lives which
is characterised by limited access to credit and insurance market, weak law enforce-
ment, and poor physical infrastructure.
2.5.1 Definition and Sources of Risk
Risk and uncertainty have always been substantial parts of human life. One choice
made by an economic agent comes with uncertainty of consequences in the future
and every consequence has its own risk. Knight (1921) distinguishes the term “risk”
and “uncertainty”. Risk can be defined as a quantifiable uncertainty measure, while
uncertainty is difficult to be quantified by any means. Moreover, risk is defined as a
state of uncertainty where the occurrence of relevant events may give undesired or
unexpected loss. Uncertainty is characterized by limited knowledge of an economic
agent to these events and its outcomes.
Risk in terms of economics is usually related to negative shocks or losses. For
households, the large risk may come in the form of consumption shocks or fluctua-
tions, which is caused by declining income or other household variables such as the
health of family member. Households as economic agents are often assumed to have
perfect foresight of future consumption by conducting transactions with others. Un-
der different assumptions of markets, negative shocks may not necessarily become
welfare losses if they can find ways to smooth consumption.
In many developing countries, risk and uncertainty emerges from social and eco-
nomic environment such as natural hazards, price fluctuation, unstable political envi-
ronment and conflicts. Changes in government policies such as market liberalisation
and privatisation may also generates problems and increase vulnerability. House-
holds also have specific or idiosyncratic risks for example family illness, death, and
crop loss for agriculture households. These risks may lead to declining household wel-
fare. Based on Holden et al. (1991), Ellis (1998), and Banerjee and Duflo (2007), the
sources of risk for household can be classified into:
1. Commodity price risk. This risk includes any changes in commodity prices and
market, which affect household consumption and production activities for exam-
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ple agricultural inputs and labour costs. Price variability of inputs influences
agricultural households to produce adequate farming outputs, which tend to in-
crease the cost of production. In many cases, some households may not produce
at all. In consumption, price variability of staple foods such as rice, corn, and
soybean, affects the consumption pattern in particular to fulfil adequate amount
of nutrition for household members.
2. Disaster risk. This risk comprises natural events or causes such floods, earth-
quakes, and other natural hazards that affect household production, housing or
dwelling, and environmental damage. Households in stricken areas may find it
difficult to recover fully and become more vulnerable and have a higher proba-
bility of being poor in the future.
3. Climate risk. This risk is related to changing in global climate particularly
global warming which leads to uncertainty of production or farming schedule.
Climate change effects in many developing countries take place in terms of de-
clining crops due to unirrigated yields. The most important agricultural prod-
ucts such as wheat, rice, and soybeans suffer from the increasing in price level,
which in turn induce food insecurity, and high level of meat consumption. For
households, the negative impacts of such events can be found in the health as-
pect and well-being of family members particularly children.
4. Income risk. This risk can be defined as a deviation of income flow from expected
future income path. In this context, income consists of all revenue received by
households, which includes earnings from labour service, gain from investment
and asset sales. The source of income risk is mainly from the labour market.
For each occupational type, it has it own idiosyncratic risk called as earnings
risk. The extreme case of income risk is unemployment risk which refers to
a condition where a person is not able to find a job, or loses the current job.
Household circumstances may worsen if the one who is unemployed is the head
of household. The cause may not be only come from individual workers such
as incompatible skills and requirement, but also from external factors such as
economic recession and business shut downs.
5. Death risk. This risk can be defined as the loss of one or more family members
which often associated with high costs. The worst case is that the one who dies
is the head of the household or the breadwinner. If this happens, the way of
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family living will be affected. In many developing and less developed countries
where many workers are not protected by insurance and social security, losing
important family members leads to higher level of household vulnerability. The
family is not only coping with grief and depression, but also have to cope with
losing the main source of income for the family.
6. Health risk. This risk can be defined as a condition where one or more family
members suffer from critical illness which may lead to an increase in family
health expenditure. Similar to death risk, the worst thing happens when the
head of household or the breadwinner is ill and unable to work. Another case
would be if one or more family members have disability or critical illness, which
incur huge amount of health costs. In summary, health risk is associated with
low level of household productivity, which leads to lower level of household wel-
fare.
7. Social risk. This risk is related to social relationships and networks. In times
when hardship emerges, households may need and seek for assistances or sup-
ports from their relatives and friends through different mechanisms such struc-
tured group, society or village association or workplace community. One well-
known example for this is Rosca (rotating savings and credit association) where
a group of individuals agrees to save and borrow between members for defined
periods. However, in recent years many of these networks and groups have been
broke down due to economic development, which affect less social cohesiveness
between individuals or households.
8. Political risk. This risk includes the changes in government policies and political
conditions. In some countries, this comprises armed conflicts that lead to politi-
cal instability. Changes in government regime are usually followed by changes
of government policies. Along with political disability, changes in policies have
significant effects on households’ asset allocation and welfare.
9. Financial risk. This risk related to the changes in economic conditions and fi-
nancial markets which influence households’ decision on savings, credit, insur-
ance, and retirement. Households need to access financial institutions to help
mitigate large and detrimental shocks. In developed countries, the problems
largely arise because households have huge debts in financial systems, which
lead to insolvency and defaults. However, in less developed economy where
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access to finance is limited, many households turn to informal moneylenders
where usually charge higher interest rates than formal financial institutions.
2.5.2 Risk Management
Households’ inability to manage risks may lead to vulnerability. Siegel and Alwang
(1999) argue that household vulnerability to various risk exposure has vicious cy-
cle. With inadequate access to finance, households in particular the have-nots find
themselves in limited asset base which lead to inefficient allocation of assets. If this
happens then the assets would yield low returns and therefore influence their con-
sumptions, savings and investment and finally a decrease in their asset base.
Risk management process includes identifying, measuring, estimating and miti-
gating risk exposure. Risk management in household level can be defined as a set of
mechanisms utilised by households to manage anticipated and unanticipated losses
due to related uncertainty and risks. These mechanisms affect household welfare
through income and consumption channel. Since households’ inability to access for-
mal financial institutions and services, formal risk management tools such as in-
surance products and formal credits, have become costly and unattainable for such
households.
Another arrangement that may be available is social risk management. Social
risk management comprises policies and programs intended to help poor or nearly
poor people (see Holzmann and Jørgensen, 2001). In many countries, social risk man-
agement is closely related to poverty alleviation programs, which vary according to
the nature of risks, household responses, and social implications. The risk manage-
ment includes intervention to labor market, social safety nets, and social insurance.
However, in many cases social security or protection is limited or even not available
for them. Therefore, households rely on informal insurance mechanisms such as so-
cial networks and kinship to cope and mitigate such idiosyncratic risks.
Table 2.1 provides four approaches that are commonly used by households as a
response to risks and uncertainty. The first approach is called as risk mitigation,
which refers to the use of formal financial instruments as risk mitigation tools. In
other words, households try to mitigate the risks to other parties. In this approach,
financial institutions both formal and informal play vital role in providing products
and services to households mainly for consumption smoothing.
The second approach is risk reduction where households try to lessen the level of
frequency or severity of unpredicted events usually by optimising efforts or physical
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activities such as new technology adoption and migration. In this approach, financial
institutions may not have important role for household.
The third approach is called risk coping where households tend to spontaneously
respond to the risk events. Household may not aware of unexpected risk. The problem
may become worse if they do not enough “buffer” to anticipate against huge loss.
The last approach is called risk sharing which can be defined as sharing the bur-
den of loss with other parties or individuals. This can be also sharing the benefits if
the arrangement includes some productive activities.
Some strategy of household risk management may fall into more than one ap-
proach. For example, private transfers within family, which can be classified as
risk sharing within a household or intrahousehold risk sharing. Another example
is Roscas that can be classified as informal insurance between households in a com-
munity or village. This can be classified as risk mitigation if it includes credits or
loans.
2.5.3 Risk Sharing
As a human being, one individual lives and interacts with other people as family,
friends, co-workers, or relatives. Whenever access to finance is none or limited and
household risk is inevitable, mutual assistance between households, friends and other
people cannot be neglected. This assistance can be formed in different level from
family or friends to village level. The simple risk sharing may take place within a
family. That is why Fafchamps (2011) called households as the first port of call for
risk sharing.
Risk sharing as a financial arrangement can lower transaction costs and therefore
facilitates greater specialisation. It can be also defined as a set of transfer between
households who have direct relationships in the social networks in all states of the
world (see Ambrus et al., 2014). Since it lies beyond formal financial institutions, it
is often classified as non-market arrangements or mechanisms. Early development of
risk sharing arrangement can be found in sharecropping or agricultural contracting
(see Besley, 1995; Stiglitz, 1974). Risk sharing works on the premise of mutuality
principle which is defined as an efficient allocation of risk that requires only aggre-
gate risk be borne by its members and all idiosyncratic risk is mitigated by mutual
insurance between members (see Lengwiler, 2004). This principle is based on the
Borch’s rule (1962) which states that risk sharing exists when the ratio of marginal
utilities of income is constant across all dates and states of the world.
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Table 2.1
Existing Literature on Household Risk Management
Risk mitigation is defined as households’ efforts to transfer the risk to other entities mainly formal
and informal financial institutions. Risk reduction is defined as households’ actions that can decrease
or lessen the likelihood of risk occurrence. Risk coping takes place when households try to accept
and bear the risk and will act accordingly after the risk event occurs. Risk sharing can be defined
as ex-ante efforts by households to share the risk by doing arrangement with other households or
entities.
Approach Strategy Related research
Risk mitigation
Asset − Portfolio adjustment Campbell (2006), Betermier et al. (2012).
management −Hold financial and/or Udry (1995), Lusardi (1998) Guariglia (2001),
non financial assets Benito and Saleheen (2013), Deidda (2014).
Credit − Formal and informal Besley and Coate (1995),
credit contracts Kochar (1997), Ghosh et al. (2001).
−Credit associations Okten and Osili (2004), Steer and Sen (2010),
and savings clubs Karlan and Zinman (2008).
Insurance − Formal and informal Udry (1994), Besley and Coate (1995),
insurance LeMay-Boucher (2012).
Risk reduction − Investment for physical Glewwe (1991), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993),
asset protection Dercon (1998), Campbell (2006).
−New technology adoption Arrau et al. (1995), Banerjee and Duflo (2007).
− Permanent migration Halliday (2006).
Risk coping −Asset liquidation Morduch (1995), Skoufias (1995), Ellis (1998).
− Self-production and under- Dercon (1998), Gertler and Gruber (2002).
employed asset utilisation
−Remittances, charity, Fafchamps and Lund (2003), Crayen et al. (2013),
and transfers Arezki and Brückner (2012).
− Illegal activities Feige (1990).
Risk sharing − Intrahousehold and Altonji et al. (1992), Hayashi et al. (1996),
extended family Cox and Fafchamps (2007), Witoelar (2013).
− Informal insurance Hayashi et al. (1996), Barr et al. (2012),
between households Fafchamps and Lund (2003), Ambrus et al. (2014).
−Community insurance Coate and Ravallion (1993), Townsend (1994),
pooling Ranis et al. (2000), Grootaert and Narayan (2004),
Ligon et al. (2002), Okten and Osili (2004).
When risk sharing arrangement exists, insurance and credit becomes strongly re-
lated. Within this arrangement, credit is functioning as a substitute to insurance
where a household is able to borrow for consumption smoothing. Moreover, the dis-
tinction becomes really unclear when households who serve as lenders are willing to
lend for those who need loans whenever unexpected events arise. And more impor-
tantly, the transactions between households within this arrangement are becoming
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increasingly complicated when the contracts are incomplete which is usually followed
by enforcement problems.
There are two advantages of using risk sharing groups or networks over formal or
market-based financial institutions. The first advantage is known as peer monitoring
(see Stiglitz, 1990). Individuals who live in the same area such as villages or com-
munities and have known each other for quite long time usually form risk sharing
arrangement. Since members are well informed about other members in the group,
it is difficult for those who want to shirk such arrangement. Given moral hazard and
adverse selection issues, any shirking in contractual agreement would usually have
results in social actions against such individuals.
The second advantage is contract enforcement which is related to peer monitor-
ing. The individuals will be punished whenever they do not honour a stipulated obli-
gation despite the contracts are not written or violated. The sanctions may not only
be monetary but also social pressure due to the household immobility and repetitive
arrangements.
Risk sharing is considered as a crucial component of household welfare and eco-
nomic growth. In order to understand risk sharing in developing countries, Besley
(1995) classifies risk sharing methodology into deductive and inductive approaches.
He also argues that there is a trade-off between them.
An inductive approach starts with empirical observations and then continued by
developing a theoretical model, which explain the risk sharing rule. Such approach
can be found for example in Stiglitz (1974) on agricultural arrangement, Udry (1994)
on informal credit markets in Nigeria, and Fafchamps and Lund (2003) on rural
households in the Philippines. The critic to inductive approach is that it tends to
focus on the reality of limited information and the imperfections of government and
markets, but theoretically lack of explanation about inefficient institutions and exter-
nalities. The end results are often inefficient risk sharing.
Inspired by mechanism design, a deductive approach starts with establishing indi-
vidual’s preferences and production technologies within a group with a set of feasible
outcomes given a set of informational and enforcement constraints. The theoretical
allocations are derived and then compared to the real world observation. The theoret-
ical approach is proposed by Harris and Townsend (1981) with empirical application
mostly related to Townsend’s works on India and Thailand. This approach offers the
possibility of deriving institutions’ optimal conditions from the underlying preferences
and technologies as a response to an economic condition. The critic to this approach
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is that it does not have adequate theory to explain why the second-best planning ap-
plication can solved in the design problem and how it should correspond to the real
world. In many studies, these methodologies have become complementary.
In terms of empirical approach, there are three type of risk sharing tests, which
usually applied to micro level data of income and consumption or expenditure. Based
on mutuality principle, the first type of risk sharing test is examining the change
of consumption dispersion. This test can be found for example in Townsend (1994).
The risk sharing is examined by controlling for aggregate shocks where individual
consumption should not depend on idiosyncratic or individual shocks. Efficient risk
sharing exists if idiosyncratic risk is not significantly related to consumption given
aggregate shock. Similar test can be found in Attanasio and Davis (1996) where they
investigate co-movement between income and consumption using the U.S. household
data.
Using the same principle, the second type of risk sharing test is known as Euler
equation test proposed by Cochrane (1991). The marginal utility of current consump-
tion and the expected marginal utility of future consumption is derived from Euler
equation given information available at present time. The efficient risk sharing ex-
ists if the ratio of marginal utility between current and future consumption should be
independent to individual shocks in current date.
To see how the second type can be derived, suppose a closed economy with N
households that have an intertemporal utility for household i can be written as fol-
lows:
EU =
∞∑
t=0
βt
S∑
s=1
pistU
(
csit
)
(2.6)
where β is a (common) discount factor, pist is probability of state s that occur at date t,
and csit is household i’s consumption at date t and the presence of state s. Households
are assumed to live infinitely. Problem faced by a social planner is a maximisation
problem with weighted sum of households’ utilities can be written as follows:
max
∑
i
$i
∞∑
t=0
βt
S∑
τ=1
pistU
(
csit
)
(2.7)
where $i indicates the Pareto weights that can be determined by the relative wealth
of household at the beginning. These weights are utility aggregating devices and
describe the importance of each household’s utility to aggregate household utilities.
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Equation (2.7) indicates the utility of household without any insurance. This also
generates the Pareto-optimal allocations by introducing constraints into the problem,
at each date and in each state:
F si,t+1 = (1+R)F sit+ ysit− csit
F si,t+1 ≥ 0,Fit is given
(2.8)
where R is the real interest rate, ysit is household i’s income, and F
s
it is household
i’s financial assets. All variables are at date t and state s. These constraints imply
that household’s current consumption is limited by the proceeds of their income and
wealth.
Households are also able to borrow which the debt cannot exceed their assets and
income. The liquidity constraint is indicated by F si,t+1 ≥ 0 which restrict households
from consuming their current proceeds from supplying their labour service in the next
period.
Following Zeldes (1989) and Matsumoto (2006), the first-order condition combined
with liquidity constraints is:
U ′
(
csit
)=E t [U ′ (csi,t+1) (1+R)β]+ µ˜st (2.9)
where µ˜st denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with liquidity constraints for
household i and U ′
(
csit
)
denotes the marginal utility of household consumption. The
expectations are assumed to be rational. An increase in µ˜ indicates an increase in the
expected utility with respect to current constraint by one unit.
The term µ˜ in (2.9) can be interpreted as an indicator for negative welfare effect if
liquidity constraints exist. When a household has a constraint from more borrowing
than saving, the term µ˜ shows a positive sign. Therefore, when µ˜ is equal to zero,
then there is no borrowing constraint. This implies that current consumption will be
lower than it would have been without such constraints. The term µ˜′sit is normalised
by
µ˜i
E t
[
(1+R)βU ′ (csit)] .
Equation (2.9) is rewritten as
(1+R)βE t
U ′
(
csi,t+1
)
U ′
(
csit
)
(1+ µ˜′sit)= 1. (2.10)
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Using rational expectations, equation (2.10) implies
(1+R)βE t
U ′
(
csi,t+1
)
U ′
(
csit
)
(1+ µ˜′sit)= 1+²i,t+1 (2.11)
where ²i,t+1 is an expectational error which has zero mean and is uncorrelated with
the information available at date t. Assuming constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
with positive common risk
U (c)= c
1−γ
1−γ exp(θxit) ,
the equation (2.11) becomes
(1+R)β
(
csi,t+1
csit
)−γ
exp
(
θ
(
xi,t+1− xit
))(
1+ µ˜′sit
)= 1+²it (2.12)
where θxit is the taste shifter as a function of household characteristics.
The consumption equation is derived from equation (2.12) by taking log differences
on both sides and aggregation over households, which can be written as follows:
∆ ln ci,t+1 = 1N
∑
i
∆ ln ci,t+1+ 1
γ
θ
(
∆xi,t+1− 1N
∑
i
∆xi,t+1
)
+ 1
γ
[
ln(1+R)+ lnβ+ ln(1+ µ˜′it)+ ln(1+²i,t+1)]
(2.13)
The common terms, 1N
∑
i∆ ln ci,t+1 and 1N
∑
i∆xi,t+1 can be replaced by community-
time dummy (αt+1). The discount factor and interest rate are assumed to be a function
of a vector of time invariant characteristics (fixed effect), zi.
Since ln
(
1+²i,t+1
)
does not have zero mean, the expectation error term becomes
ln
(
1+²i,t+1
)≈ ²i,t+1− 12²2i,t+1 by applying a second order Taylor expansion. Therefore,
(2.13) can be written:
∆ ln ci,t+1 =αt+1+φ∆xi,t+1+ϕzi+ 1
γ
ln
(
1+ µ˜′it
)+εi,t+1 (2.14)
where φ = 1
γ
θ, ϕ = 1
γ
and εi,t+1 = 1γ [− ln
(
1+²i,t+1
)− 12σ2e,i,t+1]. The term µ˜′it is renor-
malised by transforming into
(
1+ µ˜′it
) 1
γ ≡ 1+µit.
Now, the change in consumption is given by ∆ ln cit =∆ ln yit. The actual change in
log of consumption falls in a value between Equation (2.14) and ∆yit. By introducing
2.6 Summary 33
community k, Equation (2.14) becomes:
∆ ln cik,t+1 =αk,t+1+ψ∆ ln yik,t+1+φ∆xik,t+1+ϕzhk+υik,t+1 (2.15)
where υi,t+1 ≡ εi,t+1+ ln
(
1+µit
)
.
Under efficient risk sharing hypothesis, equation (2.15) is expected to have unity
for coefficient α and zero for coefficient ψ. If the risk sharing is not efficient, then
the coefficient ψ should be different from zero. This means that the change of con-
sumption of a household is expected to be equal with the average of households in the
community. Furthermore, the residual υi,t+1 which contain the Lagrange multiplier
and the disturbance term with zero mean, will give inference about the liquidity con-
straints. However, this model only shows how households may be constrained under
the condition of imperfect credit markets.
In summary, it is important to note that such arrangement like risk sharing usu-
ally do not have adequate quantitative information. The future challenge of risk
sharing study as suggested by Townsend (1995) and Besley (1995) is on the empir-
ical application of risk sharing theory. In other words, the data become really matter
to confront predictions derived from risk sharing theory.
2.6 Summary
This chapter lays foundation for this study that involves household welfare mainly in
developing economy with regard to financial development and inclusion. In assess-
ing financial inclusion, many studies combine data from existing household surveys
and macro economic variables in the absence of comprehensive household financial
information. However, there are few studies that classify different type of credit con-
straints or rationing. Furthermore, the impacts of financial exclusion should be also
assessed and estimated with respect to household welfare.
There are four broad categories of risk management instruments that can be use
by households: risk mitigation, risk reduction, risk coping and risk sharing. Initially,
households always try to protect themselves by creating “buffer” against risk and un-
certainty through their savings and asset accumulation. This approach is inadequate
due to huge severity or loss from economic or idiosyncratic causes. There is need to
investigate how savings and labour supply can play pivotal role in household’s self-
insurance.
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When access to finance is none or limited and self-insurance is inadequate, house-
holds may share their risks between their families or with other households. The
main contribution here is to study insurance problems and group formation that arise
in risk sharing arrangement and then put it into empirical context for Indonesian
households given financial exclusion and inadequate self-insurance.
Chapter 3
Finance and Economic Development in
Indonesia: A Household Perspective
3.1 Introduction
Finance plays an important role in economic development in many countries. An early
work which emphasises the role of finance by Gurley and Shaw (1955) states that
economic changes and development analysis relies heavily on a set of social accounts
such as net worth of income, saving, consumption, and wealth accumulation. This role
also includes the degree and quantity of financial intermediary within an economy.
They argue that economic development is retarded if households and firms are only
able to access self-finance and direct finance or direct borrowing from surplus units to
deficit units. Therefore, financial intermediaries evolve to provide better access and
foster economic welfare and development.
To empirically examine financial intermediaries’ roles, adequate data or infor-
mation is needed, particularly studies which emphasise household financial aspects.
Many empirical studies in credit and insurance markets extensively utilise household
surveys to examine household financial behaviour (for example see Jappelli, 1990;
Mace, 1991; Zeldes, 1989). However, the absence of comprehensive micro data can
become obstacles in understanding households’ financial behaviour. Demirgüç-Kunt
et al. (2008) documented various surveys on finance development and found that the
obstacles can be eliminated by combining existing surveys with macro data.
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Since my study focuses on Indonesian households, it is necessary to provide rele-
vant information about the Indonesian economy and about households. This chapter
aims to provide an overview of the main issues concerning Indonesia’s economy and
issues relating to household finance with respect to the data set used in the study.
In particular, the objective here is to explore and briefly discuss relevant household
economic and financial data for the study.
The content is as follows. Section 3.2 provides the highlights of finance develop-
ment in Indonesia. Section 3.3 describes the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS)
data set along with comparison to Indonesian census data and household character-
istics. IFLS data is utilised for Chapter 5 and 6. Section 3.4 provides explanation
about the Access to Finance (A2F) survey which has more detailed information on
financial-related variables which are employed in Chapter 4. Section 3.5 discusses
general issues in financial development in Indonesia. The last section summarises.
3.2 Finance and Economic Highlights
A modern stage in Indonesia’s financial system emerged in the 1900s during the last
stages of the Dutch occupation. Since it was developed by the Dutch, the objective of
the system focused mainly on the support of the commercial interests of the colonial
government. However, there were some social programs to serve the rural popula-
tions. After Indonesian Independence and the end of World War II in 1945, economic
development was slow, not started until the 1950’s. However, from 1950 until 1966,
the financial system was repressed by Sukarno government policies. The policy mak-
ing was very centralised and the financial system was badly damage. Because of this
financial repression, the economy deteriorated resulting in hyperinflation and socio-
economic problems that lasted until 1966.
Post 1966, under the Suharto regime, the financial sector began to develop char-
acterised by new financial policies and instruments. Between 1966 and 1972, the
financial sector was rapidly developed as a response to the stagnancy and devasta-
tion of the previous regime. In this period, however, the development relied heavily
on the banking sector while other financial sectors were growing more slowly. In the
next decade when the “oil boom” took place, the government pushed financial activity
into the fiscal sector and offshore financial institutions. The activity shift was also in-
fluenced by an expansion of economic opportunity in the private sector. However, the
efforts to promote new financial markets such as capital markets were not effective
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in fostering economic growth. By the end of 1982, state-owned or government-owned
banks dominated the banking system holding 80% of market share.
In 1983, when the oil price began to fall significantly, the government changed
economic policy. The changes included many aspects such as trade policy, govern-
ment expenditure and planning, and banking. In 1988, the government launched an
economic policy package which is considered the most liberal policy yet. The policy
removed restrictions on opening new banks: this also enabled foreign banks to enter
the Indonesian banking system. The loans grew aggressively which triggered high
economic growth in Indonesia. However, many banks retained very low capital re-
serves which was not in line with good banking practice. In 1991, government issued
new policies which focused on strengthening bank supervision, following the serious
effects of 1988 policy; problems included foreign exchange frauds, bank scandals, and
bankruptcy. In 1992, a new law on banking, insurance and pensions was established,
indicating new directions towards a modern financial system. This soon was followed
by the Capital Market Law in 1995. During this period, Indonesia was considered
as a new emerging economic country whose finance sector played an important role
following rapid and aggressive growth between 1984 and 1996. This is depicted in
Figure 3.A.1. More importantly, this expansion took place after the oil boom.
In 1997, as the currency crisis started in Thailand, the effect spread out to its
neighbouring countries including Indonesia. The value of Indonesia’s currency against
the U.S. dollar fell sharply from 2,436 as of July 1997 to 16,800 in mid-1998 (see
Thomas and Frankenberg, 2007). The problem was due to the fixed exchange rate
system adopted by the Indonesia government. However, much of the problem was
exacerbated by a huge amount of foreign borrowing by the private sector (see Mat-
sumoto, 2007). The interest rates on one-month SBI (Sertifikat Bank Indonesia or
Bank Indonesia Certificates) which serves as a benchmark rate rose to 67% in mid
1998, followed by the rise in unemployment rate which was around 15% and the real
wage rate fall approximately 40% since the crisis started. However, it was revealed
that the banking sector was still very fragile due not only to offshore financing but
also because of a fundamentally weak financial system. The financial crises became
a macroeconomic crisis where the unemployment rate was very high and was also
followed by high inflation rate. During the 1997-98 economic crisis, the deposit rates
were higher than lending rates implying difficulty to attract people’s money into the
financial system as depicted in Figure 3.A.2. During this period, the high level of
lending rate shows a reluctance for the financial system to provide an intermediary
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function. As the financial sector weakened, interest rates decreased rapidly and the
inflation rate soared higher (see right panel of Figure 3.A.2).
There are interesting facts about saving rates in aggregate level for Indonesia
since 1960. Figure 3.A.3 provides saving rates for Indonesia with its neighbouring
countries; these are emerging economies like Southeast Asian countries, India and
China, and developed economies like Japan and South Korea. The saving rates for
Indonesia have decreasing trends between 1960 and 2010 while other countries except
the Philippines have increasing trends for the same period. Only the Philippines and
India have average saving rates lower than Indonesia.
Saving can be considered as one important factor of economic growth. China, for
example, has one of the highest levels of saving rate in the world (see Kraay, 2000).
Saving can support the economic growth which has an important role in shaping eco-
nomic transition from an agricultural-based economy to a more market oriented econ-
omy like China. At an institutional level, this is backed by the proliferation of bank
branches and other financial institutions which give households more motivation to
save and accumulate their wealth.
The saving rates for Indonesia increased for the first decade of the Soeharto era
due to the “oil boom”. Since it was triggered by the oil exports, it was also ended
when the oil price declined in the 1980’s. During the financial deregulation when the
government launched its economic package in 1982, the saving rates were steadily
increasing due to financial expansion. As the government launched another economic
policy in 1988, the saving rates declined and continued to do so until the Asian fi-
nancial crisis struck. During the Asian financial crisis, the saving rates for Indonesia
were the lowest amongst countries that were heavily affected such as Malaysia, Thai-
land and South Korea. These countries were able to maintain the steady saving rate
to support the economic growth. For Indonesia, however, the saving rates declined to
the same level as at the end of “oil boom” era and have never fully recovered.
3.3 Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS)
In many developing countries, highly accurate and precise data on households are
hard to find. Moreover, the data becomes difficult if sample households are retained
from time to time as in the PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) in the United
States or the BHPS (British Household Panel Survey) in the United Kingdom. The
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Indonesia Family Life Survey, or IFLS, can be considered as one of its kind but it has
fewer time observations.
IFLS data are gathered and organised by the RAND Corporation and some In-
donesian institutions, from the first wave until the latest. These longitudinal surveys
consist of two levels: community and household surveys, where the latter can be de-
composed into individual and family samples. There are four waves so far: IFLS1
in 1993 (Frankenberg and Karoly, 1995), IFLS2 in 1997 (Frankenberg and Thomas,
2000), IFLS3 in 2000 (Strauss et al., 2004b), and IFLS4 in 2007 (Strauss et al., 2009).
3.3.1 Survey Methodology
Samples were taken from 13 provinces on the islands of Java, Sumatra, Bali, West
Nusa Tenggara, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. These islands represent 83 percent of
the population. Figure 3.B.1 presents the selected provinces where the surveys were
conducted. The surveys were classified into two levels: community and household
surveys. The samples were selected from the Susenas 1993 or 1993 socioeconomic
survey which consists of 60,000 households.
The surveys cover 7,224 households for the first wave and maintains around 90
percent of its samples until the latest survey wave in 2007. The latest survey con-
sists of 12,977 samples. The respondents were selected using stratified sampling on
province level and random sampling on district level with certain sampling rules such
as age, ethnicity and other demographic characteristics.
Various detailed information which describes the circumstances of the family as
a whole can be classified into four broad categories: (1) fertility and family planning,
(2) infant and child health, (3) employment, migration, and education, and (4) social,
economic, and health status of young, adults, and old people.
The interviews were conducted with relevant household members with respect to
questionnaire modules on the household’s characteristics and conditions. For exam-
ple, the wife or the female head of the household was selected to give information
about household consumption, income, health, and family planning. For other in-
formation such as employment, household asset, saving, education and community
participation, some members of the household including the head will be asked to
give responses.
The community or village data in the IFLS give some advantages, particularly in
analysing the social and economic environment where a household lives. For example,
a village is considered as a risk sharing unit or network (for example see Fafchamps
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and Lund, 2003; Ligon et al., 2002; Townsend, 1994). The problem may arise if a
household is directly assigned to a specific village identifier. The official IFLS data
release does not indicate the village where a household lives. However, this can be
managed by linking IFLS individual and household data with IFLS community data
using the specific identifier (commid) making a household can be easily tractable.
The surveys were taken in different economic periods that are quite interesting to
study. The first wave was taken in 1993 when Indonesia was in economic boom. In
this period, the financial sector was liberated while at the same time economic growth
and foreign confidence in the Indonesian economy was high (see Kenward, 1999). The
second were taken just before the Asian financial crisis in 1997. There was another
survey, called IFLS2+, which was conducted specifically to explore and investigate the
impact of the crisis for Indonesians. The IFLS2+ survey was conducted in 1998. The
survey is a subsample of IFLS households and the data is not publicly accessible. The
third wave was conducted in 2000 when Indonesia was still in economic recovery. The
last wave was taken ten years after the crisis. It is interesting to see the impact of
various changes on Indonesian households.
Figure 3.B.2 depicts the years when the surveys were conducted. This figure also
depicts the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in terms of U.S. dollar current
value shows that the effect of the crisis is drastically decreasing after year 1997. This
is also followed by the decreasing GDP per capita in terms of purchasing-power-parity
(PPP). Moreover, this indicator does not take account of income inequality, where
people with low income suffer more than others as investigated by Frankenberg et al.
(2003).
3.3.2 The Definition of Household
As discussed in Chapter 2 about the importance of household definition, IFLS defines
a household as a person or group of persons who live together and reside a part of or
an entire building and have the same kitchen for eating purpose. Moreover, eating
from one kitchen is defined further as the joint arrangement in fulfilling daily neces-
sities (see Frankenberg and Karoly, 1995). From this definition, it can be interpreted
that IFLS use the same definition as in BPS (1999) which includes people, physical
building and kitchen.
IFLS also defines the head of the household as a person among the people who
occupy the building who is responsible to satisfy daily necessities of the households.
Alternatively, IFLS defines the head of the household as a person who is assigned
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as the head of the household. These definitions are very important particularly in
understanding the context of this study.
3.3.3 A Comparison between IFLS 3 and 2000 Census
A household survey can be considered as adequate and reliable if the samples repre-
sent an up-to-date population. The census usually serves as a frame for household
surveys which give basic information about household members’ characteristics. In
many countries, the census also provides information about house or dwelling char-
acteristics.
In Indonesia, a census is conducted every ten years since 1980 and the latest
was 2010. Before 1980, the census was taken in 1961 and 1971; and 1920 and 1930
during the Dutch occupation. Figure 3.B.3 provide comparison of the two pyramids
from different data set based on age and gender. The pyramid in the left panel is
calculated from the Indonesian Census and the right panel is calculated from IFLS 2.
Both surveys were conducted in year 2000.
The difference between the IFLS and census pyramids is partly because of sam-
pling errors and difference in coverage. This may also occur because the IFLS baseline
was taken from Susenas 1993, not from the Indonesian census. In the first wave, the
IFLS covered only 13 from 27 provinces (see Table 3.B.1). Since the same households
along with their splits are retained in the next waves, the difference may increase.
Based on Figure 3.B.3, the most obvious difference is the composition of males and
females under 15 years old where these groups in IFLS classification have different
shape proportionally compared to the census for the same age groups. However, the
IFLS are partially able to capture the demographic composition of Indonesian popu-
lation, particularly for working-age and old-age population.
According to Deaton (1997), non-coverage of some of the population characteristics
is common in household surveys. This does not mean that statistical inference cannot
be made from the household survey data set. The optimal way to utilise the data set
is to develop research frameworks, which fit with the available information. In terms
of household information, the IFLS can be considered as a comprehensive survey with
respect to Indonesian population characteristics.
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3.3.4 Data Treatment
Since the data were collected in different years: 1993, 1997, 2000, and 2007, the
context of unique economic circumstances cannot be neglected. It is necessary to
treat the collected data and information in specific ways so that the interpretation of
related information can be conveyed accurately and reflect real economic activity.
3.3.4.1 Constructing Household Income and Consumption
The importance of household finance is pointed out by Campbell (2006) in his pres-
idential address on American Finance Association. He argues that it is difficult to
measure household finance due to constraints that cannot be captured by any text-
book models, from which two challenges emerge: measurement and modelling. How-
ever, it is still possible to measure some aspects of households in terms of acquisition,
purchasing, and the use of goods and services.
Since the first survey is based on Susenas samples, (ordinary) households in the
IFLS can be defined as an individual or a group of individuals living in a physical
dwelling or part of it and usually sharing the same kitchen. Each household in the
IFLS is uniquely identified and tracked from the first survey to the latest survey.
Some individuals have moved across households between each IFLS respectively.
The first analysis starts from two basic household economic variables: income and
consumption, where these variables are flow variables. In constructing the household
income, the whole family members’ incomes are calculated into one household as a
unit of analysis.
The household income can be calculated from four sources of income: (1) house-
hold earnings or income which come from supplying their labour, (2) net revenue gen-
erated from farm business, (3) net revenue generated from non-farm business, and
(4) other sources which may comprise of retirement, scholarship money, insurance
money, transfers from other households, and Roscas. Since an household is treated as
a unit of analysis, the income calculations include all income generated by household
members which are in terms of nominal figures.
These nominal figures are then converted into real figures. The conversion method
is explained in Section 3.3.4.3. Here, the samples are divided into two categories
based on the location: rural and urban areas. A rural or village area is characterised
by low-density population and agricultural-based economy, while an urban area is
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characterised by high-density population and non agricultural-based economy. The
income figures are summarised in Table 3.B.2.
The latest survey gives more detailed information about household economy than
previous surveys. For example, IFLS4 contains information of responses to the key
public transfer program in late 2005 and late 2007. This includes for example Raskin
(Beras Miskin or Rice for the Poor), a subsidised program that gives poor households
an access to rice, and government market operations concerning rice and some food
distribution to households.
In constructing the consumption aggregate from IFLS data, I follow Witoelar
(2009). However, for benchmarking reasons, I transform all necessary data in terms
of annual information as necessary. The figures are also converted into per capita
measures such as per capita income or per capita expenditure. This can be done by
dividing such measures with the number of people living in a household.
3.3.4.2 Constructing Household Income Statements and Balance Sheets
This section describes household balance sheet construction based on the existing
IFLS data. Samphantharak and Townsend (2010) provide comprehensive approach
in constructing household financial statements from the Townsend Thai Monthly Sur-
vey since September 1998 until December 2005. Their survey questionnaires are in-
tended to capture household financial variables on a high frequency basis. Using
this kind of data, they are able to construct monthly household financial statements
containing, for example, monthly income statements, cash flows and balance sheets.
These enable the information users to analyse key household variables such as con-
sumption, investment, and liquidity.
The IFLS are not designed to capture the household financial activities completely.
Therefore, the chapter can make a potential contribution to the construction of house-
hold financial statements from longitudinal household surveys. Another feature in
the IFLS questionnaires is the different types of question concerning household eco-
nomic activity. For example, more detailed information about household credit or
borrowing history is available since IFLS3, while IFLS1 and IFLS2 only give limited
information about household credits or loans.
However, household financial statements have some limitations. As stated by
Samphantharak and Townsend (2010), there are at least four limitations. Firstly,
it only describes household activities in aggregate measures. Therefore, it is not easy
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to analyse resource allocation within a household. Secondly, it fails to identify and
measure human capital and household intangible assets.
Thirdly, it does not capture some decision-making process that are made arbitrar-
ily: an example would be financial decision making related to household production
activity. Finally, similar to corporate financial statements, one may use financial in-
formation to analyse different types of household variables such as liquidity and ac-
tivity ratios. However, this will not be adequate, as one should go further than using
financial ratios only.
Constructing household financial statements using IFLS data has some limita-
tions since the IFLS are longitudinal surveys. For example, the beginning value for
net wealth and cash equivalent accounts should be based on the previous year’s bal-
ance. The IFLS data do not contain explicit household information that usually exist
in corporate financial statements, such as fixed asset depreciations.
Household financial statements are given in Table 3.B.2 and 3.B.3. The tables
show the differences between average households who live in different areas. In terms
of average net income, rural households have better conditions than those who live in
urban areas in that year. One possible explanation is that many of the urban house-
holds are still affected by the effects of the crisis for the past three years. However,
based on the saving to gross income ratio and the saving to net income ratio in Table
3.B.4, the urban households’ financial circumstances are still better than the rural
counterparts.
3.3.4.3 Converting Nominal to Real Values
Following Strauss et al. (2004a) and Witoelar (2009), two set of deflators are used in
this study. The first set is called as the temporal deflators using December 2000 or
IFLS3 as the base. The second set is called as the spatial deflator using Jakarta (the
capital city) as the base. Therefore, the real value of a household expenditure x is
calculated as follows:
v= x× itörnq
ispt00
where itörnq denotes Törnqvist index and ispt00 denotes the spatial index. The tempo-
ral deflator is based on Törnqvist index calculated as follows:
itörnq =
N∏
i=1
{
pit
pib
}( 1
2
pib qib∑N
i=1 pib qib
+ 12
pit qit∑N
i=1 pit qit
)
(3.1)
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where pit and pib denote the price of good or service i in period t and base period b
respectively. qit and qib refer to the quantity of goods or service i purchased in period
t and base period respectively. Since IFLS do not provide adequate information to
calculate Törnqvist index, the related information will be taken from Susenas data.
Another limitation is that the first wave only is calculated in nominal values since
there are no regional deflators before 1997. I use GDP deflator from BPS consumer
price index as a proxy only for IFLS1 if necessary.
3.3.5 A Comparison of Rural and Urban Households
There are several reasons why households live in poverty: there may be too many
adults who can not find jobs or are poorly paid, too many dependents or children
within a household even though this household may earn a relatively high salary or
income. In many cases, the family composition has strong correlation with poverty
along with employment and dependency rates. There may be a high dependency rate
or the ratio of dependent young and old (see Musgrove, 1980). In many Asian and
African countries, most poverty occurs in rural areas. However, for the past 40 years
the poverty trend has changed and shifted to urban areas: this significantly increases
the number of urban poor. This condition could lead the population to a greater vul-
nerability to poverty and undernutrition (see for example Haddad et al., 1999). Since
distinct characteristics between rural and urban households exist, it is useful to com-
pare and analysis households in different areas separately.
Using Susenas data between 1987 and 1996, Asra (1999) finds that migration
in Indonesia has affected the decline in observed poverty between urban and rural
households. This study emphasises that household location should be taken into ac-
count since the inflation rate and cost of living between rural and urban environment
is significantly different. In this subsection, I will explore the characteristics of IFLS
households with respect to household welfare issue.
3.3.5.1 Demographic Characteristics
One of the most important demographic variables in relation to income and wealth
is household size or composition. In their study, Peichl et al. (2012) find that the
growth income gap has strong correlation with changes in household structure. This
structure significantly influences per capita incomes in terms of structural shifts in
household formation.
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In the first survey in 1993, a half of urban households consisted of more than four
persons in a family while in rural areas, 45% of respondents were in a household with
more than four persons. In the next survey, these figures have decreased to 29% of
urban and 26% of rural households with more than 4 persons.
Households with three and four persons are relatively stable from the first wave
until the last wave of the IFLS survey. Two persons households have increased since
the first wave. A significant increase for this category is for urban households, imply-
ing large scale movement from rural to urban area in particular between 2000 and
2007: during this period the number of two person households grew by 50%. The fig-
ures for household size are given in Table 3.B.5. The age structure of a household may
also affect its welfare. Table 3.B.5 provides figures for different age categories based
on regions where households live. Children below 5 years old in rural households are
relatively stable over four IFLS waves while in urban areas, children under five years
old are stable for the first three waves and then rise significantly in the last survey.
Working-age individuals for rural and urban area steadily increased by around
1% between 1993 and 1997. However, during the economic crisis between 1997 and
2000 the proportion of this group increased significantly especially for urban areas.
Persons over 65 years old are constantly increasing with the final proportion at 12.3%
for urban households and 13.7% for rural households. To summarise, the changing
family structure based on age cohort found in urban households, is proportionally
higher than rural households. However, rural households have a higher proportion of
over 65 year olds.
Another interesting fact is found in the marital status of IFLS households. During
the economic crisis, the number of separated and divorced spouses between 1997 and
2000 was higher than any other period between IFLS survey waves. This number
is higher for those who live in urban area as well as rural area. It seems that social
economic conditions during the economic crisis may have affected household attitudes
towards marriage.
The key population characteristics from demographic information are household
size and working-age structure particularly of the head of the household. House-
hold size affects per capita expenditure and per capita income in analysing household
management and later on risk sharing arrangement. The age of the household head
is also important in determining the life cycle of an household.
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3.3.5.2 Educational Attainment
Education background is related to improved household welfare through better and
well-informed decision making on every aspect of household life. In many develop-
ing countries, education is still a big issue along with poverty and malnutrition. In
terms of nationwide education policy in Indonesia, each citizen is required to complete
9-year mandatory education, which consists of elementary and junior school educa-
tion. Further discussions about the Indonesia national education system is given in
Chapter 5.
As provided in Table 3.B.5, it can be inferred that most of IFLS households have
managed to finish their elementary education. In 1993, the percentage of individuals
who have completed mandatory is 42% for urban and 19% for rural. In the last survey
in 2007, the education attainment of IFLS households is getting better where 50% of
individuals in urban area are able to finish their mandatory education: this shows
an improvement in educational attainment for this sector. However, this is not the
case for individuals in rural areas where only 30% of individuals completed their
mandatory education.
The key characteristic from education information is the last level of education ob-
tained by individuals. This is important to determine the length of education which
also implies investment in human capital. Moreover, in order to derive any risk re-
lated to labour service, this information is necessary to obtain the estimations of earn-
ings risk.
3.3.5.3 Employment Occupation
Employment is a source of information about various dimensions of labour including
wages, working contracts, and the range of employers. This information is necessary
to analyse how households earn earnings and other revenues.
Concerning employment questionnaires, there are some differences in each survey
wave. IFLS asked about employment type through primary activity in the employ-
ment module (see Table 3.B.6). IFLS1 and IFLS2 have different question structures
while IFLS3 and IFLS4 have same set of questions. Based on Table 3.B.6, it can be
inferred that the number of individuals who are working or helping to earn income is
constantly increasing: the rate of change in urban area is 33% and 24% in rural area.
Initially, in the IFLS1 the employment classification is based on employment sta-
tus such as self-employed, government employee, private employee, and family worker.
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Starting from IFLS2, the employment classification is based on industry. There is a
decrease in agricultural employment in rural area: it stood at 55% of the rural pop-
ulation in 1997 and 51% in 2007. In urban areas, the employment is dominated by
transportation, storage, and communication sectors followed by utility services.
Related to educational characteristics in the previous section, occupational char-
acteristic is also important to determine the degree of earning risk. Some occupation
in particular sector or industry may have lower or higher risk than other occupations.
3.3.5.4 Consumption and Income Profiles
Figure 3.B.4 and 3.B.5 depict monthly per capita income and consumption patterns
of IFLS households based on household location for 1997 and 2000 respectively. Con-
sumption is indicated by monthly per capita expenditure. The age profile is based on
the head of household’s age with the respective year of the survey. The main ques-
tion here is to observe the consumption and income pattern before and after economic
crisis.
If the age-profile of household consumption or income have hump-shaped curves,
then it can be said the consumption or income is tracking age profiles. All of con-
sumption and income profiles follow this pattern in 1997, except monthly per capita
expenditure for urban households (bottom left in Figure 3.B.4). Urban households
have higher levels of consumption and income compared to rural households. As pre-
dicted by PIH/LCH model, the income is decreasing when age is increasing. The
income trends are declining after retirement age.
After the Asian financial crisis in 1997, as predicted the income level for both rural
and urban households fell due to macroeconomic shocks as shown in Figure 3.B.5. On
the other hands, the consumption levels increase for rural and urban households.
However, there is a significant change for rural households as the curve now is more
convex than in the previous period. This means that younger households tend to
consume more compared to elder households in rural area. For urban households,
the consumption pattern is relatively stable after age of 40. Similarly in the previous
period, the income patterns decline after retirement age but the income level is lower
than before.
In summary, as indicated by Frankenberg et al. (2003), rural households have
experienced more decline in their per capita income after the economic crisis. This
may affected their well-being. However, at same time consumption increased.
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3.3.5.5 Financial Well-being
A set of ratios can be used to assess financial well-being for households, which is use-
ful in understanding financial decision making and planning. Greninger et al. (1996)
documented various methods for this purpose along with discussion of standardisa-
tion, consensus, and application of financial ratios for households.
In the first wave, 64% of urban households and 89% of rural households live in
their own house (see Table 3.B.4). These figures do not change much until the latest
wave. The numbers who live in owner-occupied houses or rent a house are much
higher in urban areas than in rural areas where only 2% of rural households fall
in this category. In terms of percent of household income, rent fee is not a burden,
since the majority of households pay less than a half of their income, especially those
who live in rural areas. The rent fee in terms of percentage of household income is
decreasing around the financial crisis period and then increasing in the last waves. It
may imply that during crisis period the rent fee is relatively cheaper than in normal
time.
In analysing financial ratios in Table 3.B.4, the mean values are compared to rec-
ommended ratios as described in Greninger et al. (1996). First, the liquidity asset to
monthly expenditure ratio for average urban households is drastically decreasing af-
ter the IFLS1. On average, this ratio is close to the recommended ratio (between 2.46
to 2.70) except for average rural households in the IFLS4. This implies that house-
hold capacity to smooth their expenditure using their own liquid asset is quite stable
from the first wave until the last wave except for rural households in the IFLS4. For
liquid asset to current debt ratio, it is quite surprising because on average the figures
are higher than the recommended ratio (between 0.79 to 0.94). It seems that the IFLS
households tend to keep their liquid assets and borrow far less than the value of their
liquid assets.
Based on the savings to gross income ratios, IFLS households tend to save more
as reported in the IFLS1 especially those who live in urban area. However, after the
financial crisis the numbers are drastically decreasing especially for those who live
in rural area. The financial crises may badly affect those who live in rural areas
rather than urban households. When savings are calculated against net income, the
figures deteriorated. In IFLS1, the value of this ratio is negative for both household
types. IFLS households around this period may consume more than they could earn.
This may also be induced by the financial boom during this period that lead to higher
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household consumption. The figures continued to fall and then bounced back in mid
2005 as indicated by savings to net income ratio in 2007.
Finally, the IFLS household decision making in terms of asset allocation can be
considered inefficient. As suggested by Greninger et al. (1996), the liquid asset to
net worth ratio should be between 15% and 20%. The mean values for urban and
rural households in 1993 are quite good. However, from IFLS2 until IFLS4 the mean
values are lower than recommended values indicating that average IFLS households
are financially worse off.
3.4 Access to Finance (A2F) Survey
Financial systems in many developing countries are typically underdeveloped, and
often serve mainly large firms and wealthy individuals. As an emerging economy,
Indonesia has limited households who can access financial systems. According to Fer-
nando (2007), financial access in Indonesia has a different story compared to other
developing countries. In Indonesia, the financial institutions have expanded signifi-
cantly but households are still facing significant problems in gaining access to finance.
Another problem that arises in developing countries is the maintenance of ade-
quate social security or protection for its citizens. As a way to cope with social secu-
rity issues and inaccessible financial system in Indonesia, the Indonesian parliament
passed a new social security law in 2004 (Undang Undang Sistem Jaminan Sosial
Nasional Nomor 40/2004 or Law Number 40/2004 regarding National Social Secu-
rity System). This law promises to introduce a new nationwide social security system
that provided basic protection including an old-age pension, health insurance, death
benefits and worker protection for all Indonesian citizens.
However, there is no significant progress since the enactment of social security
law. As of 2013, the current system only provides basic protection for formal workers,
both in public and private sectors. Therefore, this exacerbates the problems in infor-
mal workers and people in village areas. Based on the latest survey by BPS (2010),
the number of informal workers is estimated about 71.4 percent of total productive
workers, while number of people who live in villages is estimated at 57 percent of to-
tal populations. The dispersion of the population and the limited government budget
also add more problems to social security program.
Latest estimation by World Bank (2012) reveals that 8.5% of the Indonesian popu-
lation above 15 years old who have access to a formal loan from financial institutions
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while 42.3% of the population borrow from their family and friends. This number is
relatively high on average compared to other East Asia and Pacific countries (27.2%)
and lower-middle income economies (11.1%). For insurance, only 0.9% of the Indone-
sian population personally pay for their own insurance which is very low compared to
Asia and Pacific countries (36.8%) and lower-middle income economies (5.1%).
This section provides an explanation of the second data set used in this research.
The data set is called the Access to Finance (A2F) survey conducted by the World
Bank in 2008, covering 3360 households from 10 provinces (see World Bank, 2009).
Compared to the IFLS data set, the A2F survey covers a smaller region and fewer
households. However, it provides more detail on household information in terms of
financial attitude and behaviour which is very important in examining household
risk management. This information is not covered in the IFLS data set. In this study,
the A2F data set is utilised to identify credit constraints (see Chapter 4).
3.4.1 Survey Methodology
In terms of survey scale, A2F is a smaller survey than IFLS. The A2F survey com-
prises two levels of observations: household and individual. The financial charac-
teristics are observed in the household level, while the individual level focus on the
socio-economic characteristics. The A2F survey put more emphasis on the head of
household, defined as the person who has authority over household financial decision
making. Like the IFLS, the A2F sample selection ensures nationwide representation
of the Indonesian populations using multi-stage random sampling. The sampling
weight is based on the different types of administrative level: province, district or city
as sub-province, and village level.
The survey covered four provinces in Java (the main island): Banten, West Java,
Central Java, and East Java, and six provinces outside Java: Aceh, Jambi, West
Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, West Nusa Tenggara, and Maluku. The final samples
include 34 urban villages and 30 rural villages which comprises 3,360 survey house-
holds: 1,920 on Java and 1,440 outside Java island. Figure 3.C.1 presents the loca-
tions of A2F households. Table 3.C.1 provides the summary of samples taken from
each province along with the type of access to finance.
The head of the villages was interviewed in order to get information about finan-
cial services at the community level such as telecommunication, mode of transporta-
tion to the nearest financial institutions, and other information which are related to
access to finance. For household questionnaire modules, almost two third of the total
3.4 Access to Finance (A2F) Survey 52
respondents were the household head. The rest of these respondents were the wife or
the female head of the households. From the total respondents who were interviewed,
a half of them was a woman. 83% percent of the total respondents are married.
3.4.2 The Definition of Household
Although the survey samples are households, A2F does not explicitly define household
in the survey. However, based on the demographic information about individuals
living in the household given in the questionnaire, it seems that A2F follows the
definition of “unitary” household similar to the definition as given in the IFLS. The
information of household composition is based on family relationship with the person
who is assigned as the head of the household.
3.4.3 Remittances
Remittances sent by migrants in developed countries to their home countries, which
are usually developing or less developed countries, have became trends in the past
decades. The remittances can be considered as a means of self-insurance which in
many cases have became a substitution for formal and informal insurances, especially
when social security become less accessible for households (see Crayen et al., 2013;
Morduch, 1995). The A2F put more emphasis on information about remittances than
any other module in the survey.
Based on the A2F survey, 241 households have at least one household member
working abroad. Most of them are working in Malaysia (41%) and Saudi Arabia (32%).
The rest are working in South East Asia, East Asia, Middle East, the United States,
and Australia. Around 87% of these individuals have at least once part of their earn-
ings remitted to their family in Indonesia, mostly on special occasions or for special
purposes (52%). The average value of remittance is Rp 3.2 millions or approximately
USD 353.63 (1 USD = Rp 9,200) with the maximum remittance value is Rp 20 mil-
lions or USD 2,173.91. Remittances are also used to meet daily needs.
However, most households who received remittances did not save the money and
spent it mainly for consumption purposes. The reason is that they do not know how
to save. From this, it can be summarised that most of migrant workers along with
their respective family do not have adequate knowledge or information about financial
services.
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3.4.4 Insurance Knowledge
Insurance is perceived as one of the most complicated financial products by house-
holds. Insurance is intended to provide household protection against risks such as
death, life, property, liability, third-party liability, and old age. Compared to the IFLS
survey, the A2F survey provided more insight on insurance products.
Based on the A2F survey, illness and loss of employment are the first two impor-
tant risks perceived by the majority of households (63%) that can affect their financial
well-being. The third risk is losing their dwelling or place to live according to 17% of
the households. Having a perception of these risks does not necessarily mean that
this will translate into action.
Table 3.C.2 provides insurance ownership based on the type of product. The ma-
jority of households in this survey are not covered by government-sponsored health
insurance. For private insurance, it is easy to infer that only a small number of house-
holds, that is 9.46%, took up insurance against illness. Moreover, the figure is smaller
for rural households (5.46%) if private insurance uptake is divided by region. Around
42% of these households also understand that it is important to have protection for
their breadwinner. However, not only is health insurance uptake low, but life insur-
ance uptake is also low.
Households who do not take up insurance give two reasons for this position: the
first reason is that they do not have enough money to buy insurance. This is quite con-
tradictory since the majority of households (around 95.75%) think that the premium
is not too expensive. This may lead to the second reason for not having insurance:
they do not know about any insurance product. Therefore, it can be concluded that a
low level of knowledge about insurance products or insurance literacy plays a signifi-
cant role in explaining this situation. The fact that the benefit of the product may not
be realised in the near future was another reason people failed to buy insurance.
3.4.5 Household Financial Literacy
Another feature in the A2F data set is a set of questions on the household finan-
cial management and financial literacy. This module also includes information on
whether an individual is interested in financial matters. The financial management
section briefly assesses the household behaviour towards saving and retirement. The
financial literacy section is divided into two sets of questions: basic mathematics and
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simple loan calculations. However, these questions must be assessed together to get
robust results and a better understanding.
Table 3.C.3 provides the basic mathematics and financial literacy scores. There
are significant correlations between these scores across cohorts. This implies that the
financial literacy score is correlated with basic mathematical skills. However, the fi-
nancial literacy scores are lower compared to the mathematics score. This means that
although one may understand simple calculation in mathematics, it does not neces-
sarily mean he or she is able to understand simple financial calculation. For example
the correlation for older cohorts is higher than any other cohorts but eventually the
actual scores are lower than younger cohorts. Those who live in urban areas seem
have better knowledge about financial products, as they tend to have higher scores
than those who live in rural areas. The figures confirm stylised facts about financial
literacy where those who are less educated have lower financial literacy scores.
3.5 Issues in Indonesian Financial Markets
Indonesian financial systems have been heavily dominated by the banking sector
since the late 1970s until the present. Despite a huge decline in the number of banks
during the economic crisis, the bank networks have increased in terms of branches
and the number of ATMs (automated teller machines). However, this development
only occurs in big cities, particularly Jakarta which is considered as “over-serviced”.
In terms of finance access in the institutional level, the IFLS does not provide
much information about financial institutions. The accessibility of financial institu-
tions at village level is given by the distance between village offices and the nearest
financial institutions as provided in Table 3.C.4. The village offices are usually lo-
cated at the centre of the village and more likely accessible by residents on that area.
The A2F survey also gives similar information based on the questionnaire for village
heads.
The financial development should also be taking account of the demand side. How-
ever, data and information on financial development from the demand side perspec-
tive is still rare. The IFLS is not intended to specifically address household financial
behaviour, while the A2F survey was only conducted once. However, it is important to
discuss relevant issues about financial development in Indonesia from the households’
point of view, given these existing data.
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3.5.1 Weak Market Institutions
The development of financial institutions at village level in Indonesia was considered
a success. Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega (1996) studied eight financial institutions in
rural areas which were relatively successful in reaching out to large numbers of small
individual clients and providing suitable financial services. However, these financial
institutions do not exist equally throughout the country.
There are several problems these financial institutions meet when trying to pene-
trate remote areas. Local financial institutions which have a lower cost of information
and monitoring mechanisms may be wealth-constrained or too risk averse. Those
who have resources may have no access to information, screening and monitoring
mechanisms. In other words, asymmetric information and moral hazard characterise
financial institutions’ problems in rural and particularly remote areas.
Having no or limited information on probability of defaults, financial institutions
have to seek other sources of information such as local government officers and in
particular village heads. These people can serve as credit rating agents who deter-
mine the creditworthiness of an applicant. However, this method is very subjective
and risky. Moreover, the accuracy and reliability of village heads as a source of infor-
mation may jeopardise the existence of financial institutions.
Regulatory constraints may also make it difficult for financial institutions to pro-
vide their services to remote and small customers. The policies launched by govern-
ment through the Ministry of Finance or Bank Indonesia (the central bank) put more
emphasis on people who are mainly located in the cities and less emphasis on rural
and remote areas. However, the government has also dedicated BRI, one of the state-
owned banks in Indonesia, to focus on small and remote customers and specialise
its services for these clients. As the cost of information and monitoring mechanism
increases, it has become less viable to penetrate and serve the population which are
diverse and demographically dispersed.
When institutions fail to address accessibility issues, informal institutions matter.
Such institutions may take various forms of risk sharing arrangement. One typical
arrangement, which can be found in many regions in Indonesia, is known as arisan or
in economics literature, Roscas or rotating savings and credit associations. Different
types and mechanisms of arisan can be found throughout the country (see Cole and
Slade, 1996; Ravallion and Dearden, 1988).
With diverse demographic characteristics, Roscas generally consist of a group of
people who usually have weekly gathering and rotate part of the pooled resources in
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certain ways using random pot or systematic rotation. People are generally motivated
to enter Roscas arrangements in order to cope with unexpected income or consump-
tion shocks. This tradition still continues even though financial institutions exist.
Since Roscas constitute a simple approach to conducting financial contracts rather
than formal financial institutions, a lot of people, especially those who are credit con-
strained, prefer to use Roscas particularly for short-term needs. However, despite the
importance of Roscas for Indonesian people, the government has never put efforts to
regulate this “underground” banking practice.
3.5.2 Lack of Contract Enforcement
As mention in the previous chapter, the role of design and enforcement is inevitable
in the establishment and development of economic and financial institutions. Like in
many developing countries, since barriers to formal financial services are relatively
high, many Indonesian households face legally incomplete contract. This means that
“unverifiable information” exist in the contracts. Ideally, judicial and mediatory insti-
tutions should be able to fill the gaps related to contracts and take remedial measures.
The issue of formal contract enforceability gives less incentive to financial institu-
tions to serve a broader scope of customers. In order to overcome constraints such as
agency problems, many financial institutions rely on endorsement or references from
village heads or other local government officers, as they perceive that these officers
may have informational advantage over the management of these borrowers or po-
tential customers. These officers also play a significant role as contract enforcers if
there are repayment problems.
3.5.3 Inadequate Access to Formal Credits
Since 1970s, Indonesian government has initiated credit schemes for small-scale busi-
ness to stimulate business activities. The schemes can be classified into two broad
groups: farm and non farm activities. These credit schemes are mostly operated by
BRI with the assistance from central ministries, local government agencies and insti-
tutions. Many studies conclude that where BRI plays a pivotal role in credit channel-
ing it is a success story. Moreover, BRI is considered as one of the largest and most
successful micro-finance institutions in the world (see Kristiansen, 2006).
However, the success story of credit channeling does not mean households have
adequate access to financial institutions across the country. The diverse characteris-
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tics along with geographic location have become challenges for financial institutions
wanting to expand their financial services. The high level of demand for financial
services does not necessarily meet the supply from formal financial institutions.
Using random trial experiment data from the A2F survey and Indian data, Cole
et al. (2011) can investigate the demand for financial services and financial literacy.
They find that financial literacy education does not increase the probability of access-
ing bank services even though the demand is quite high. This suggests that financial
deepening is not yet there to reach people who are excluded from financial markets.
Besides Roscas, households also use other informal financial arrangements such
as moneylenders, trade credit, village savings, pawning (gadai), and also other sources
of loan such as friends, relatives, storekeepers, and employers. Farmers often conduct
forward selling of their crop which know as ijon. The impact of ijon, however, is costly
to farmers as the selling price is lower than the market price.
3.5.4 Inadequate Formal Insurance Providers
Agricultural and commodity trade is characterised by high uncertainty and have
many kind of risk exposures. The source of risks can be in the forms of climate change
and disasters, huge price fluctuations, and inadequate infrastructure for distributions
such as road and mode of transportations. It is unlikely to find formal insurance in-
stitutions that can give protections for farmers, small traders and companies against
such risks. The problem is similar to the conditions in loan or credit markets where
the source of information is none or inadequate. It is difficult for formal insurance
institutions to provide insurance products whenever actuarial information is less or
unreliable.
3.5.5 High Search and Transaction Costs
Indonesian households are not well-informed about financial markets and institutions
which include market and economic situations, credibility of financial institutions
and products. The government efforts to provide such information to households are
still ineffective as indicated by frauds and financial losses suffered by Indonesian
households.
As a result from imperfect and asymmetric information, households tend to collect
information based on peer or respected people that they may perceive as trustworthy
and reliable. Farmers and traders have similar characteristics and tend to gather in-
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formation of financial products from their own group and networks without spending
more time to check the quality of information. Those who are able to find and access
informal services mostly end up with high interest rates. Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega
(1996) find that the effective rates of credit services are between 32% and 84%. From
the financial institutions’ view, providing services to small-scale customers may not
be effective because of diseconomies of scale.
Moreover, Kristiansen (2006) argue that costs of interaction, lack of trust and in-
formation uncertainty have a significant contribution in explaining high transaction
costs in Indonesia. This also explains why households with profitable business in ru-
ral area have difficulties in business growth. The result of high transaction costs is
market failure and under-utilised economic potentials despite credit growth.
3.6 Summary
This chapter describes two recent surveys, which cover the main information about
Indonesian households and particular financial related information. Four waves of
IFLS surveys have advantages in the sense that it retains around 92% of its respon-
dents since the initial survey in 1993. However, it gives limited information about
household financial behaviour. In comparison to the IFLS, the A2F provides a deeper
insight into financial behaviour but in a smaller number of households covered by the
survey. Given information from these two surveys, household behaviour related to
economic and financial activities can be captured and analysed.
As the economic crisis hit Indonesia in 1997 to 1998, access to financial institu-
tions has become increasingly important. However, the barriers to financial services
still exist from both supply and demand side. Since financial institutions fail and pen-
etration is still low, many households tend to use informal institutions or arrangement
to cope with risk and uncertainty. The informality and flexibility of these mechanisms
which reduce transaction costs are seen as an advantage for many people wishing to
cope with risk and uncertainty.
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Appendix 3.A Financial Development Indicators
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Figure 3.A.1. Financial Sector and Growth in Indonesia, 1981–2010. Bank private
credits refer to financial claims provided by commercial banks or similar institutions to private sec-
tors through loans, non equity securities, trade credits, and other receivables. Bank deposits refer
to third party funds which are placed in the commercial banks and similar institutions. The num-
ber of bank offices and branches in the right panel comprises only commercial banks. Source: au-
thor’s calculations from the Global Financial Development (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/
global-financial-development).
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Figure 3.A.2. Interest Rates and Inflation in Indonesia, 1986–2010. The deposit
rate is the rate of demand, time, or savings deposits which are paid by commercial banks or
similar financial institutions. The lending rate is the average rate of the short- and medium-
rate financing paid by private sectors to commercial banks or similar institutions. Source: au-
thor’s calculations from the World Development Indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/
world-development-indicators).
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Figure 3.A.3. Saving Rates in Selected Asian Countries. The aggregate saving rate is
computed as 100−kg−kc where kc denotes consumption share of real GDP per capita and kg denotes
government share of real GDP per capita. Source: author’s calculations from the Penn World Table 6.3
(Heston et al., 2009).
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Appendix 3.B IFLS Household Profiles
Ac
eh
No
rth
Su
ma
ter
a
Ria
u J
am
bi
We
st
Su
ma
ter
a Be
ng
ku
lu
La
mp
un
g
So
uth
Su
ma
ter
a
Ce
ntr
al
Ka
lim
an
tan
Ea
st
Ka
lim
an
tan
We
st
Ka
lim
an
tan
So
uth
Ka
lim
an
tan
No
rth
Su
law
es
i
Ce
ntr
al
Su
law
es
i
Go
ron
tal
o
So
uth
Su
law
es
i
We
st
Su
law
es
i
Ma
luk
u
No
rth
Ma
luk
u
Pa
pu
a
Ba
nte
n We
st
Ja
va
Ja
ka
rta
Ce
ntr
al
Ja
va Ea
st
Ja
va
Yo
gy
ak
art
a
Ba
li
We
st
Nu
sa
Te
ng
ga
ra
Ea
st
Nu
sa
Te
ng
ga
ra
Ba
ng
ka
-
Be
litu
ng
Ria
u
Isla
nd
s
So
uth
ea
st
Su
law
es
i
We
st
Pa
pu
a
Co
py
rig
ht
DIV
A-G
IS
IFL
S p
rov
inc
es
No
n I
FL
S p
rov
inc
es
Le
ge
nd
:
0  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
50
0 k
m
0  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
30
0 m
iles
F
ig
ur
e
3.
B
.1
.
A
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e
M
ap
of
In
do
ne
si
a:
IF
L
S
Sa
m
pl
es
.
T
hi
s
m
ap
is
ba
se
d
on
th
e
re
sp
on
de
nt
pr
ofi
le
s
of
IF
L
S1
sa
m
pl
es
.
T
he
se
w
er
e
ta
ke
n
fr
om
se
le
ct
ed
In
do
ne
si
a
pr
ov
in
ce
s,
w
hi
ch
ar
e
in
di
ca
te
d
by
or
an
ge
-s
ha
de
d
ar
ea
.
T
he
nu
m
be
r
of
cu
rr
en
t
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e
pr
ov
in
ce
s
is
di
ff
er
en
t
fr
om
th
e
fir
st
su
rv
ey
w
as
co
nd
uc
te
d
in
19
93
.
T
hi
s
is
du
e
to
th
e
fo
rm
at
io
n
of
ne
w
pr
ov
in
ce
s:
B
an
gk
a-
B
el
it
un
g
(f
or
m
er
ly
a
pa
rt
of
So
ut
h
Su
m
at
er
a)
,
B
an
te
n
(f
or
m
er
ly
a
pa
rt
of
W
es
t
Ja
va
),
R
ia
u
Is
la
nd
s
(f
or
m
er
ly
a
pa
rt
of
R
ia
u)
,
G
or
on
ta
lo
,
N
or
th
M
al
uk
u,
an
d
W
es
t
Pa
pu
a.
T
he
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
su
rv
ey
s
re
-
ta
in
ed
ar
ou
nd
90
%
fr
om
th
e
fir
st
IF
L
S
su
rv
ey
w
it
h
ad
di
ti
on
al
sa
m
pl
es
m
ai
nl
y
du
e
to
ho
us
eh
ol
d
sp
lit
s.
S
ou
rc
e:
au
th
or
’s
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
fr
om
th
e
IF
L
S
da
ta
se
t.
3.B IFLS Household Profiles 62
-1
5
-1
0
-5
0
5
10
GD
P 
gr
ow
th
 (a
nn
ua
l %
)
60
0
80
0
10
00
12
00
14
00
16
00
GD
P 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 (c
on
sta
nt
 2
00
5 
US
$)
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Year
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) GDP growth (annual %)
Figure 3.B.2. Indonesia GDP Per Capita and Growth, 1990–2010. The vertical line
indicates the time when the surveys were conducted respectively: IFLS1 in 1993, IFLS2 in
1997, IFLS3 in 2000, and IFLS4 in 2007. The period of Asian financial crisis took place
between mid of 1997 and 1998. Source: author’s calculations from the World Development
Indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators).
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Figure 3.B.3. A Comparison between Indonesian Population and IFLS3. The first
panel on left side shows population pyramid based on Indonesian Census 2000 which classified
by gender and age. The second panel on the right side shows IFLS samples taken in the same
year. Both are classified by gender and age. Source: author’s calculations from BPS and the
IFLS data set.
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Figure 3.B.4. Income and Expenditure Pattern Based on Cohort, 1997. The figures
are fitted values with 95% confidence interval for household head’s age against per capita
expenditure and per capita income respectively. All variables are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah.
Source: author’s calculations from the IFLS data set.
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Figure 3.B.5. Income and Expenditure Pattern Based on Cohort, 2000. The figures
are fitted values with 95% confidence interval for household head’s age against per capita
expenditure and per capita income respectively. All variables are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah.
Source: author’s calculations from the IFLS data set.
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Table 3.B.1
IFLS Samples Based on Locations
Due to household migration, the figures show different profiles compare to IFLS1 in 1993
as depicted in Figure 3.B.1. Aceh, Riau, Bengkulu, Central Kalimantan, East Kalimantan
and Southeast Sulawesi are included due to household migration. Banten is a spin-off from
West Java, Bangka-Belitung is a spin-off from South Sumatera, Riau Islands is a spin-off
from Riau, and West Sulawesi is a spin-off From South Sulawesi. The figures in parentheses
are calculated by using the number of households in that area and province over the total
number of households by area. Source: author’s calculations from the IFLS data set.
Province
IFLS1 (1993) IFLS2 (1997) IFLS3 (2000) IFLS4 (2007)
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Aceh 1 1
(0.02) (0.01)
North Sumatera 320 300 300 241 385 306 478 433
(8.47) (7.59) (8.56) (5.84) (7.66) (5.66) (6.47) (7.04)
West Sumatera 120 240 124 251 162 313 287 340
(3.17) (6.08) (3.54) (6.08) (3.22) (5.79) (3.89) (5.53)
Riau 39 17 64 36
(0.78) (0.31) (0.87) (0.59)
South Sumatera 160 210 147 225 188 327 198 381
(4.23) (5.32) (4.19) (5.45) (3.74) (6.04) (2.68) (6.20)
Bengkulu 1
(0.02)
Lampung 60 240 51 240 75 308 161 360
(1.59) (6.08) (1.46) (5.81) (1.49) (5.69) (2.18) (5.85)
Bangka Belitung 57 16
(0.77) (0.26)
Riau Islands 32 1
(0.43) (0.02)
DKI Jakarta 800 651 853 994
(21.16) (18.57) (16.98) (13.46)
West Java 620 630 596 662 948 940 1383 779
(16.40) (15.95) (17.00) (16.03) (18.87) (17.38) (18.72) (12.67)
Central Java 380 540 389 610 541 784 711 905
(10.05) (13.67) (11.10) (14.77) (10.77) (14.49) (9.63) (14.72)
DI Yogyakarta 320 180 295 190 383 221 552 162
(8.47) (4.56) (8.42) (4.60) (7.62) (4.09) (7.47) (2.63)
East Java 460 660 434 683 618 885 933 1001
(12.17) (16.71) (12.38) (16.54) (12.30) (16.36) (12.63) (16.28)
Banten 209 276
(2.83) (4.49)
Bali 140 210 135 224 204 287 380 255
(3.70) (5.32) (3.85) (5.43) (4.06) (5.30) (5.14) (4.15)
West Nusa Tenggara 120 300 98 358 173 489 351 486
(3.17) (7.59) (2.80) (8.67) (3.44) (9.04) (4.75) (7.90)
West Kalimantan 1
(0.02)
Central Kalimantan 5 3 9 3
(0.10) (0.06) (0.12) (0.05)
South Kalimantan 120 210 128 210 170 293 255 364
(3.17) (5.32) (3.65) (5.09) (3.38) (5.42) (3.45) (5.92)
East Kalimantan 6 1 25 8
(0.12) (0.02) (0.34) (0.13)
North Sulawesi 1
(0.01)
South Sulawesi 160 230 157 235 274 234 284 336
(4.23) (5.82) (4.48) (5.69) (5.45) (4.33) (3.85) (5.46)
Southeast Sulawesi 1
(0.02)
West Sulawesi 21 7
(0.28) (0.11)
Total 3,780 3,950 3,505 4,129 5,025 5,410 7,386 6,150
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Table 3.B.2
IFLS Household Income Profile, 2000
The figures are in thousands and in 2000 Indonesian rupiah, except for the number of
observations. Source: author’s calculations from IFLS data set.
(a) Urban households
Obs. Mean Median Standard Deviation
Income
Labour income (earnings/salary) 4,906 8,830 5,400 12,500
Net revenue, farm business 84 2,584 1,130 3,388
Net revenue, non-farm business 783 6,077 2,520 15,800
Other revenues
Retirement 346 5,731 5,400 3,461
Scholarships 229 960 300 2,499
Insurance money 66 2,077 600 4,834
Transfers 44 1,872 200 2,897
Roscas 658 623 275 1,143
Total income 4,906 10,500 6,400 15,800
Expenditures
Food consumption 4,906 7,138 5,545 6,207
Freq. Purchased items 4,906 2,394 1,146 4,169
Non freq. Purchased items 4,906 2,160 766 5,752
Housing 4,906 2,393 900 10,900
Education 4,906 1,096 335 2,290
Total expenditures 4,906 15,387 10,300 19,000
Net income (deficit) 4,906 −4,877 −3,448 18,600
(b) Rural households
Obs. Mean Median Standard Deviation
Income
Labour income (earnings/salary) 5,323 5,151 2,850 9,272
Net revenue, farm business 283 1,368 670 2,221
Net revenue, non-farm business 601 3,885 180 16,400
Other revenues
Retirement 118 5,262 540 3,498
Scholarships 142 3,479 150 37,800
Insurance money 19 1,770 300 4,720
Transfers 33 1,391 245 2,571
Roscas 592 516 1,575 1,038
Total income 5,323 5,979 3,190 13,000
Expenditures
Food consumption 5,323 5,208 4,207 4,494
Freq. Purchased items 5,323 1,005 502 2,044
Non freq. Purchased items 5,323 1,236 480 3,705
Housing 5,323 976 480 5,399
Education 5,323 458 125 1,196
Total expenditures 5,323 9,039 6,725 9,891
Net income (deficit) 5,323 −3,062 −2,848 13,600
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Table 3.B.3
IFLS Household Balance Sheets Profile, 2000
The figures are in thousands and in 2000 Indonesian rupiah, except for the number of
observations. Source: author’s calculations from the IFLS data set.
(a) Urban households
Obs. Mean Median Standard Deviation
Assets
Savings/CDs/stocks 1,620 6,202 1,000 26,100
Receivables 613 5,596 700 26,600
Appliances 4,080 2,452 1,300 5,234
Jewelry 2,950 1,692 500 5,679
Furniture and utensils 4,532 1,951 900 43,579
Livestock/poultry/fishpond 85 1,480 200 8,170
Vehicles 2,401 11,800 2,660 36,500
House occupied 3,004 50,900 22,000 87,200
Other house/building 712 51,800 25,000 92,600
Non-agricultural land 768 30,300 10,000 60,200
Other assets 1,780 6,751 200 2,637
Total Assets 5,025 55,800 16,200 12,700
Total liability 879 2,710 480 17,500
Net worth 5,025 55,300 16,000 126,000
Total liability and net worth 5,025 55,800 16,200 12,700
(b) Rural households
Obs. Mean Median Standard Deviation
Assets
Savings/CDs/stocks 940 2,420 400 9,220
Receivables 561 3,114 500 15,900
Appliances 3,699 1,092 450 2,567
Jewelry 2,984 921 300 7,572
Furniture and utensils 5,089 967 500 1,945
Livestock/poultry/fishpond 244 563 100 1,136
Vehicles 2,011 3,901 250 12,500
House occupied 4,467 14,700 8,000 24,700
Other house/building 367 22,800 10,000 46,800
Non-agricultural land 921 10,900 4,500 28,500
Other assets 1,935 388 185 1,638
Total Assets 5,410 20,100 88,876 41,500
Total liability 674 2,557 500 6,461
Net worth 5,410 19,800 8,680 41,100
Total liability and net worth 5,410 20,100 88,876 41,500
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Table 3.B.5
Profile of IFLS Households: Demography
The figures are calculated in percentage for each category based on household location,
except for average age. It only includes those who are living within the households
when the survey was being conducted. Age 6 to 17 implies the age for primary and
secondary education. Age 18 to 64 implies working age. Above 64 years old implies re-
tirement age. The majority of household dwelling is occupied by more than five people.
Source: author’s calculations from the IFLS data set.
IFLS1 (1993) IFLS2 (1997) IFLS3 (2000) IFLS4 (2007)
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Household size
1 person 7.42% 4.99% 7.63% 7.70% 10.63% 6.10% 12.67% 11.61%
2 persons 7.89% 11.46% 10.67% 13.89% 11.02% 13.86% 21.19% 21.44%
3 persons 15.16% 19.09% 14.10% 16.67% 18.43% 21.46% 18.24% 21.42%
4 persons 19.50% 19.98% 19.51% 20.28% 19.28% 20.15% 19.18% 19.61%
5 or more 50.03% 44.48% 48.09% 41.46% 40.64% 38.43% 28.73% 25.91%
Age cohorts
Under 5 11.71% 14.40% 10.65% 12.70% 10.83% 12.13% 14.69% 14.44%
6 to 17 29.04% 29.96% 26.97% 29.39% 22.53% 25.96% 20.87% 23.44%
18 to 64 50.08% 44.73% 51.09% 45.22% 56.68% 49.78% 52.11% 48.37%
Above 64 9.17% 10.91% 11.30% 12.70% 9.96% 12.13% 12.33% 13.74%
Average age 26.35 26.42 28.95 28.16 28.78 28.46 30.78 30.14
Marital status (>15 years old)
Single 31.25% 18.36% 31.19% 19.06% 31.84% 18.78% 23.54% 17.80%
Married 59.48% 70.57% 58.73% 69.49% 59.03% 71.07% 65.71% 70.77%
Separated 0.52% 0.50% 0.61% 0.50% 0.77% 0.51% 0.52% 0.46%
Divorced 2.00% 2.35% 1.85% 2.13% 1.90% 2.29% 1.93% 2.06%
Widowed 6.75% 8.22% 7.63% 8.82% 6.46% 7.35% 8.29% 8.91%
Religion
Islam 85.30% 86.49% 87.65% 87.86% 86.94% 89.72% 88.69% 88.78%
Protestant 5.44% 5.41% 4.94% 4.72% 5.17% 4.11% 4.30% 4.64%
Catholic 3.09% 1.28% 2.59% 1.17% 2.51% 1.07% 2.19% 1.31%
Hindu 2.86% 5.82% 2.68% 5.83% 3.88% 4.96% 4.08% 5.10%
Budha 2.63% 0.05% 2.06% 0.06% 1.41% 0.09% 0.66% 0.13%
Other 0.67% 0.95% 0.08% 0.36% 0.08% 0.05% 0.08% 0.04%
Highest education attainment
No/not yet
in school 19.13% 31.82% 16.89% 28.31% 13.33% 22.07% 17.98% 23.32%
Elementary 39.64% 50.50% 36.80% 49.86% 32.22% 47.87% 30.35% 44.71%
Junior high 15.74% 10.06% 17.53% 12.24% 16.44% 14.58% 15.19% 14.96%
High school 19.14% 6.49% 21.02% 8.09% 24.89% 11.27% 23.85% 11.96%
University 4.02% 0.48% 4.68% 0.69% 6.50% 1.23% 6.76% 1.79%
Other 0.41% 0.26% 0.29% 0.15% 0.81% 0.58% 0.75% 0.75%
Islamic school 0.01% 0.02% 0.26% 0.39% 0.18% 0.38%
Vocational/college 1.92% 0.39% 2.72% 0.63% 3.89% 1.06% 3.68% 1.14%
Kindergarten 0.06% 0.03% 1.68% 0.94% 1.27% 0.99%
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Table 3.B.6
Profile of IFLS Households: Employment
The question about last week primary activity is only included for IFLS3 and IFLS4. For IFLS3
and IFLS4, unemployment figure is taken from “Stay at home/unemployed” optional answer for
a question about last week primary activity. The unemployed person is then classified based on
working age definition from this option. For employment by industry, if a person has more than
a single job, then the primary occupation is selected. Agriculture includes forestry, fishing, and
hunting. Utility services include electricity, gas, and water. Wholesale includes retail, restaurants,
and hotel. Transportation includes storage and communication. Financial services include finance,
insurance, real estate, and business services. In IFLS1, public welfare sector is used instead of social
welfare sector. Source: author’s calculations from the IFLS data set.
IFLS1 (1993) IFLS2 (1997) IFLS3 (2000) IFLS4 (2007)
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Primary activity
Working/helping to earn income 35.56% 39.06% 38.51% 39.00% 40.54% 42.41% 47.32% 50.00%
Unemployed 35.28% 29.10% 7.71% 7.60% 5.47% 5.01%
Job searching 2.93% 1.81% 1.23% 0.80% 0.82% 0.51%
Attending school 25.15% 19.01% 22.99% 21.00% 20.83% 20.58%
Housekeeping 15.07% 13.76% 13.92% 12.98% 17.35% 16.86%
Retired 0.93% 0.20% 1.34% 0.68% 3.32% 2.55%
Sick/disabled 0.36% 0.59% 0.50% 0.67%
Other 20.35% 26.16% 26.22% 31.90% 2.92% 2.09% 1.85% 0.87%
Stay at home 8.98% 11.85% 2.54% 2.94%
Employment status
Self-employed 12.86% 21.96% 35.02% 50.81% 20.56% 24.29% 17.35% 17.96%
Self-employed (with workers) 8.20% 12.62% 13.68% 22.12% 14.02% 25.02%
Government workers 17.96% 6.54% 12.13% 5.24% 9.35% 4.30% 9.10% 4.92%
Private employee 56.76% 41.12% 48.30% 26.15% 48.17% 27.76% 41.01% 17.56%
Family worker 3.99% 16.82% 4.55% 17.81% 8.22% 21.52% 8.46% 23.06%
Others 0.22% 0.93% 0.02% 10.06% 11.50%
Employment by industry
Agriculture 8.60% 53.62% 11.80% 54.95% 11.66% 54.05% 10.78% 51.42%
Mining and quarrying 0.68% 1.77% 0.15% 0.08% 0.20% 0.09% 0.16% 0.10%
Manufacturing 14.18% 11.23% 0.34% 0.72% 0.31% 0.74% 0.37% 0.86%
Utility 1.31% 0.59% 18.20% 10.03% 18.13% 10.37% 15.94% 10.65%
Construction 6.15% 5.39% 0.54% 0.12% 0.49% 0.15% 0.41% 0.18%
Wholesale 23.12% 7.98% 5.30% 3.23% 5.33% 3.40% 5.87% 3.37%
Transportation 5.07% 5.17% 29.79% 16.48% 29.07% 16.29% 31.91% 17.72%
Financial services 6.83% 2.29% 4.84% 2.87% 5.03% 3.00% 4.16% 2.54%
Social services 24.43% 7.98% 1.25% 0.14% 1.31% 0.15% 1.45% 0.21%
Others 9.62% 3.99% 27.79% 11.37% 28.47% 11.77% 28.94% 12.96%
3.C A2F Household Profiles 71
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Table 3.C.1
Household Samples Based on Access to Finance and Geographic Base
The provinces located in Java island are West Java, Central Java, East Java, and Banten. The
non-Java provinces are Aceh, Jambi, West Nusa Tenggara, West Kalimantan, North Sulawesi,
and North Maluku. The number in parentheses denotes the proportion of households in that
category for each province respectively, except for Column (6) which shows the number of sam-
ples for each province respectively. Source: author’s calculations from A2F data set.
Province
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Borrowing Non Borrow Borrow Borrow Total
households borrowing from from from
households formal informal both
only only
Aceh 184 56 37 91 56 240
(6.63%) (9.61%) (11.78%) (5.90%) (6.09%) (7.14%)
Jambi 216 24 14 139 63 240
(7.78%) (4.12%) (4.46%) (9.01%) (6.85%) (7.14%)
West Java 515 85 46 310 159 600
(18.55%) (14.58%) (14.65%) (20.09%) (17.28%) (17.86%)
Central Java 405 75 45 194 166 480
(14.58%) (12.86%) (14.33%) (12.57%) (18.04%) (14.29%)
East Java 629 91 83 295 251 720
(22.65%) (15.61%) (26.43%) (19.12%) (27.28%) (21.43%)
Banten 112 8 1 96 15 120
(4.03%) (1.37%) (0.32%) (6.22%) (1.63%) (3.57%)
West Nusa Tenggara 187 53 11 123 53 240
(6.73%) (9.09%) (3.50%) (7.97%) (5.76%) (7.14%)
West Kalimantan 163 77 13 131 19 240
(5.87%) (13.21%) (4.14%) (8.49%) (2.07%) (7.14%)
North Sulawesi 188 52 25 84 79 240
(6.77%) (8.92%) (7.96%) (5.44%) (8.59%) (7.14%)
North Maluku 178 62 39 80 59 240
(6.41%) (10.63%) (12.42%) (5.18%) (6.41%) (7.14%)
2777 583 314 1543 920 3360
3.C A2F Household Profiles 73
Table 3.C.2
Insurance Ownership Based on Product Type
Public health insurance is defined as medical insurance provided by government or through PT.
Askes Indonesia (government-owned health insurance company). Private health insurance is
defined as commercial medical insurance provided by a private company. Education insurance
is basically saving for children’s education and will be disbursed in particular date when a child
enters certain level of education. Travel insurance is defined as benefit that will be received
if the holder suffers loss during business or personal trip. Accident insurance is defined as
benefit that will be paid to the holder or his/her beneficiaries if the holder suffers from accident.
Home insurance is defined as protection for dwelling house. Life insurance is defined as a lump
sum payment to the beneficiaries due to the insurance policy holder’s death. Source: author’s
calculations from the A2F data set (World Bank, 2009).
Urban Rural Total
Obs. Percentage Obs. Percentage Obs. Percentage
Public health insurance 568 41.16 589 29.75 1,157 34.44
Private health insurance 218 15.80 100 5.05 318 9.46
Home insurance 32 2.32 13 0.66 45 1.34
Education insurance 119 8.62 51 2.58 170 5.06
Vehicle/asset insurance 265 19.20 199 10.05 464 13.81
Travel/accident insurance 466 33.77 347 17.53 813 24.2
Life insurance 181 13.12 108 5.45 289 8.6
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Table 3.C.3
Financial Literacy and Mathematics Scores
The scores for financial literacy and basic mathematical skill are between 0 and 1
where 1 is the maximum score. The questions to measure financial literacy consist
of interest compounding, numeracy, inflation, and diversification. The questions
with regard to mathematical score consist of basic mathematics such as simple
algebra and arithmetic. Coefficients significant at the 1% are denoted by ∗. Source:
author’s calculations from the A2F data set (World Bank, 2009).
Cohort Obs. Financial literacy Mathematics Pairwise
correlationMean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Rural
15−24 185 0.453 0.248 0.767 0.229 0.394∗
25−34 488 0.475 0.267 0.752 0.223 0.364∗
35−44 436 0.487 0.264 0.774 0.221 0.389∗
45−54 370 0.459 0.281 0.752 0.242 0.423∗
55−64 220 0.365 0.281 0.678 0.272 0.495∗
Above 64 181 0.269 0.281 0.590 0.309 0.529∗
Overall 1980 0.442 0.277 0.736 0.247 0.449∗
Urban
15−24 91 0.516 0.252 0.864 0.152 0.331∗
25−34 331 0.581 0.261 0.853 0.184 0.338∗
35−44 412 0.579 0.258 0.856 0.170 0.275∗
45−54 270 0.577 0.277 0.850 0.181 0.484∗
55−64 171 0.557 0.256 0.861 0.191 0.275∗
Above 64 105 0.493 0.307 0.807 0.244 0.551∗
Overall 1380 0.566 0.267 0.852 0.183 0.389∗
Table 3.C.4
Average Distance to Nearest Financial Institutions
The distance was measured from the head of village office in kilometres. The Islamic Microfi-
nance was not asked in IFLS 2 and IFLS 3. The Village Credit Fund Institution was eliminated
from IFLS 4 survey. Source: author’s calculations from the IFLS data set.
IFLS2 IFLS3 IFLS4
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Bank BRI 1.982 7.599 1.885 8.084 2.389 8.790
People Credit Bank (BPR) 4.300 11.403 3.576 7.759 3.124 12.519
Village Credit Institution (LKD) 2.000 4.750 2.250 n.a. 3.042 5.667
Village Credit Fund Inst. (LKDP) 2.500 11.000 n.a. 3.000
Village Unit Cooperative (KUD) 2.609 5.183 2.321 4.237 3.609 6.679
Other formal cooperative 2.000 5.500 1.333 9.950 2.518 5.950
Private bank 4.123 13.948 2.746 21.649 3.473 17.875
Islamic Saving and
Loan Cooperatives (BMT) 2.594 10.568
Chapter 4
Credit Constraint Identification and
Household Welfare
4.1 Introduction
Credit or loans are essential for household economies in various ways. Households
use them whenever consumption smoothing is needed to cope with income changes
or health shocks. They can also support home business and investment, particularly
for financing working capital. Credit can be very flexible for households if they hold
credit cards which serve as a tool for household money management or for revolving
credit lines. This means credit is available up to certain levels for households who
have this kind of facility. However, many households may find it extremely difficult
to gain credit access. In these cases, the difficulty in accessing credit or financial
markets may impedes household welfare.
From a macroeconomic perspective, credit or financial markets are important to
an economy: they affect economic growth and equality as well as investment and
technology choices. Well-developed credit markets are crucial for conducting finan-
cial transactions through different credit channels. However, credit markets are not
properly established in developing countries (see for example Deaton, 1992).
A study by the World Bank (2009) shows that only fifty percent of Indonesia’s
population have adequate access to financial services. The rest is considered as un-
bankable with the majority living in rural areas and working in the informal sector.
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This study shows how banks and other financial services are heavily concentrated
in urban area, particularly in Jakarta which is regarded as “over-serviced”. In rural
areas, the granularity of customers matters. Four financial institutions providing fi-
nancial access in rural area are: government-owned commercial bank (BRI or Bank
Rakyat Indonesia), government-owned pawnshop (Perum Pegadaian), people credit
banks (BPR or bank perkreditan rakyat), and various types of formal and informal
microfinance institutions. These institutions serve different segments and have dif-
ferent regulations. The first three are formal financial institutions, which have formal
regulations of their operational system. The latter is dominant compared to others in
terms of the number of people participating in different ways.
Furthermore, Ghosh et al. (2001) describe important features that characterised
informal credit and financial institutions in developing countries. The features are:
(1) contracts are unlikely to be written in advance when credit agreements emerge, (2)
highly segmented credit markets with repetitive lending and long term relationships,
(3) higher interest rates compared to average interest rates in formal institutions, (4)
closely related with other markets for example labour, agricultural, and land markets,
and (5) a large amount of credit rationing or the inability to borrow according to
household needs.
The main question here is how to identify and measure accessibility of credit mar-
kets for households. Most research usually uses one of two approaches in estimating
credit constraints based on participation in credit markets: “indirect” and “direct”
methods. The “indirect” method tries to assess conditions when the credit supply can-
not match the demand for credit. This method has many difficulties in terms of dis-
tinguishing supply from demand equations. The other method is based on the survey
data on credit information, particularly on credit applications and related conditions
that emerge from these processes. Using this method, the researchers directly ask
the households about their credit rationing.
This chapter investigates credit constraints in Indonesian households mainly by
identifying and classifying the constraints using DEM (direct elicitation methodol-
ogy). This is important in order to understand the household problem of accessing
formal financial institutions. Furthermore, the welfare loss is estimated for those
who have difficulties in accessing credit markets. This study focuses on formal finan-
cial institutions since these institutions provide several advantages to households
such as low interest rates for loans and consumer protection. The number of formal
financial institutions has increased significantly for the past 30 years. However, due
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to informational disadvantage and transaction costs, the formal financial services are
limited to mainly in urban areas. Some households are still reluctant to fully access
and use formal financial services. Moreover, they may end up by getting loans from
informal financial institutions which are often more expensive than formal financial
institutions.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes various
methods used in empirical measurements of credit constraints. Section 4.3 discusses
methodology and empirical strategy by utilising A2F survey data. Section 4.4 gives
the empirical findings and discussions. Section 4.5 provides concluding remarks.
4.2 Related Literature
An individual or household is said to have access to finance if he or she can use formal
or informal financial services in the right form and at reasonable prices whenever he
or she needs it. This definition can be considered as full access to finance. One may
have partial or limited access due to different dimensions for example the scope of
products, institutional, quantity, price, gender, and age. Access to finance means
an economic opportunity for those who have the access since they are able to take
advantage from financial markets to improve their welfare.
Fernando (2007) argues a root cause of the supply side constraints is the conven-
tional view the potential market holds of those on lower incomes. This view focuses
on two interrelated ideas with regard to these particular people. The first is the po-
tential profit of the low end of financial markets. The second is the financial services
through governmental programmes and social-oriented institutions. In many devel-
oping countries, conducting transactions with formal financial institutions is often
perceived as a complicated procedure carrying high transaction costs, and may even
be intimidating, especially for women and those who have low financial literacy. Bin-
swanger and Sillers (1983) also find that risk aversion may affect different types of
small-scale potential creditors: it prevents them applying for a loan especially when
collateral is required.
Credit constraints are different to liquidity constraints. If the former exists, they
can consume more than their income but are limited by the borrowing constraints.
Liquidity constraints are considered as a condition of imperfect credit markets where
a financial intermediary does not prevail or is less effective than it should be. In
other words, the supply of credit cannot prevail to fulfil demands for credit effectively.
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Hayashi (1987) describes the way in which liquidity constraints occur under either
one of two following conditions. First, households are rationed, meaning that they
face quantity constraints on borrowing. The amount of credit needed is lower than
expected. Secondly, they may face the interest rates that are higher than the bench-
mark (market) interest rate: this is referred to as interest rate differential. However,
if credit constraints emerge, households cannot consume more than their income.
Credit constraints limit household welfare and access to financial services to cope
with needs and mitigate risks. Jappelli (1990) defines credit constraints as any sit-
uations where economic agents report unsatisfied demands for credit or any other
borrowings from financial institutions. In this context, financial institutions refuse to
grant credit due to the inherent risky conditions of the agents or asymmetric infor-
mation about the ability of the agents as lenders.
However, a household with no or small debt cannot be assumed as likely to be
constrained since the level of credit or debt is a function of credit supply and the
household’s demand for credit (see Grant, 2007). Boucher et al. (2009) classify credit
constraints into two types: (1) ex ante and (2) ex post credit constraint. The former
exists when households are not able to secure loans and are unable to take desired
actions and engage in profit maximising investment. The latter exists when they
are prevented from borrowing after decisions are made and investment outcomes are
realised. The credit constraints would have implications on the household’s ability
to pool risks across time. As the facility to absorb random shocks in income and
consumption decrease, there would be a change in behaviour towards risk. Eswaran
and Kotwal (1990) argue unequal ability to access financial market would have an
impact on the degree of risk aversion. In other words, the risk aversion can be a
reflection of inability to cope with downside income risks.
A starting point would be a condition within credit markets where demand for
credit does not meet with the credit supply. Credit rationing can be defined as a
situation where the demand for credit exceeds supply at the prevailing interest rate.
In other terms, this implies the demand and supply curves may not intersect due
to backward-bending supply curves for high levels interest rates (see Freixas and
Rochet, 2008). Households or individuals who are in such a situation face what is
called credit constraint.
Petrick (2005) documented various empirical methods on credit rationing along
with specific strengths or weaknesses. He then classified various studies on credit
rationing into six methods: (1) measurement on loan transaction costs, (2) qualitative
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information from interviews, (3) qualitative information from interviews using the
credit limit approach, (4) spill-over effects with regard to secondary credit sources, (5)
economic household modelling, and (6) econometric analysis of dynamic investment
decisions. The first four are seen as direct methods in the sense that the inference is
made based on direct information from borrowers. The last two can be classified as
indirect methods because they analyse the consequences of credit rationing through
econometrics techniques, which seek to identify credit constraints by assessing the
conditions between supply and demand of credits or loans. The interaction between
these two types may exist since indirect methods use some information generated by
direct methods.
Credit constraint identification through measurement of credit transaction costs
requires collection of specific information about households, in particular the calcula-
tion of the effective costs to gather a relevant price variable. These costs may result
in negative investments and therefore lead to exclusion of those who are not able to
repay nominal interest rests. Moreover, the value of the price variable is difficult to
measure because it requires distinguishing different types of costs that are necessary
for credit approval, monitoring, and the costs that are due to shirking loan officers
or inefficient practices. Schneider (1987) argues that providing a theoretically accu-
rate measurement of transaction costs is difficult whenever the opportunity costs of
related transaction activities are not known.
The second method identifies credit constraints from direct questions about credit
application and approval using qualitative information from survey data. For in-
stance, households can be classified into four categories according to demand for cred-
its: (1) did not have any demand for credits, (2) had demand for credit but did not ap-
ply, (3) applied for credit but was rejected, and (4) received a credit. The last category
can be divided into two subcategories: received full or partial credit. Therefore, the
first and fourth category is not credit constrained, except for those who received par-
tial credits. The second and third category can be considered as “credit constrained”.
However, the categorisation would be different based on respondent’s subjective
assessment with regard to his circumstances. Using this method, the gathered in-
formation provides consistent identification of households with exogenous liquidity.
However, this method does not quantify the severity of credit constraints nor credit
market efficiency. Another disadvantage of this method is that some information
about loan contracts, for example credit size and interest rates will not be used.
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Some studies using this approach are for example Jappelli (1990), Kochar (1997),
Guirkinger and Boucher (2008), and Boucher et al. (2009).
Boucher et al. (2009) use DEM (direct elicitation methodology) to identify credit
constraints between different types of rationing by using multinomial logit. Their
study is able to identify four different rationing: quantity, risk, transaction cost, and
price. This study focuses on the identification of credit constraint through the bor-
rower’s perception of lender credit rules.
The third method, which is called the credit limit approach tries to overcome the
limitations of the qualitative nature in the second method by asking respondents the
maximum amount of credit willing or able to be taken. This amount is the respon-
dents’ credit limit with respect to a particular lender which implies access to credit
from different sources (for example see Swaminathan et al., 2010). However, this ap-
proach has a limitation since it requires specifying particular item questions on credit
limits which are not easy to be understood by respondents.
The next method is constructed on the concept of “spill-over” which simply can be
defined as the use of secondary credit sources as a result of unsatisfied demand with
respect to the initial source of credit (Besley, 1994). This method needs detailed in-
formation from formal and informal financial institutions that are commonly used by
respondents. One must be careful to identify both primary and secondary sources of
credit since segmentation is very important. However, this measurement may gener-
ate an underestimation of credit constraints if some rationed households just accept
the constraints on formal loans and do not use the secondary sources of credit.
The last two methods, which are classified as indirect methods, are household
modelling and dynamic investment models. Studies that employed this approach,
focus on one of two main aspects: the shadow interest rate, or the identification of
interdependencies between consumption and production decision making by house-
holds. Both approaches are able to estimate the marginal effects of credit and can
be used to measure credit rationing or credit market efficiency. This is achieved by
comparing estimated effect and market interest rate. However, this approach is more
data demanding than any other method described before.
Kochar (1997) employs this approach in identifying credit rationing in different
aspects of household borrowing and different sources of credit. Using the 1981-1982
All-India Debt and Investment Survey (AIDIS), Kochar calibrates the models to esti-
mate the probability of demand and access to both formal and informal credit sources
and finds that the level of demand for credit is low. Instead of using interest rate
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differential, she use reservation cost and finds that the reservation cost is lower for
informal credit compared to formal credit which effectively reduces formal credit ra-
tioning. However, in many case in developing countries, it may be difficult to find the
interest rate differential particularly from the demand-side using micro data.
The dynamic investment models examine credit constraints by identifying viola-
tions of a theoretical investment decision model which is based on neoclassical as-
sumptions of perfect and complete capital markets (see Arrow, 1964; Arrow and De-
breu, 1954; Debreu, 1959). If imperfect capital markets exist which implies financial-
structure-dependent investment, this gives a first test of credit constraints as implied
by Hayashi (1987). Early works in this approach are more pragmatic in terms of util-
ising liquidity variable alone. Later works are more flexible by augmenting a financial
variable which is derived from a dynamic decision model. In household modelling, this
approach requires various data that sufficient large panel data needed in many cases
(for example see Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993).
This literature survey has shown that studies on credit constraints or rationing
can be developed in various ways. More sophisticated approaches in terms of micro-
econometric analysis would yield more economic meaning and interpretation of credit
constraints; in particular, about those households who are constrained. However,
most of these studies focus on rural or agricultural environments. Therefore, this
study attempts to contribute by identifying credit constraints and estimating welfare
loss for general households with Indonesian households as a case study. Secondly, the
contribution of this study also investigates the credit constraints with risk preferences
and financial literacy.
4.3 Methodology
A household’s decision to borrow depends on the demand for credits and credit supply.
Grant (2007) argues that one cannot assume that households with little or no credit
are likely to be credit constrained. The observed level of household’s credit is a func-
tion of household’s demand for credit and the credit supply from lenders or financial
institutions.
Furthermore, there are three aspects that should be addressed regarding the bor-
rowing behaviour of households. The first aspect is the number of households who
are credit constrained. The second is how to distinguish households who are likely to
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be constrained and unconstrained. The third is how much welfare loss tis caused by
credit constraints.
In observing borrowing behaviour, one must consider asymmetric information that
may exist between borrowers and lenders which leads to moral hazard and adverse
selection. In the absence of insurance markets, households are called to have notional
demand which is defined as a demand for credit in the first-best world when perfect
credit markets exist. In the presence of asymmetric information, households’ demand
for credit can be defined as effective demand.
Following Boucher et al. (2009), the presence of asymmetric information in the
credit market may also lead to non-price constraints: quantitative, transaction-cost
and risk. Quantitative rationing takes place when a potential borrower has a prof-
itable project or a productive activity but is unable to find a credit supply. This can be
considered as supply-side constraints.
The other two rationing categories imply low level of demand for credit compared
to quantitative rationing. Transaction-cost rationing occurs when a potential bor-
rower has positive notional demand but does not have effective demand for credits
due to transaction costs. Risk rationing occurs when a potential borrower has a prof-
itable project or productive activity but chooses to withdraw due to lower return. The
details of each classification will be discussed in the next section.
4.3.1 Data
In understanding the different categories of credit rationing, I use the A2F data
set which contains adequate information about Indonesian households’ financial be-
haviour (see World Bank, 2009). This nationwide survey carefully selected households
in order to ensure representativeness by using multistage random sampling based on
province (first level), district (second level) and village (third level). The final sample
comprised of 3,360 household respondents with 1920 households from Java (the main
island in Indonesia) and 1,440 from outside Java.
Using DEM method as proposed by Boucher et al. (2009), I classify households ac-
cording to their status towards the credit market as described in Figure 4.1. The clas-
sification between constrained and unconstrained households is based on the credit
supply and households’ demand for credit. Using DEM approach, the classification
can be brought into operational concept in household surveys such as the A2F survey.
The difference is that the A2F survey questions tried to capture and identify credit
rationing based on the actual experience of the household, while Boucher et al. (2009)
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use respondents’ opinions or perceptions about the possibility of getting credit from a
bank.
4.3.2 Credit Constraint Classifications
Suppose DNh denotes household h’s notional demand for credit and D
E
h denotes house-
hold h’s effective demand for credit. Notional demand for credits implies households’
demand for credit when first-best world exists or when credit markets are perfect
assuming the absence of well-functioning insurance markets.
Effective demand for credit implies demand for credit contracts available in a
world with asymmetric information. Sh denote the maximum amount of credit which
can be supplied by a lender to household h.
A household can be considered unconstrained if he is not affected by asymmetric
information. Unconstrained also implies price-rationed, meaning that credit limit
levied by lenders will not bind for these households where:
DEh =DNh ≤ Sh. (4.1)
Unconstrained households can be also divided into two groups: borrowers who have
positive effective demands and non-borrowers who have zero effective demand for
credits.
The constrained households can be divided into two types: demand-side and supply-
side constrained. A household can be considered as supply-side constrained or quan-
tity rationed when a credit limit is binding as follows:
DNh ≥DEh > Sh. (4.2)
Equation (4.2) means that household h’s notional demand for credit is equal or greater
than effective demand for credits, but the credit supply is lower than the effective
demand for credit. One important characteristic from supply-side constrained is that
the constraint comes from the credit supply in terms of credit limit. The households’
effective demand may be lower than notional demand due to asymmetric information.
If a household secures less credit than the desired credit then equation (4.2) will hold.
In identifying quantity constrained households in the A2F survey, households clas-
sified in this category are mainly rejected applicants. Those who were rejected in their
application have positive effective demand for credit; however, they face a zero credit
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Have you or any of your
household members ever
used [...] to borrow money?
In the past 12 months have you
or any of your household mem-
bers applied for a credit to [...]?
Are you or any of your house-
hold members currently us-
ing [...] to borrow money?
Was the appli-
cation accepted
or rejected?
Non-borrower
What was the
main reason of
stopped borrowing
money from [...]?
Unconstrained
RejectedAccepted
Quantity
rationed
(constrained)
Unconstrained
Risk rationed
(constrained)
Transaction
cost rationed
(constrained)
Price rationed
(uncon-
strained)
DNh =DEh ≤ Sh
DNh =DEh ≤ Sh
DNh ≥DEh > Sh DNh =DEh < ShD
N
h > DEh
Sh ≥ DEh
DNh > DEh
Sh ≥ DEh
No
Yes
No
Yes No
Yes
Figure 4.1. Borrowing Classification. The questions are taken from A2F survey module.
[...] denotes the type of financial institutions or services which the respondents were able to
choose from available options. Only respondents who use formal financial institutions are in-
cluded in the analysis. This includes formal financial institutions such as government-owned
bank, private bank; and micro finance such as cooperatives, Islamic saving and loan coop-
erative, formal saving by non-governmental organisation. DEh denotes household’s effective
demand for credit, DNh denotes household’s notional demand for credit, and Sh denotes credit
supply. Source: author’s summary from the A2F data set.
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limit from lenders. Boucher et al. (2009) identify two other groups that fall into this
category: unsatisfied borrowers and “certainly rejected” applicants. Unsatisfied bor-
rowers currently have credits but are asking for more. In other words, the credit
amount for this group is lower than their effective demand for credit. The applicants
who are “certain” of loan rejection are those who have positive effective demand and
do not apply for a credit. This is caused by past credit history or perceptions of credit
limit rules. However, questions with regard to these two types of borrowers are not
included in A2F survey.
Households who are demand-side constrained can be expressed as follows:
DNh >DEh (4.3)
Sh ≥DEh (4.4)
where the credit limit is not binding. Equation (4.3) implies effective demand is lower
than notional demand for credits that exists because of transaction costs or risk shar-
ing rules of first-best contract. Equation (4.4) implies that credit supply limits the
effective demand for credits.
In this particular case, the low level of effective demand is due to either risk or
transaction costs. To distinguish between risk and transaction-cost rationed, it is
necessary to classify households’ responses as described in Table 4.1.
The A2F also provided an alternative answer for respondents who wish to provide
a specific reason apart from available options by writing down their own reason on
the “other” option. The reasons can classified into one classification: risk, transaction
cost or price reason. Furthermore, it is important to note that the respondents already
had loans from the financial institutions, but then they decided to stop borrowing due
to a particular reason.
4.3.3 Empirical Strategy
Identifying credit constraints using the DEM approach is essentially trying to gather
information by capturing all relevant variables from borrowers’ perceptions. Boucher
et al. (2009) address some issues in using the DEM approach. The first issue is the
respondents’ perception of financial service provider definition. The sources of credit
may imply different credit rules that may also influence the decision to apply for
credit. This may also help to test sector-specific hypothesis of credit sources. The A2F
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Table 4.1
Reasons for Lack of Effective Demand for Credits
The questions are taken from A2F survey module where the respondents are asked what
was the main reason they stopped borrowing money from a particular formal financial insti-
tution. The respondents should choose one of these options or state a reason of stopped their
borrowings (Question E1.3). The elicited responses are then classified into five borrowing
classifications. Source: author’s summary from A2F data set.
Classification Reasons of stop borrowing
Unconstrained Do not need to borrow
Price rationed Prefer to save
Interest rate too high
Risk rationed Worry about the repayment
Not enough collateral
Decided to use another source of credits
Unfavourable credit term
Unfavourable repayment schedule
Do not have job or business
Do not have enough money
Transaction-cost rationed The bank officers were unfriendly or unhelpful
Inconvenient location
Institution not existed anymore
Quantity rationed The bank refused to lend
questionnaire provides options relating to various types of financial institutions so
that it would be easy for respondents to give accurate responses.
The second issue is about household versus individual constraint. The A2F sur-
vey explicitly describes that the constraints are addressed at household level, which
means that this is consistent with a “unitary” household definition. This implies that
the household head should be able to identify the effective and notional demand for
credit for the entire household. The next issue is using respondents’ perceptions of
lender supply rules. The questions should be properly designed so that they are un-
derstood by respondents.
Since various household characteristics are used to observe credit rationing, the
analysis will be conducted within a multivariate environment in particular multino-
mial logit model. Suppose Yh is a categorical variable which represents observable
credit rationing of household h and takes value 0,1, .., I. Y ∗hi is defined as the unob-
served “propensity” of household h fall into credit rationing category i:
Y ∗hi =β
′
Xh+εhi (4.5)
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where β denotes a vector of parameters with the i−th category, Xh denotes a vector of
household characteristics, εhi denotes unobservable component of the household h’s
propensity to be in the category i, and credit rationing regimes are indexed by i.
The εhi are independent and identically distributed with Weibull distribution as-
suming I+1. The probability of household h in category i is
Pr(Yh = i)=Pr
(
Y ∗hi >Y ∗h j
)
∀i 6= j. (4.6)
The objective here is to assess the correlation between the observed rationing cate-
gory and other factors that may influence credit demand such as risk preferences and
financial literacy. Another relevant variable to be considered is the applicant’s earn-
ings or income. This gives insight into the borrowing capacity and ability to repay the
credits. The annual income is the total of all household members’ income compris-
ing earnings or salary, grants or transfers, rent fee, and interest income. Household
assets can also be used as the collateral required by the banks. Other variables are
discussed as follows.
4.3.3.1 Asset Index
Since the nominal values of asset data are not provided in the A2F survey, I use asset
index as proposed by Filmer and Pritchett (2001) as a proxy for collateral. They tested
the index using data from India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Nepal. They also show
that this index have reasonable correlation between expenditures and asset variables
from the same households. Furthermore, they argue that the asset index can be used
a proxy for economic status for a household.
The questions in A2F concerning asset variables are given in two parts or subsec-
tions. The first part comprises questions the structure of the building such as main
material used for the most part of the house, roof, floor, and electricity. This part also
asks about house ownership, rent payment (if the house is rent), and credit install-
ment (if the house is purchased using credit).
The second part of this survey section comprises of assets owned by households.
The respondents are asked whether they have a specific asset and then they are asked
the quantity of asset owned by them, except for land, which is in terms of square me-
tre. The type of asset comprises 22 components, which are used to construct the asset
index. The respondents can specify one asset that is not given in the list. However,
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this is not included in the asset index construction because it may not be the same
asset type for all households.
Using principal component analysis, the index is constructed from various asset
ownership indicators that are aggregated into one variable. The index assumes that
the maximum variances and covariances in the asset variables can be used to explain
household wealth in the long run. After the principal components are derived and
the “scoring factors” are recovered, the index score for each household is calculated.
The results of principal component analysis are given in the Appendix 4.C (see Table
4.C.1, 4.C.2 and 4.C.3).
4.3.3.2 Risk Aversion
In order to capture household’s risk preference by the elicitation approach, the A2F
provides a set of questions that relate to household perception about risk (A2F Ques-
tionnaire Section L). The A2F provides a set of questions that captures household
perception of risk. The respondents are asked to play a “game” in which they have a
chance to earn a small amount of money. The question is simple, if a respondent is
willing to play the game, he or she will draw a marble from a bag of white and black
marbles. If he draws a white ball, then he will get Rp 5,000 and 0 for a black marble.
If the respondent is not willing to play, then he or she will certainly get Rp 2,000. The
other option is to refuse to play. The risk aversion can be defined as follows
U (a)≤ 1
2
U (b)+ 1
2
U (d) (4.7)
where a, b and d are the value different expected payoff which are Rp 2,000, Rp 5,000
and 0 respectively. The utility function is assumed to be:
U (c)= c
1−γ
1−γ (4.8)
where γ is the coefficient of constant relative risk aversion. Equation (4.7) implies
that one will choose uncertain payoff if the expected utility of this payoff is equal or
higher to the expected utility of certain payoff. In order to get values for the coefficient
of constant relative risk aversion, plug (4.8) into (4.7), then solve to get γ. The range
of γ is between 0.244 and 2.385. Respondents with higher γ are more risk averse.
To understand respondents’ attitudes towards credit or financial services, a financial
literacy variable is used. The A2F gives five questions about loan mechanisms (A2F
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Questionnaire Section K). For example, the question is about interest rate calculation,
comparing two different credit schemes, and diversification in farming. The literacy
score range is between zero and one where one is the highest score. Furthermore,
the level of education may also affect household decision making in applying for a
credit. Therefore, the highest attainment level of education of the household head is
also taken into account.
4.3.3.3 Financial Literacy
Financial literacy can be defined as a quantitative measure of households’ financial
decision making (see Attanasio and Weber, 2010). The questions concerning finan-
cial literacy in the A2F follow Lusardi and Mitchell (2008, 2014). The questions that
are employed to calculate financial literacy score for each household are given in Ap-
pendix 4.B.
The questions are designed to capture households’ understanding about four basic
financial skills and knowledge. These are (1) numeracy and the ability to calculate
interest rate compounding, (2) numeracy and the ability to understand the concept of
time value of money, (3) understanding of the concept of inflation and (4) understand-
ing the principle of risk diversification.
The correct answer for each question has value of one and otherwise is zero. All
answers are divided by four to get overall score. Therefore, the maximum score is one
and the minimum score is zero. The questions are designed to be simple, relevant to
daily financial decision, concise, and able to distinguish financial knowledge across
households.
4.3.4 Welfare Loss Estimations Using Matching Models
In order to measure welfare loss due to credit constraints, I use matching models
in particular average treatment models to evaluate the effects of inadequate credit
access for households. The matching models overcome selection bias if OLS methods
are used to estimate such data.
Average treatment effect (ATE) models are mainly use to evaluate economic pol-
icy such as job training (Heckman et al., 1997) and credit policy (Rui and Xi, 2010).
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that matching between treated and control units
based on propensity scores is sufficient if conditional independence assumption holds.
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This model also assumes counterfactual settings which refer to the fact that one indi-
vidual household has only one outcome.
In this study, the treated units are households who are likely to be constrained,
and the control units are borrowers who are not constrained by credit access or price-
constrained households.
Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the propensity score is defined as the
conditional probability of receiving a treatment:
p (X )=Pr(W = 1|X )=E (W |X ) (4.9)
where W ∈ {0,1} indicates the exposure to the treatment and X is the vector of house-
hold characteristics.
If the propensity score for a population of households p (Xh) is known, the average
treatment effect on the treated (ATT), in this case to the constrained households, is
estimated by:
τ=E {Y1h−Y0h|Wh = 1}
=E [E{Y1h−Y0h|Wh = 1}] (4.10)
=E [E{Y1h|Wh = 1, p (Xh)}−E{Y0h|Wh = 0, p (Xh) |Wh = 1}]
where Y1h denotes potential outcome with treatment, and Y0h denotes potential out-
come without treatment.
Since the data is not from experimental design, propensity score matching em-
ployed in this study is based on the selection of observables. The idea here is to
compare the outcome variables of households who are likely to be constrained with
those who are not constrained.
There are four methods of matching the units or these households using propen-
sity scores: nearest-neighbour, stratification, radius and kernel. Nearest-neighbour
method is a matching of treated units or the constrained households to the control
units or unconstrained households with the closest propensity scores. This is usually
applied with replacement.
Let C be the set of constrained households as the treated units and U is the set
of unconstrained households as the control units. Y Ch denotes the observed outcome
of constrained households and Y Ui denotes the observed outcome of unconstrained
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households. The nearest-neighbour is written as follows:
U (h)=min
i
∥ ph− pi ∥ (4.11)
where U (h) is the set of unconstrained household characteristics, ph and pi is the
estimated value of propensity score of household h and household i respectively.
Stratification can be done by dividing the range of propensity score variations in
intervals. Within these intervals, treated and control units will have average propen-
sity scores which can be expressed by
τSq =
∑
t∈H(q) Y Ch
NCq
−
∑
t∈H(q) Y Ui
NUq
. (4.12)
However, some matches may be considered as poor when the nearest neighbour
has an extremely different score. This issue can be overcome by implementing the
other two matching methods. First by radius matching, constrained households as
the treated units are matched only by control units this falls into a predefined neigh-
bourhood of the propensity scores of constrained households. The neighbourhood di-
mension in this particular case by radius is set in a very small value which may lead
to exclusion for some treated units which do not have controls. This can be written as
U (h)= {pi| ∥ ph− pi ∥< r}. (4.13)
For nearest-neighbour matching in (4.11) and radius matching in (4.13), the estima-
tors can be written as
τ= 1
NC
∑
c∈C
Y Cc −
1
NC
∑
j∈U
w jY Uj (4.14)
where NC is the number of units of constrained households in treated groups and w j
are the weights defined by w j =∑h wh j.
By using kernel matching method, all constrained households as treated units
are matched with a weighted average of unconstrained households as control units.
The weights are set to be inversely proportional between the propensity scores of
constrained and unconstrained households.
τK = 1
NC
∑
h∈T
Y Ch −
∑
i∈U Y Ui R
(
ph−pi
bn
)
∑
k∈U R
(
ph−pi
bn
)
 (4.15)
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where R (·) is a kernel function and bn is a bandwidth parameter. The welfare loss
can be estimated using the average treatment effects (ATT) between constrained and
unconstrained households.
To get empirical results, I employ Stata’s pscore package for the estimation of
various matching models. This package estimates propensity scores and ATT for each
matching technique (see Becker and Ichino, 2002).
4.4 Analysis and Discussions
4.4.1 Data Description
In the A2F survey, financial institutions can be divided into formal and informal insti-
tutions. Formal institutions are divided into three types: banks, micro finance insti-
tutions and pawnshops. Banks in the A2F include government banks, private banks
including Islamic banks, and people credit banks (BPR). Microfinance institutions in-
clude credit associations or cooperatives, Islamic saving and loan cooperatives (BMT),
and formal saving institution by NGOs (non government organisations). Employers,
daily banks, community welfare schemes, neighbourhood community, and family or
friends are considered as informal sources of credit. This study focuses on formal fi-
nancial institutions since these institutions ideally should cover many households as
possible. Respondents who are in the process of getting loans would not be considered
in the samples.
Based on the A2F data set, more than 17% of the total households do not have any
access to formal or informal financial institution in terms of credit and 45% of house-
holds only use informal sources of credits. If the number of households who use both
are added, then 73% of households utilise informal financial services to get a credit.
For non-Java provinces, there is around 5% of total respondents in each province who
are borrowers. From 3,360 households surveyed, only 8% of total households secured
credit from formal financial institutions only, 44% of total households had credit from
informal sources only and 26% of total households borrowed from both sources. These
facts suggest that banks and other formal institutions are still unable to cover the
majority of households despite high growth of financial service expansion after year
2000.
Only households with complete information are used in the analysis. From 3,360
households in A2F, the final samples used are 1,775 households which comprise of
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1,050 rural households and 725 urban households. Therefore, the sample rate used in
the analysis is 53% of the A2F households. More summary statistics for each credit
regime based on the location of the households are given in the Appendix 4.D (see
Table 6.B.2 and 6.B.3).
Table 4.1 provides household samples based on their location and credit classifi-
cation. The majority of urban households do not borrow from formal financial insti-
tutions. In urban area, households also have similar characteristics and have higher
proportion than urban household counterpart. In many provinces, the proportion
of households who do not borrow is on average around ten percent except for rural
households in West Nusa Tenggara and West Kalimantan and for urban households
in Jambi, West Java and North Sulawesi, which are around twenty percent.
In terms of unconstrained regime, urban households comprise of around twenty
percent while rural households comprise of eleven percent. This shows that access
to formal financial institutions may likely to occur in urban area. However, the low-
est proportion of unconstrained households can be found in Banten province. This is
quite interesting because Banten is a Java province, which was a part of West Java
province until 2000. As a newly formed province, it seems that formal financial insti-
tutions have not well developed in Banten for both rural and urban area since it was
separated from West Java province.
Credit constraints due to price-related reason seems occur in a small number
of respondents. For non-price reason, risk-related reasons take place more than
transaction-cost constraints. Demand-side credit constraints, which are due to price
and risk rationing, are likely to incur in urban than rural area. The number of house-
holds who are constrained by supply-side or quantity rationing is also higher in urban
area than rural area.
In summary, the number of urban households who can access formal financial in-
stitutions is higher than rural households. The number of unconstrained households
also follows similar pattern where urban households are higher than rural house-
holds. However, credit rationing is also likely to incur more for urban households
than rural households.
Table 4.2 describes relevant household characteristics which are related to finan-
cial market activity. Households use some of their assets as collateral in order to
secure credits from financial institutions.
The negative value of the average asset index for non-borrowers implies that these
households have a low value of assets. The high value of asset index can be found for
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unconstrained and price rationed households, indicating their ability to fulfil credit
requirements from the lenders.
The annual income is standardised from total household income for the past 12
months. Similar to asset index, non-borrowers have a relatively low level of income
compared to average households. The quantity constrained households have a rela-
tively high level of average annual income compared to other credit constraint cate-
gories.
For risk preference, households who had their credit application rejected are less
averse than others. This confirms that the lenders are reluctant to approve the ap-
plication because quantity rationed households exhibit risk taking behaviour. House-
holds who fall in the transaction-cost rationed category have a relatively high level
of risk aversion as well as negative annual income. This may also explain why these
households have more aversion given low levels of income.
As expected, households who are non-borrowers tend to have lower financial lit-
eracy scores than other households who are borrowers. This implies that financial
literacy seems play a vital role in household decision making to apply for a loan. In
other words, non-borrowers seem reluctant to apply for a credit loan due to their un-
derstanding toward financial products and knowledge. Households who are quantity
rationed seem to have a better knowledge of financial information. This may imply
they have better understanding toward financial information which motivate them to
approach formal financial institutions in order to get a loan. The rest of households
in other categories have relatively similar average financial literacy scores between
57% and 60%.
In summary, A2F households have relatively different characteristics when they
are classified based on a credit constraint regime. The results provide initial condi-
tions that could confirm the source of constraints still exists in credit markets.
4.4.2 The Impact of Different Credit Constraint Regimes
The use of DEM in defining the type of credit constraints faced by households requires
accurate questionnaire design to distinguish each credit constraint regime. Such clas-
sifications can be done as the required information given in the A2F questionnaire
enable us to do so. After the households are classified into the appropriate regime,
the multinomial logit along with the marginal effects can be estimated for each clas-
sification simultaneously. The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the impact of the
probability of being observed in each rationing regime where the independent vari-
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Table 4.3
Marginal Impact of Regressors on the Probability of Each Credit
Constraint Regime and Non-Borrower
Column (1) denotes non-borrower, (2) unconstrained, (3) price constrained, (4) risk constrained,
(5) transaction-cost constrained, and (6) quantity constrained. To estimate the marginal effects,
the regressors are set to equal to the sample median. The income variables are standardised.
The subdistrict (kecamatan) dummy is used as control variables. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and
at the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Source: author’s calculations from the A2F data set.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non Unconstrained Price Risk Transaction- Quantity
borrower cost
Age −0.004∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Asset −0.077∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.013 0.001 0.017∗
(0.016) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.007)
Education −0.015∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.000 0.001 0.005∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Financial literacy −0.141∗∗∗ 0.058∗ 0.003 0.047 0.003 0.030
(0.040) (0.024) (0.007) (0.026) (0.011) (0.017)
Annual income −0.041∗ 0.030∗∗ −0.007 0.001 0.004 0.012∗
(0.019) (0.009) (0.006) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005)
Risk aversion −0.015 0.004 0.003 0.007 −0.000 0.001
(0.009) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
ables are evaluated at median values. The marginal impact of regressors for each
rationing is given in Table 4.3. The post-estimation results for the multinomial logit
regressions are given in the Appendix 4.E (see Table 4.E.2).
Starting with quantity rationed regime in Table 4.3 Column (6), the probability of
quantity rationed household increases as the asset index increases. This type of ra-
tioning would be related to some credit rules that is usually evaluated by lenders. The
credit rules are usually related collateral or some assets that could be pledge in order
to get credit loans. The possible explanation for this is because potential borrowers
are required to pledge some of their worthy assets in order to apply for a credit that
may not fulfill the requirement needed to get a credit loan. The household income
may also play role in this context. For quantity constrained households, the prob-
ability of being classified in this category increases as household income increases.
Although the households have certain level of income, this is not adequate to secure
a loan from formal financial institutions. If we compare the marginal effect of annual
income between quantity constrained households and unconstrained households, the
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effect for the latter is lower than the former. From these results, it can be inferred
that the credit rule imposed by formal financial institutions can be assessed through
the marginal effects.
The other variables that have significant effects for quantity rationed households
are the age of respondents and their education level. The effect of age for quantity
constrained households is similar to risk constrained households and unconstrained
borrowers. For the level of education, the possibility of being quantity rationed in-
creases as the level of education is higher. Financial literacy and risk preference of
households seem do not have any effects in determining probability of being classified
in this regime. Households in the quantity rationed regime are said to have a binding
supply-side constraint.
As mentioned before, non-price rationing can be divided into risk and transaction-
cost rationing. However, for the transaction-cost rationed, nothing can be inferred (see
Table 4.3 Column (5)). This is due to an inadequate number of sample households for
this regime. For the risk rationed household, the age of the respondents is the only
variable that has significant and positive effect to the probability of being classified
in risk rationed regime. This effect is similar to the same variable as for quantity
constrained households and unconstrained households. It seems that experience af-
fects the way households interact with formal financial households. As households
get older, they accumulate experience in terms of interacting with these institutions.
Following Boucher et al. (2009), unconstrained households can be divided into
price rationing households and unconstrained borrowers. Price rationed households
here are those who stop borrowing loans from formal financial institutions due to
price-related reasons. For price constrained households, the case is the same as
transaction-cost constrained households where the number of sample households may
not be adequate to estimate the marginal effects.
For borrowers, the effect on the probability of being unconstrained is increasing
as regressors increased with the exception of risk aversion. It can be interpreted
that these households have adequate collateral capacity in terms of asset and income
would lead to higher probability of being unconstrained borrowers. The possibility
of being accepted is because the lenders are able to observe their financial capacity
based on the households’ asset and income. Again, if we compare the marginal effects
of these two variables, the unconstrained households have higher effects than any
other households in other regimes. It can be inferred that their asset and income are
above certain level, which is imposed by formal financial institutions.
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Unconstrained households are also financially literate which implies that they
have adequate knowledge in accessing and using loans from lenders. This can be
shown given the fact that the effect of financial literacy increases as the probability
of being observed in this regime also increases. In other words, those who are well
informed about financial knowledge are likely to apply successfully for credit from
financial markets. The effect of age for unconstrained borrowers is also increasing
significantly. However, it has similar effect with risk constrained and quantity con-
strained households. The level of last education obtained by the head of the household
also has positive effect toward the probability of being classified as unconstrained
households. Again, the marginal effect of education level for unconstrained house-
holds is the highest among credit constraint classification. This suggests that people
who obtained higher level of education may be able to secure loans from formal finan-
cial institutions.
As anticipated, the overall impact of explanatory variables to the probability of
non-borrowers has significant and negative marginal effects, except for risk aversion.
The non-borrowers are defined as households who do not apply for a loan to formal
financial institutions. The impacts of asset and income indicate low capability in
providing collateral to gain credit. This may suggest that non borrower households
have less confidence whenever they have to deal with formal financial institutions
especially in terms of applying and securing a loan from these institutions.
The marginal effect of age for non-borrower households is significant and nega-
tive. This may imply that younger households tend to be classified as non-borrower.
The similar interpretation can be also used to explain the level of education for non-
borrower households. Since the marginal effect of education is significantly negative,
it can be said that those who have lower level of education may not be able to or have
less access to formal financial institutions.
Moreover, the negative impact of financial literacy score indicates that they do
not have adequate knowledge of credit with its related information. One interesting
fact is that the marginal effect of financial literacy for non borrower households is
higher than any effects given by the rest of the variables. This means that financial
literacy is very critical component in explaining low level of the accessibility of formal
financial institutions in Indonesia. The low level of financial literacy also implies that
if borrowers know that the loan is too risky for them, and then they may reluctant to
continue using credit and stop borrowing. Another possible explanation is that since
they are well-informed about the credit terms, they are able to measure their ability
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to face future consequences. Therefore, they feel it would be difficult to fulfil loan
requirements.
To conclude, the key point here is each credit constraint regime can be identified
and distinguished by using multinomial logit method. Although there are inadequate
samples for price and transaction-cost constraint observation, this method is still re-
liable to distinguish the effect of different credit constraint regime. The results show
that there are different characteristics between households given their credit con-
straint classification. This excludes the age where the effects are quite similar for
unconstrained borrowers, quantity rationed and risk rationed households.
4.4.3 Welfare Loss Estimation
The most important question with regard to credit constraint classification is about
the impact of inadequate access to financial markets. Therefore, the welfare loss can
be used to answer this issue. The method used here is an ad-hoc approach using
matching models.
After classifying credit regime in the previous section, the constrained households
are then matched against unconstrained households who are borrowers. Table 4.4
provides estimation results, the impact of credit constraints on per capita income with
different treated units: price, risk, transaction-cost and quantity rationed households.
The unconstrained households are used as control in matching methods. It should be
noted that the context of this case is only for formal financial institutions based on
the A2F data.
The credit constraints have negative impacts on annual income across different
regimes with the transaction-cost constrained group as an exception. However, these
methods are only able to significantly estimate for risk constrained households. Using
a different approach of matching models, it can be shown that the welfare loss range
due to risk constraints is between Rp 16 millions to Rp 19 millions which are statis-
tically significant except for the nearest neighbour matching method. The nearest-
neighbour method seems to generate lower figures since it takes the nearest unit be-
tween propensity scores of constrained and unconstrained households as treated and
control units. The impact of risk rationing for households is between these figures,
which can be interpreted as a decrease in annual income.
The coefficients for the price constrained indicate welfare loss, which are higher
than risk rationing. However, since the coefficients are not statistically significant,
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Table 4.4
Estimation Results of Matching Models for Each Regime
The coefficients are in millions Indonesian rupiah. The treated observations are
households being constrained in a particular credit rationing regime and the con-
trol observations are unconstrained borrowers. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by ∗, at the 5%
level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Source: author’s calculations from A2F
data set.
Matching Price Risk Transaction-cost Quantity
methods constrained constrained constrained constrained
Stratification −23.6 −16.0∗∗∗ 29.3 −4.23
(10.0) (6.18) (49.3) (8.74)
Nearest neighbor −48.1 −19.2 50.6 −8.92
(4.45) (6.44) (36.9) (6.40))
Radius −23.6 −19.2∗∗∗ 29.2 −6.67
(5.57) (7.98) (50.5) (7.31)
Kernel −24.0 −16.9∗∗∗ 29.4 −6.51
(9.24) (5.03) (3.64) (8.04)
the loss may not be there. This is understandable: they refuse to continue using loans
because they are not affected by asymmetric problems.
None of the coefficients for the transaction-cost constrained regime gives statisti-
cal meaning. However, since the sign of the coefficients are different from other credit
constraint regimes, it is possible that administrative factors in formal financial insti-
tutions do not significantly affect household welfare. In other words, households are
no or less affected by transaction-cost factors such as inconvenient location and un-
friendly bank officers. Households may still able to cope with their financial circum-
stances even tough they have stopped borrowing from formal financial institutions.
For the quantity constrained households, although the coefficients are not signifi-
cant, the losses are lower than other credit constraint regime. The possibility is that
these households face supply side constraints, meaning that they may have other
sources of financing that enable them to have lower impacts than others.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
It should be noted that the purpose of DEM is to identify circumstances in multiple
type of credit constraints, not to explain how to alleviate the problems. The results
provide evidence of credit constraint in Indonesian households represented in the A2F
survey using the DEM approach. This approach is able to distinguish the difference
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between each regime. However, the results for price and transaction-cost constraints
are not sufficient due to the small number of observations.
For risk constrained, those who are unable to access credit markets suffer loss in
terms of income smoothing between Rp 16 millions and 19 millions. From the welfare
loss estimations, it can be inferred that the credit constraints for Indonesian house-
holds are more likely due to demand-side constraints in particular risk rationing.
This fact can be seen as an opportunity to tap into constrained households by giving
adequate information and offering credit terms which are appropriate for them.
In this study, the limitation comes from the survey data where it does not provide
adequate information on those households who are constrained by price reason and
transaction-cost factors. Another limitation is that the approach only allows for one
category for each household. The argument is that the a household may be classified
into various categories which is likely to change the welfare loss estimation. Fur-
thermore, a natural expansion of this study using the same data set is investigating
the spill-over effects from formal to informal financial institutions. The reasons why
households use informal financial institutions may also explain inaccessible formal
financial services to many Indonesian households.
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Appendix 4.A Variable Definitions
Table 4.A.1
Variable Definitions
Variable Definition Remarks
Age Age of the head of
the household (in
years)
The age for each household member was directly
asked to the respondents.
Annual income Household’s annual
income
The total of all household members’ income for the
past one year.
Asset index A measure of house-
hold asset
This is a proxy of household asset which is derived
on 21 types of household asset ownership for each
household using principal component analysis as
given by Filmer and Pritchett (2001). The asset list
is given in Table 4.C.2.
Education The highest educa-
tion attained by the
head of the house-
hold
Education category is converted into continuous
variable. Since A2F do not provide specific informa-
tion about the number of years spent in education,
I assume that persons in each category in manda-
tory education follow minimum number of years in
education as regulated by the government:
1. primary school: six years,
2. secondary school: three years,
3. senior high: three years.
For university category, the number of years is five
based on World Bank (2010). For not finished pri-
mary school category, the number of years spent
in school is three years based on IFLS4 data set.
Those who never go to school are given zero value.
For more information about IFLS4, see Strauss
et al. (2009).
Financial liter-
acy score
The respondent’s
understanding to-
ward basic financial
concepts
The score is based on four basic questions in fi-
nance: compounding interest, numeracy, inflation,
and diversification. The maximum score is 1
(highly financial literate) and the minimum score
is zero (financial illiterate).
Risk aversion The respondent’s
degree of risk aver-
sion
This is a proxy for risk aversion which are derived
from a set of questions about risk perception. The
answers from the head of the household are then
calculated to estimate the degree of risk aversion.
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Appendix 4.B Financial Literacy Questions
1. Suppose you borrowed Rp. 100,000 from other people and the interest rate is
2% per month. If you can not repay the within three months, how much do you
owe?
(1) Less than Rp. 102,000
(2) Exactly Rp. 102,000
(3) More than Rp. 102,000
(4) Do not know
2. Suppose you need to borrow Rp 500,000. There are two persons who offer loan
for you. The first person asks you to pay back Rp 600,000 next month. The
second person requires repayment of the principal Rp 500,000 with additional
interest rate of 15% next month. Which one do you choose?
(1) Rp. 600,000 in one month
(2) Rp. 500,000 with 15% interest rate
(3) Do not know
3. Suppose you put your money in a saving account and receive interest 1% annu-
ally. If prices were increasing by 2% annually, next year would you be able to
buy more than, less than, or exactly the same amount of goods today with the
money in your saving account?
(1) Less than the same amount of goods today
(2) Exactly the same amount of goods today
(3) More than the same amount of goods today
(4) Do not know
4. Do you think the following statement is true or false? “For farmers, planting
one crop is usually safer than planting multiple crops”.
(1) True
(2) False
(3) Do not know
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Appendix 4.C Asset Index Construction
Table 4.C.1
Principal Components for Asset Index
Principal components/correlation Number of obs = 1917
Number of comp. = 3
Trace = 21
Rotation: (unrotated = principal) Rho = 0.3336
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 4.1875 2.7358 0.1994 0.1994
Comp2 1.4518 0.0864 0.0691 0.2685
Comp3 1.3654 0.2589 0.0650 0.3336
Comp4 1.1066 0.0245 0.0527 0.3863
Comp5 1.0821 0.0270 0.0515 0.4378
Comp6 1.0550 0.0739 0.0502 0.4880
Comp7 0.9812 0.0196 0.0467 0.5347
Comp8 0.9616 0.0661 0.0458 0.5805
Comp9 0.8955 0.0444 0.0426 0.6232
Comp10 0.8510 0.0456 0.0405 0.6637
Comp11 0.8055 0.0188 0.0384 0.7021
Comp12 0.7867 0.0176 0.0375 0.7395
Comp13 0.7691 0.0466 0.0366 0.7761
Comp14 0.7225 0.0085 0.0344 0.8105
Comp15 0.7140 0.0469 0.0340 0.8445
Comp16 0.6671 0.0183 0.0318 0.8763
Comp17 0.6487 0.1031 0.0309 0.9072
Comp18 0.5457 0.0262 0.0260 0.9332
Comp19 0.5195 0.0479 0.0247 0.9579
Comp20 0.4715 0.0594 0.0225 0.9804
Comp21 0.4121 0.0196 1.0000
4.C Asset Index Construction 107
Table 4.C.2
Principal Components (Eigenvectors) for Asset Index
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Unexplained
Telephone (landline) 0.2156 −0.1863 −0.3034 .6293
Telephone (mobile) 0.3328 −0.0671 −0.0476 .5266
TV 0.3420 0.1281 −0.0420 .4841
Parabole (satellite dish) 0.1682 0.3764 −0.1779 .6326
VCD/DVD 0.3151 0.1346 −0.0609 .5528
Radio/tape 0.1923 0.1520 −0.0368 .8097
Jewelry 0.2536 0.1028 −0.0054 .7153
Sewing machine 0.1704 −0.0214 −0.0355 .8760
Car 0.2112 −0.0606 −0.1760 .7656
Other motorised vehicle 0.2946 0.1590 0.0559 .5955
Other non-motorised vehicle 0.1108 0.2519 0.1662 .8187
Refrigerator/freezer 0.3604 −0.0771 −0.1121 .4305
Electric pump 0.2884 0.0311 −0.0170 .6499
Cow 0.0107 0.2808 0.2248 .8160
Buffalo 0.0260 0.1626 −0.0505 .9553
Pig −0.0383 0.2286 −0.0618 .9128
Poultry −0.0963 0.4880 0.2735 .5132
Goat −0.0270 0.2853 0.2824 .7699
Electric fan 0.1469 −0.1212 0.4370 .6275
Rice cooker 0.2213 −0.2515 0.4700 .4014
Water dispenser 0.1685 −0.3099 0.4098 .5125
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Appendix 4.D Summary Statistics
Table 4.D.1
Descriptive Statistics: Urban Households
Non borrowers
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 454 40.015 13.414 16 77
Asset index 454 0.161 0.863 −1.295 2.259
Education 454 8.643 4.134 0 17
Financial literacy 454 0.489 .27 0 1
Annual income 454 −0.052 0.497 −0.434 4.072
Risk aversion 454 0.815 0.948 0.244 2.385
Unconstrained borrowers
Age 144 39.306 12.661 17 86
Asset index 144 0.737 0.811 −1.131 2.634
Education 144 11.604 3.863 3 17
Financial literacy 144 0.589 0.22 0 1
Annual income 144 0.506 1.246 −0.411 8.968
Risk aversion 144 0.809 0.947 0.244 2.385
Price rationed (base)
Age 14 44.643 13.293 30 74
Asset index 14 0.814 0.716 −0.347 1.832
Education 14 10.929 4.287 3 17
Financial literacy 14 0.571 0.267 0 1
Annual income 14 0.021 0.314 −0.314 0.568
Risk aversion 14 1.315 1.111 0.244 2.385
Risk rationed
Age 37 47.162 12.253 28 72
Asset index 37 0.562 0.917 −1.128 2.309
Education 37 9.081 4.192 3 17
Financial literacy 37 0.587 0.229 0 1
Annual income 37 0.055 0.457 −0.414 1.341
Risk aversion 37 1.228 1.082 0.244 2.385
Transaction-cost rationed
Age 5 42.4 16.861 24 68
Asset index 5 0.486 1.1378 −1.077 1.832
Education 5 12.8 4.549 6 17
Financial literacy 5 0.6 0.224 0.25 0.75
Annual income 5 2.487 5.326 −0.384 11.975
Risk aversion 5 0.244 0 0.244 0.244
Quantity rationed
Age 71 43.493 12.589 23 76
Asset index 71 .752 0.759 −0.833 2.116
Education 71 11.38 4.261 0 17
Financial literacy 71 0.595 0.248 0 1
Annual income 71 0.574 1.206 −0.394 5.833
Risk aversion 71 0.817 0.955 0.244 2.385
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Table 4.D.2
Descriptive Statistics: Rural Households
Non borrowers
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 840 40.777 14.957 15 95
Asset index 840 −0.421 0.744 −1.353 2.082
Education 840 5.662 3.846 0 17
Financial literacy 840 0.391 0.268 0 1
Annual income 840 −0.216 0.673 −0.438 16.286
Risk aversion 840 0.761 0.917 0.244 2.385
Unconstrained borrowers
Age 116 43.552 11.793 17 78
Asset index 116 0.429 0.843 −1.208 2.129
Education 116 9.009 5.107 0 17
Financial literacy 116 0.537 0.266 0 1
Annual income 116 .346 1.636 −0.428 15.476
Risk aversion 116 1.001 1.028 0.244 2.385
Price rationed
Age 5 39 12.787 20 53
Asset index 5 0.409 1.073 −0.696 1.716
Education 5 10 4.637 6 17
Financial literacy 5 0.5 0.306 0.25 1
Annual income 5 0.045 0.407 −0.339 0.558
Risk aversion 5 0.672 0.958 0.244 2.385
Risk rationed
Age 31 40.839 12.681 21 65
Asset index 31 −0.104 0.778 −1.208 1.857
Education 31 6.387 2.974 3 12
Financial literacy 31 .476 0.284 0 1
Annual income 31 −0.092 0.472 −0.431 1.821
Risk aversion 31 0.728 0.91 0.244 2.385
Transaction-cost rationed
Age 8 41.25 13.036 24 64
Asset index 8 0.194 0.806 −1.076 1.387
Education 8 7.75 4.773 3 17
Financial literacy 8 0.5 0.267 0 0.75
Annual income 8 −0.226 0.106 −0.343 0.013
Risk aversion 8 1.047 1.108 0.244 2.385
Quantity rationed
Age 454 40.0154 13.414 16 77
Asset index 454 0.161 0.863 −1.295 2.259
Education 454 8.643 4.134 0 17
Financial literacy 454 .4889 0.27 0 1
Annual income 454 −0.052 0.497 −0.434 4.072
Risk aversion 454 0.815 0.947 0.244 2.385
4.E Multinomial Logit Regression 111
Appendix 4.E Multinomial Logit Regression
Table 4.E.1
Multinomial Logit Regression
Number of obs = 1775 LR χ2(149) = 577.50
Log likelihood = −1316.5798 Prob > χ2 = 0.00
Pseudo R2 = 0.18
Sub-district dummies are employed in the estimations but the results are not displayed.
Coefficient Std. Err. z P > |z| 95% confid. interval
Non borrowers
Education −0.145 0.067 −2.160 0.031 −0.277 −0.013
Asset index −1.099 0.379 −2.900 0.004 −1.842 −0.357
Annual income 0.833 0.673 1.240 0.216 −0.486 2.152
Risk aversion −0.356 0.229 −1.550 0.120 −0.806 0.093
Financial literacy −0.617 0.929 −0.660 0.506 −2.438 1.203
Age −0.033 0.019 −1.730 0.083 −0.070 0.004
Constant 7.379 1.440 5.130 0.000 4.557 10.201
Unconstrained borrowers
Education −0.019 0.068 −0.270 0.786 −0.153 0.115
Asset index −0.493 0.386 −1.280 0.201 −1.250 0.263
Annual income 1.270 0.673 1.890 0.059 −0.049 2.588
Risk aversion −0.288 0.234 −1.230 0.219 −0.747 0.172
Financial literacy 0.310 0.951 0.330 0.744 −1.554 2.175
Age −0.012 0.019 −0.600 0.548 −0.050 0.026
Constant 3.097 1.470 2.110 0.035 0.217 5.978
Price rationed (base outcome)
Risk rationed
Education −0.127 0.075 −1.690 0.092 −0.275 0.021
Asset index −0.714 0.418 −1.710 0.087 −1.532 0.105
Annual income 0.913 0.711 1.280 0.199 −0.482 2.307
Risk aversion −0.170 0.258 −0.660 0.510 −0.676 0.336
Financial literacy 0.612 1.046 0.590 0.558 −1.438 2.662
Age −0.008 0.021 −0.360 0.718 −0.049 0.034
Constant 2.753 1.592 1.730 0.084 −0.367 5.872
Continued on next page
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Table 4.E.1 – continued from previous page
Coefficient Std. Err. z P > |z| 95% confid. interval
Transaction-cost rationed
Education −0.008 0.103 −0.080 0.936 −0.211 0.194
Asset index −0.925 0.556 −1.660 0.097 −2.015 0.166
Annual income 1.312 0.682 1.920 0.055 −0.026 2.650
Risk aversion −0.351 0.392 −0.900 0.371 −1.119 0.417
Financial literacy −0.126 1.450 −0.090 0.931 −2.968 2.715
Age −0.010 0.029 −0.350 0.728 −0.066 0.046
Constant 1.141 2.108 0.540 0.588 −2.991 5.273
Quantity rationed
Education 0.005 0.071 0.070 0.945 −0.134 0.144
Asset index −0.554 0.397 −1.390 0.163 −1.333 0.225
Annual income 1.214 0.674 1.800 0.072 −0.107 2.536
Risk aversion −0.308 0.245 −1.260 0.209 −0.789 0.173
Financial literacy 0.359 0.990 0.360 0.717 −1.582 2.300
Age 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.997 −0.039 0.039
Constant 1.746 1.527 1.140 0.253 −1.246 4.738
Table 4.E.2
Post-estimation for Multinomial Logit Regression
Log-Lik Intercept Only: −1605.330 Log-Lik Full Model: −1316.580
D(1553): 2633.160 LR(170): 577.500
Prob > LR: 0.000
McFadden’s R2: 0.180 McFadden’s Adj R2: 0.083
Maximum Likelihood R2: 0.278 Cragg & Uhler’s R2: 0.332
Count R2: 0.733 Adj Count R2: 0.015
AIC: 1.658 AIC*n: 2943.160
BIC: −9486.961 BIC′: 537.252
Chapter 5
The Impacts of Earnings Risk on
Education and Savings
5.1 Introduction
As the main source of income, occupational earnings or salary contributes signifi-
cantly to a household’s welfare. Many economic decisions that households make,
including those about education and savings, are based on the nature of earnings.
Education has become an important component of human capital acquisition and in-
fluences earnings.
According to Mincer (1958, 1974), the earnings function is determined by invest-
ment in human capital and work experience. Education can be considered as a con-
tributing factor to human capital. In the field of neoclassical economics, Mincer (1958)
also introduced the term “human capital” where he argues that it is highly associated
with the occupational composition. Furthermore, Becker (1964, 1993) provides details
and comprehensive understanding on human capital. He defines that human capital
as a different type of capital, which can be gained through investment in education,
training, and other expenditures such as health treatment or medical care. The most
distinctive feature of human capital is that knowledge, skills, and health cannot be
separable from its owner. This means that human capital cannot be transferable like
physical capital. Furthermore, in terms of human capital as means of production,
one’s rate of return on human capital determines one’s outputs.
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Mincer (1958, 1974) argues that educational differences also determine inequality
in earnings distribution. Mincer’s approach is able to explain the return to human
capital, but do not capture some factors such as earnings uncertainty, saving deci-
sions, or schooling decisions in the past. Earnings to some extent become uncertain
when households decide to enter schooling.
In anticipating uncertainty about future earnings, households use their savings
as a “buffer”. The results of supplying their labour services are accumulated usually
as savings which mainly are regarded as “self-insurance” against shocks that arise
from consumption or earnings variability. Saving behaviour and labour supply are
highly related to age-earnings profile of households. Therefore, this is also related
to permanent income and life cycle hypothesis (PIH/LCH). PIH/LCH theory predicts
that during the early life stage households rationally tend to accumulate their assets
in savings and financial instruments, and consume these assets during retirement.
However, since the span of life is quite long and earnings risk is very high, households
tend to save more for unpredictable circumstances. The motivation to save due to
uncertainty over labour income is commonly known as precautionary motives.
The aim of this study is to investigate the role of schooling or education in antici-
pating earnings risk in the future. Secondly, it investigates household attitude toward
earnings risk, in particular the impact of earnings risk on savings as a mechanism
to mitigate future uncertainty. Therefore, this study considers that saving behaviour
can be affected by schooling decisions.
At macro economic level, investment in human capital is necessary for economic
growth. However at micro level, if the certainty equivalent return to such investment
is lower close to higher earnings risk, there will be less incentive to enter schooling
and this will possibly affect household saving as well. The rest of this study is as
follows. Section 5.2 provides a literature review on savings and labour supply. Section
5.3 outlines the theoretical framework and empirical strategy employed in this study.
Section 5.4 discusses empirical findings and section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Related Literature
The labour decision in terms of occupational choice is usually influenced by educa-
tional background. Occupational choice can be defined as a set of individual decision
making processes leading towards a particular occupation. Banerjee and Newman
(1993) argue that the dynamics of the choice have a significant impact on the de-
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velopment process in particular to the distribution of income and wealth. Moreover,
the motivation to enter different occupations is determined by the individual’s wealth
which also affect saving decisions and risk bearing. The job decision is also influenced
by educational background which is usually decided before entering certain occupa-
tions. Since different types of occupation have different risk, then the risk should be
compensated in the labour wage income or earnings.
A theoretical model of risk and human capital can be found in Levhari and Weiss
(1974) which is developed from the perfect foresight assumption. They studied labour
earnings uncertainty which is determined by human capital where this capital can
be considered riskier than physical capital. The uncertainty comes from two sources:
household exogenous characteristics and imperfect knowledge of future market con-
ditions. They argue that the risk is inversely correlated with the human capital in-
vestment. However, there is an ambiguous effect in savings, given the human capital
investment, if there is an increase interest rates.
In studying human capital, the work of Mincer (1958, 1974) has been used widely
in labour economics to describe the relationship between earnings function and school-
ing or education. In this model, the earnings process is captured by the education level
and experience. Since there is a risk and return relationship between these variables,
risk measure of earnings variability can be derived. Some literature on earnings risk
such as Hartog et al. (2003) and Bonin et al. (2007) and others such as Pereira and
Martins (2002) utilise this approach to estimate the return to education.
Pereira and Martins employ quantile regressions on this earnings function using
micro data from 16 countries and compare the results to finance theory. The earnings
risk is defined by the difference in returns in different deciles. They find that there
is a positive relationship between the return to human capital and the related risk
where the investment in human capital shares similar characteristics to other assets.
Hartog et al. (2003) and Bonin et al. (2007) use Mincer functions to derive earn-
ings risk based on the occupational classification where both utilise cross-sectional
data. Hartog et al. (2003) also find that earnings risk has a positive correlation with
individual wages. Bonin et al. (2007) explore the role of risk attitudes in determin-
ing the earnings risk. Their findings show that people with low risk aversion tend to
take jobs with high earnings risk. However, both do not fully explore the relationship
between earnings risk and saving.
Using a similar approach, Betermier et al. (2012) investigate the relationships
between earnings risk and financial investment decisions using Swedish panel data.
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They estimate earnings risk from an average of earnings volatility based on industry
classification. The interesting part of this study is that the risk here is not only
applied to earnings risk but also human capital risk in the stock market. This study
finds that in order to anticipate earnings risk, households tend to switch jobs and
then adjust their investment portfolios.
The labour decision affects the way household use some part of their earnings
as a precautionary savings. The first model of saving as insurance is proposed by
Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1992, 1997). Their paper argues that the adjustment
toward labour supply comes through household expenditure while previous models
usually dissociate consumption from income.
In particular, Deaton’s model provides an explanation of how flexibility in labour
supply may affect household in two ways. Firstly, it allows households to work harder
and earn more income in order to anticipate uncertainty shocks. Secondly, it allows
households to respond to earnings shock by changing working hours in order to reduce
uncertainty. He also argues that the microeconomic process of income is different
from the aggregate macroeconomic process where variances in households’ earnings
are dominated by specific components: some are permanent and some transitory. This
results in negative serial correlation of income due to a high level of transitory income.
If the income process is independent, there will be no saving generated.
Low (2005) use simulations to show households’ intertemporal choice between
work and consumption. In his study, young households borrow more and middle-age
households save more given a constant labour supply. When uncertainty is intro-
duced with constant preference parameters, young households work harder in terms
of working hours and they consume less. Moreover, he emphasises that precautionary
saving models should include labour supply due to its effect on consumption growth
and wealth accumulation. A similar theoretical framework by Basu and Ghosh (2001)
shows how the role of uncertain tax rate in labour supply leads to uncertainty in earn-
ings. Using a two period model when households work and save, they argue that the
relationship between savings and income is determined by preference parameters.
From an empirical standpoint, many studies on precautionary savings have pro-
vided mixed results. Using the 1984 UK Family Expenditure Survey, Dardanoni
(1991) finds that precautionary savings significantly characterise saving behaviour
comprising 60% of total savings. This study also shows that when income variance
is higher, the average consumption tends to be lower across occupational choice and
industry.
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Using PIH/LCH framework, Carroll and Samwick (1997) derive a theoretical and
empirical approach to precautionary savings. They derive earnings risk estimations
using the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data to investigate the re-
lationship between earnings risk and wealth. They find that wealth is significantly
related to the level of transitory and permanent income uncertainty. In this study,
the time preference is significantly important for younger households and households
begin to save money for retirement around the age of 50.
The similar application of Carroll (1992, 1997) can be found for example in Lusardi
(1998) and Guariglia (2001). Using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data set,
Lusardi derives a precautionary saving estimation using subjective data. She argues
that the variance in earnings can be used to explain saving behaviour and wealth ac-
cumulation. Precautionary saving is important but it does not provide an explanation
of the asset holdings of very rich households. Using the British Household Panel Sur-
vey (BHPS), Guariglia uses various measures of earnings risk which are statistically
significant in explaining saving behaviour. She also finds that households tend to
save more if they expect that they will experience financial difficulties. Most of these
studies derive earning risk from life-cycle data.
A recent study by Deidda (2014) shows that Italian households tend to have higher
precautionary savings particularly those who are rationed or expect to face credit con-
straints. Another study by Benito and Saleheen (2013), working hours and labour
market participation from BHPS data is used as a proxy for a “buffer” against future
uncertainty. The risk measures are financial shocks which are derived from individ-
uals’ judgments of their financial situations. This study finds that households adjust
their working hours to anticipate financial shock.
To summarise, the literature mainly focuses on two important issues. The first
group has more emphasis on earnings risk as a part of the labour income process
which is influenced by education background, while the second group of literature dis-
cusses precautionary savings and other labour variables as a buffer against earnings
risks. One particular issue that has not yet been widely explored is the relationship
between earnings risk and schooling decision. The challenge of many empirical stud-
ies concerned with precautionary savings and schooling decisions, is how to measure
income or earnings risk where it is exogenously observable.
5.3 Methodology 118
5.3 Methodology
This study aims to consider the quantitative impact of earnings risk to savings and
schooling decisions using Indonesian households as a case study. Specifically, the
contribution examines the sensitivity of schooling and saving to earnings risk when
measured by occupational classification given the Indonesia Family Life Survey (or
IFLS) data constraints. Different from previous studies, which utilise time series
or panel data, IFLS is a longitudinal study which to some extent makes empirical
estimations challenging.
To measure household’s earnings risk, three different approaches to estimate earn-
ings risk are implemented. This section provides the theoretical foundation of the
relationship between risk, education, and savings. The earnings risk measurement is
subsequently explained along with the data source and empirical strategy.
5.3.1 Theoretical Framework
The theory of human capital investment mainly assumes that households have perfect
foresight over future earnings. The theoretical framework of this study is adopted
from Basu and Ghosh (2001). However, their model focuses on the effect of tax rate
uncertainty to labour supply decisions and savings. The present study examines the
effects of earnings risk on these variables. During their time in school, individuals
usually receive support from their parents. At the same time, this decision implies
that they are willing to give up current potential earnings in order to earn more in
the future.
Suppose there are two periods where the time is discrete. The agent spends the
first part of his youth at school and then enters the labour market. The decision
about schooling and work was made when he was young. The total time spent on
schooling and work is given by 1−`1. The earnings from this investment is received
in the second period but was uncertain at the time when the decisions about time
of schooling and work is made. The stochastic earnings is given by W˜ . This return,
which results in future earnings, is uninsurable. 1−`1 denotes labour supply and 1
is normalised time endowment. The example is a college student does not know her
or his potential earnings in the future. The agent works in period 2 and receives all
his earnings W˜ (1−`1).
Since the decision concerning schooling and work is made in the first period, the
term 1−`1 can be interpreted as an investment in human capital which yields earn-
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ings risk W˜ in the second period. In the Mincerian framework, the time spent for
work can be considered as a post-schooling investment. Therefore, 1−`1 interchange-
ably refers to schooling and work. Assuming that the interest rate is constant, saving
amounts in period 1 can be defined as
S1 =Y −C1 (5.1)
where Y denotes exogenous income, and C1 denotes consumption level in period 1.
The household’s consumption in period 2 is given by
C˜2 = S1R+W˜ (1−`1) (5.2)
where R is gross risk-free rate of return on saving. The household’s risk preference
is characterised by constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). The risk preference is
captured by
V
(
C˜2
)= A− e−γC˜2 A > 0 (5.3)
where γ > 0 is the risk aversion parameter. Following Selden (1978), the certainty
equivalent level of period 2 consumption is
A− e−γĈ2 =E
[
A− e−γC˜2
]
(5.4)
where Ĉ implies non random consumption. Using (5.2) and simplifying the terms to
arrive at
−γĈ2 =−γS1R+ logE
[
e−γW˜(1−`1)
]
.
Therefore Equation (5.2) can be written as
C˜2 = S1R+Q (5.5)
where
Q
(
`1,γ
)=−1
γ
logE
[
e−γW˜(1−`1)
]
(5.6)
is the certainty equivalent earnings for a given labour supply. The effect of earn-
ings risk is captured by the risk aversion parameter. Equation (5.5) and (5.6) imply
the importance of utility-based specifications when the certainty equivalence is taken
into consideration of schooling decision. At the certainty equivalent earnings level, a
household will have no preference between work or education.
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The household’s optimisation problem can be written as
C1−α1
1−α +
`1−α1
1−α +β
Ĉ1−α2
1−α
subject to (5.1), (5.5), and (5.6). α> 0 denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elastic-
ity of substitution and 0<β< 1 denote the utility discount factor.
The first-order conditions are given by
C−α1 =βRĈα2 (5.7)
`−α1 =βĈ−α2 W` (5.8)
where W` =−Q`. The term Q` is defined as
Q`
(
= ∂Q
∂`1
)
=−
E
(
W˜ e−γW˜(1−`1)
)
E
(
e−γW˜(1−`1)
) . (5.9)
Basu and Ghosh (2001) show that an increase in earnings uncertainty unambigu-
ously increases labour supply because households want to smooth their consumption
and therefore they work harder. The effect on saving, however, depends on how such
an earnings uncertainty impacts the certainty equivalent wage income Q.1 When
earnings risk rises, the effect on certainty equivalent income Q can be understood by
writing the following decomposition of Q:2
dQ
dγ
= ∂Q
∂γ
+ ∂Q
∂`1
× ∂`1
∂γ
The first term captures the “pure risk effect” which is unambiguously negative as
shown by Basu and Ghosh. It implies that the earnings uncertainty decreases the
certainty equivalent earnings for a given labour supply. The second term which they
call “utility smoothing effect” is positive because in response to a higher earnings un-
certainty the household would work harder to smooth his consumption. Although the
net effect on is theoretically ambiguous, for empirically plausible parameter values
1Basu and Ghosh (2001) actually focuses on wage income tax uncertainty. Earnings are uncertain in
Basu and Ghosh (2001) due to income tax uncertainty. I abstract from income tax issues and consider
overall earnings uncertainty. The basic theoretical principle of Basu and Ghosh (2001) holds for overall
earnings uncertainty which is my principal concern here.
2Basu and Ghosh (2001) formulate a higher income risk as a rise in the risk aversion parameter
from zero level.
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they argue that Q is lower when earnings risk is higher. If the certainty equivalent
income Q is lower, by virtue of permanent income hypothesis it follows that savings
would rise to mitigate earnings risk.
I test these two key hypotheses of Basu and Ghosh (2001) using two reduced-form
equations as follows:
`i = θ0+θ1V ar(W`,i)+
∑
h=1
θhVh,i+²i (5.10)
and
Si =ϑ0+ϑ1V ar(W`,i)+
∑
h=1
ϑhVh,i+²i. (5.11)
where Vh,i denote control variables h such as household characteristics for individual
i and ²i denotes residual terms. In order to derive the empirical results, Equation
(5.10) and (5.11) can be estimated using cross-sectional approach. The reason to use
cross-section household information is to accommodate the nature of IFLS data, which
is a longitudinal study of Indonesian households.
5.3.2 Earnings Risk Measurement
As mentioned in the previous section, the way that earnings risk is measured, is very
important in determining the effect of earnings variability on savings and the labour
supply. For this purpose, the Mincer earnings function is employed to derive the risk
measures. Suppose there are two periods where the return to schooling at education
period is ρn and the return to schooling after education period is ρp.
Mincer assumes that individuals have identical abilities and opportunities. These
individuals also do not earn during their education. There are no direct costs of educa-
tion and the credit markets are perfect meaning that individuals are able to optimise
earnings throughout their lifetime. The earnings function can be expressed as follows:
logWt = logW0+ρnNi+ρp
t−1∑
i=0
ki (5.12)
where Wt denotes earnings at period t, W0 denotes initial earnings, and N is the
length of schooling or education.
Consistent with the theory in the previous section, Equation (5.12) implies that ki
comprises two components: (1) a schooling period S where ki = 1 for all i, and (2) a
post-schooling investment where ki is monotonically decreased to zero on retirement.
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Define X as a post-schooling period captured by years of work experience where
t=T−n, the estimable equation of (5.12) can be rewritten
logWi jt = logW0+ρnNi j+φ0X i j+φ1X2i j+εi j (5.13)
which is known as the standard form of Mincer wage regression. Parameter ρn can
be interpreted as the return to educational investment.
The ratio of φ0/φ1 implies the return to experience. The experience is defined
as work or labour-market experience that one accumulates through his occupational
activities. Therefore, the return in this case can be interpreted as the contribution of
work experience to wages earned. The regression function in (5.13) can be extended
by augmenting the individual or demographic characteristics, including location, age,
gender, and occupation.
Earnings risk can be based on occupational sorting, that is a process of classifying
occupation into certain groups based on certain parameters, mainly job tasks, require-
ments, environments, and locations. People tend to choose their occupation based on
these characteristics and choices are usually related to their educational background
or previous work experience, where it exists. When this can be done, the earnings
characteristics for each sorting can be traced. Therefore, the earnings risk can be
measured.
Bonin et al. (2007) shows that earnings risk can be derived from Mincerian wage
regression based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO).
In this study I use job classification based on the definition given in the IFLS survey:
sector/industry and employment type. The combination of sector and employment
type can be considered as occupational sorting. The occupational classification or
sorting in this study are defined by the sector where an individual works, and the
employment type.
There are nine sectors or industries given in the IFLS: (1) agriculture, forestry,
fishing and hunting, (2) mining and quarrying, (3) manufacturing, (4) electricity, gas
and water, (5) construction, (6) retail, restaurants and hotels, (7) transportation, stor-
age, and communications, (8) finance, insurance, real estate and business service,
and (9) social services. The employment type consists of (1) government workers, and
private workers. In the latest survey or IFLS4, there are two additional types of em-
ployment: (3) casual workers in agriculture, and (4) casual workers not in agriculture.
Therefore, the earnings risk is exogenously classified by this category.
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Following Hartog et al. (2003) and Bonin et al. (2007), the occupation-specific vari-
ance of the residuals is utilised as an earning risk measure. In this study, I employ
three earnings risk measures. The first measure is based on the Mincer equation as
in (5.13) where earnings risk is estimated by
σ2i j =
1
N j
∑
i
(
εˆi j− ε¯ j
)2 (5.14)
where εˆi j denotes residuals of individual observations belonging to occupation j de-
rived from the Mincer regression in (5.13) and ε¯ j denotes the mean value of residuals
of a specific occupation category. Since the residuals are classified based on the occu-
pation j, it is not necessary to have a zero value in ε¯ j.
The earnings risk here is measured by the cross-sectional variance of the earnings
shock. Note that in the stylised two-period model, a mean preserving increase in
variance lowers the certainty equivalent income (for proof see Basu and Ghosh, 2001).
Therefore, the variance of earnings is an adequate proxy of earning risk and it relates
reasonably well to the risk specification in the stylised two-period model.
The second measure is cross-sectional variances based on the following equation
logW ′i jt = logW0+φ0X i j+φ1X2i j+εi j. (5.15)
Compare to (5.13), (5.15) only includes post-schooling or working experiences. The
earnings risk is derived using the same steps as in the first measure where
σ
2,ne
i j =
1
N j
∑
i
(
εˆi j− ε¯ j
)2. (5.16)
where σ2,nei j is earnings risk which includes only working experience. Therefore, the
empirical results for this estimation is different than the results provided by (5.14)
which includes both education and post-schooling activities.
For both earnings risk measures, the cross-sectional variance σ2j can be estimated
from earnings regression residuals εˆi j for each occupation type j, not individual ob-
servations i.
Since earnings risk can be also interpreted as earnings dispersion, the third mea-
sure of earnings risk is based on the earnings range, which is defined by
logWi,range = log
(
Wi,max−Wi,min
)
(5.17)
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where Wi,max and Wi,min denotes the maximum and minimum earnings that a house-
hold received across the survey waves. Using this measure, the households’ expecta-
tion towards their earnings is examined. This earnings range can be interpreted as
earnings instability across the survey waves.
5.3.3 Data
The data used in this research is the Indonesia Family Life Survey where IFLS2 in
1997, IFLS3 in 2000, and IFLS4 in 2007 are employed. IFLS1 do not provide the same
information about labour classification as given in the subsequent surveys. The unit
of observations is a household head who is employed during the length of the survey
and from whom the demographic information is obtained. Since the earnings risk is
derived from one occupation choice, only the primary job that consumes the most time
will be analysed. Those who are self employed cannot be included in the analysis.
The education information that is captured in IFLS is based on the highest educa-
tion level attained by heads of the households. The important information of house-
holds’ educational background is captured within the IFLS data set. In order to get
the number of years in education, the period of education is calculated based on the
last level of education attended by the head of the households.
For the purpose of analysis, the information retrieved from the data set is then re-
lated to labour supply information such as earnings, occupational sector, employment
type and working hours. As usual, the respondents’ demographic characteristics are
also retrieved. Earnings calculation is based on the labour income received by the
head of households. If the head has more than one occupation, then the occupation
that consumes most of the working hours is selected.
A unique characteristic of Indonesian households is how they prepare a “buffer”
against risk and uncertainty. There is no specific question about the reasons or mo-
tives for households to save. However, according to Frankenberg et al. (2003), in
addition to saving in banks, Indonesian households have a tendency to keep jewellery
as a precautionary measure. Therefore, the definition of savings in this study includes
savings and deposits in banks, shares, and also jewellery. Another proxy for saving is
the saving to earnings ratio.
The data is trimmed by dropping observations where there is an extreme value of
savings to earnings ratio greater than five. This equals around 10% of the total com-
plete observations for each IFLS wave. Finally, the earnings and saving calculations
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are adjusted into 2000 Indonesian currency by using the price deflator taken from
BPS.
There is some limitation of using IFLS data to assess earnings risk. As explained
in the previous section, the nature of the IFLS data gives an empirical implication
in interpreting the results. If the household information is pooled and estimated in
a panel data environment, there is a loss of information since there is only a small
number of samples that can be used in the estimations. Therefore, a cross-sectional
approach is the optimal way in deriving the estimations from the respected models.
In order to control the estimation results, the study uses household-specific vari-
ables, which are available in IFLS data such as household head’s age and gender.
Other variables can be also derived from the dataset such as household size and de-
pendency ratio. The dependency ratio is calculated as follows:
Dependency
ratio
= number of people aged 0-14 and those aged 65 and above
number of people aged between 15 and 64
×100.
This ratio measures the ratio between those who are not in the labour force and those
who are typically in the labour force and live under one household. People who are not
in the labour force are called dependents to those who are assumed to be productive
part of the household.
Appendix 5.A provides summary statistics for savings, earnings and education of
IFLS households used in this study. Table 5.A.1 presents the summary statistics of
samples used in this study along with the number of observations taken from total
IFLS households. Table 5.A.2 gives the summary of earnings risk estimates based on
occupation type and sector classification of the respondents. Table 5.A.3 presents the
summary of each earnings risk measure based on age cohort.
5.4 Empirical Findings and Discussions
Earnings and employment vary across the life cycle and by occupational type. At the
same time, saving decisions can be also affected by these variables. Moreover, the
behaviour of saving over the life time of households in developing countries is differ-
ent compare to developed economies. The difference can be a result of socio-economic
environments, financial access, and related government regulations such as retire-
ment policy. The buffer-stock theory predicts that when households face uncertainty
over their earnings, they will make precautionary savings to anticipate the uncer-
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tainty. Households may have impatience as well as prudent behaviour as a result of
a precautionary motive.
5.4.1 Education Profiles of the Head of the Households
Until the last IFLS wave in 1997, the educational system is organised under two min-
istries: the Ministry of Education and Culture, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs.
The educational system is historically and culturally influenced by religious systems
such as Hindu–Buddhism and Islam. The modern education system was introduced
by the Dutch during the occupation era: its influence has shaped current educational
policy.
A mandatory schooling program has been established since 1950 when Law Num-
ber 4/1950 regarding Basic Education and Teaching in Schools (Undang Undang
Nomor 4/1950 tentang Pendidikan dan Pengadjaran di Sekolah). Under this law,
education was compulsory for children between 8 and 14 years old. In 1984, the law
was changed and all Indonesia citizens must undertake mandatory education, which
consists of six years in elementary level and three years in junior high school level.
Under Law Number 20/2003 regarding the National Education System (Undang Un-
dang Nomor 20/2003 tentang Sistem Pendidikan Nasional), all Indonesia citizens
aged 6 years are able to start and participate in national education system and the
government has a responsibility to provide basic education for all Indonesians. Na-
tional mandatory education is based on a universal basic education paradigm which
states that every Indonesian has a right to participate in basic education.
Currently, there are four broad levels of education in Indonesia: elementary school,
junior high school, senior high school and higher education. For junior and senior
high school, the classification can be divided into two types: general and vocational
education. Those who have been in work for several years but do not have elemen-
tary, junior or senior high school are able to attend an adult education package which
consists of the same duration of participation.
For higher education, the classifications are college and university. The college
education which is commonly called an academy or polytechnic focuses on applied
or vocational education and usually lasts for three years. University education has
three levels: bachelor, masters, and doctorate degrees all of different duration. In
many cases, those who already hold diplomas from college, enter the undergraduate
programme in order to get higher degrees and would expect to earn more income after
5.4 Empirical Findings and Discussions 127
graduation. Some may not be satisfied with their current occupation due to inherent
occupational risk or employment conditions.
Another classification is based on religious-based education for all levels of edu-
cation in particular Islamic education. The government requires these institutions to
adopt the national curriculum. The students are also required to take equivalent ex-
amination as a part of the graduation process. Therefore, religious-based educational
institutions generally has the same structure and duration as education in public
institutions.
The level of educational background influences households’ behaviour particularly
in decision making processes. Since the occupation is usually determined by the edu-
cational background, this will also have effects on saving process. Figure 5.B.1 depicts
the saving profiles of IFLS households based on educational level and households’ cur-
rent location.
In terms of average saving amount, the highest value of savings can be found in
1997. IFLS households managed to save more because the economic situation was
favourable up until the first half of 1997 when the Asian financial crisis started. By
2000 the average value of savings declined and this had not changed much by 2007.
Across the survey waves, the average value of savings for urban households is
higher than rural households for every category of education level, except for uni-
versity graduates in 2000. This implies that the urban households may have higher
earnings and are able to save more in terms of nominal amount given high living cost
in the cities. There is also an increasing trend in the relationship between education
and savings. As the time spent in schooling increased, the saving amount tends to
increase with IFLS2 as an exception.
However, if the households’ labour income is brought into consideration with sav-
ings, the savings to earnings ratios show different patterns for urban and rural house-
holds. On average, savings to earnings ratios are relatively stable around 26% for
IFLS2 and IFLS3 and declined to 22.5% in IFLS4 (see Table 5.A.3). The increasing
pattern is also found in IFLS3 and IFLS4 where the higher educational level, the
higher the savings to earnings ratio. Only in the IFLS2, are the figures relatively
constant across educational level: this is particularly the case for rural households
(see Figure 5.B.1).
5.4 Empirical Findings and Discussions 128
5.4.2 Age Profiles of Savings Based on Gender and Location
In order to understand the saving behaviour in the IFLS households, the relationship
between households’ saving and age is investigated. Figure 5.B.2 provides age pro-
files of earnings and savings to earnings ratio for each IFLS waves. The figures are
classified by the respondent’s gender. Most households are headed by males with the
proportion standing at 99% in IFLS2, 98.1% in IFLS3, and 97.68% in IFLS4.
In Indonesia, the retirement age of many occupations is 55 years old. Some people
may still work after retirement or occupations like farming or fishing may not have
an upper age limit. On average, women have relatively lower earnings than men,
with the exception of those under 40 and for a brief period around the age of IFLS3
and IFLS4. However, women seem to have higher savings to earnings ratios, which
indicates that women are more cautious than men as head of the households. This
may also result from these women being single parents, since the ratios are relatively
higher after the age of 30. More over, in the last two survey waves the ratios are
higher compared to men, particularly in the later ages. In summary, urban house-
holds headed by women tend to have a high marginal propensity to save compared to
those which are headed by men.
Figure 5.B.3 in Appendix 5.B depicts the relationship between earnings, saving
ratio and age profiles based on the location. As expected, the average value of earnings
is higher for urban households across the survey waves. A possible explanation is that
jobs in cities offer a higher high salary. The earnings figure based on the age cohort
also has interesting aspects. The IFLS households have a low labour income at the
beginning of their career, and then increase until the retirement age. After retirement
age, earnings tend to fall.
For saving to earnings ratios, the rural and urban households share similar pat-
terns until the mid 40’s except for IFLS2 in 1997. In 1997, urban households tended
to have a higher saving ratio than rural households. This may imply that there was
more inequality between urban and rural areas before the economic crisis. For IFLS3
and IFLS4, there is a tendency to save more after mid the 40’s. This suggests that
households become prudent about their future earnings as predicted by PIH/LCH
since they are near to retirement age. The low level of saving ratio in the micro level
indicated by the IFLS data set may also characterise a low level of saving ratio in the
macro level (see Appendix 3.A, Figure 3.A.3).
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In summary, these figures provide evidence of the importance of saving for house-
holds. As predicted by PIH/LCH, the expectation of future earnings and its variability
play a vital role in decision making on saving.
5.4.3 Earnings Risk Measurements
As mentioned earlier that the main challenge of empirical measurement is to find a
proxy for earnings risk. In this study, the risk is derived from residuals of Mincerian
earnings function as in Equation (5.14) and similar function excluding the education
variable as in Equation (5.16). The residuals are then estimated by controlling the
occupational sector and employment type to get cross-sectional variance.
The results of Mincerian earnings regressions controlled by occupational classi-
fications are given in Table 5.1 Column (1), (2) and (3). The estimations show that
initial earnings, experience and educational level have significant impact in explain-
ing the earnings of IFLS households across the waves. Experience can be interpreted
as post-schooling education investment in the form of training and job experience.
The negative coefficients of the second term of experience which are significant for
IFLS3 and IFLS4 confirm the convexity of earnings function. This implies that the
earnings diminish near retirement age.
Across the waves, the results suggest that the level of education last attended has
significant impact on return to schooling. The common practice in interpreting the
return to human capital is to use the coefficients on years of schooling. Therefore, it
can be interpreted that the return on human capital has decreased since 1997.
Table 5.1 Column (4), (5) and (6) provide the results of earnings regressions with-
out taking education into account for each IFLS wave respectively. The coefficients
still have similar inferences but with lower values and less explanatory power. This
confirms that the estimates can be used to obtain an earnings risk measure. Us-
ing two regression specifications, the earnings risk is then derived by using cross-
sectional occupation variances for all survey waves.
The estimation results of earnings risk for each classification in each wave are
given in Appendix 5.A, Table 5.A.2. The information of casual employment in agri-
cultural and non-agricultural sectors is only available in IFLS4. Given information
in Table 5.A.2, people who work as government employees in the financial service
sector in IFLS2 are exposed to higher earnings risk compared to the other classifica-
tions. This is also the same case in IFLS4 where these workers have a high level of
earnings risk. Casual workers in the non-agricultural sector also experience similar
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Table 5.1
The Estimations of Earnings Function
The dependent variable is the log of earnings. Column (1) and (4) indicate IFLS2; Column
(2) and (5) indicate IFLS3; and Column (3) and (6) indicate IFLS4. Education and experience
are in years. Classification dummy is a dummy variable based on the occupational sector and
employment type. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the
10% level are denoted by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Source: author’s
calculations from the IFLS data set.
Mincerian functions Experience only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 12.95∗∗∗ 14.12∗∗∗ 15.06∗∗∗ 14.14∗∗∗ 14.83∗∗∗ 16.06∗∗∗
(0.537) (0.338) (0.313) (0.368) (0.384) (0.339)
Experience 0.044∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.027∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005)
Experience2/100 −0.064 −0.074∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗ −0.049 −0.081∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗
(0.036) (0.016) (0.015) (0.026) (0.017) (0.017)
Education 0.119∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 401 2040 2642 1215 2158 2711
Adjusted R2 0.391 0.352 0.357 0.190 0.243 0.242
Classification dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
earnings risk exposure to the former. In IFLS3, government workers in the wholesale
and retail industry have the highest earnings risk exposure. In summary, working
in some government-owned institutions may induce higher occupational risk, which
reflect households’ willingness to take risks.
Table 5.A.3 presents the summary of average earnings risk for households’ age
profiles along with related information of average schooling, average savings and av-
erage savings to earnings ratio. A similar pattern can be found in savings and earn-
ings profiles with the exception of households aged between 30 and 40 years old in
IFLS2 that has high average earnings. Savings and earnings decline sharply after
the age of 55 , which imply households’ marginal propensity to consume is increasing.
The savings to earnings ratio for each of the cohorts confirm the saving behaviour of
IFLS households as previously mentioned .
However, the earnings risk does not follow similar patterns to saving and earn-
ings. There are two earnings risk measures in Table 5.A.3. The results in column (6)
are estimated using residuals from (5.13) and column (7) are estimated using resid-
uals from from (5.15) respectively. When the education variables are not included as
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regressors, the risk estimates are higher. This may imply that the level of education
play a significant role in reducing the variability of labour income.
For IFLS2 and IFLS3, the earnings risk is higher for younger households and
lower nearer retirement. Those who are still working and are over 55 years old have
higher earnings risk. The possible explanation for this is that they may have inade-
quate retirement money or unavoidable life circumstances. For IFLS4, the earnings
risk is relatively similar across the cohorts until 50 and then lower near retirement.
5.4.4 The Impact of Earnings Risk on Schooling
The theoretical model given in Section 5.3.1 has several testable implications which
will be discussed in this section and the subsequent section. From the household’s
point of view, the decision to enter schooling in many cases is related to the expected
occupation type in the future. This decision is very risky compared to physical capital
because human capital is inherent to the owner and cannot be separated. The invest-
ment in education can be also regarded as a way to diversify human capital and to
gain the advantage of specific knowledge and skills.
In this study, this decision is also affected by earnings, which would be realised
in the future or in period 2 according to the theoretical framework. Since one may
predict the occupational type in the future, the decision to invest in education, im-
plied by the duration in schooling, is significant. Table 5.2 provides the results of the
relationship between the duration in schooling and earnings risk for each IFLS wave
based on Equation (5.10) and the earnings risk estimates are derived from the resid-
uals in Equation (5.16). The demographic characteristics of the IFLS households and
dependency ratio for each household are also employed to control the estimations.
The coefficients for each IFLS wave can be interpreted because decisions about
schooling and work were made in the past. In this context, the risk is interpreted
as earnings dispersion based on the job classification. From Table 5.2, it can be in-
ferred that the investment in human capital is inversely related to earnings risk.
This means that high levels of schooling, which is indicated by the years in education,
should benefit from a lower earnings risk. However, this is not the case in IFLS4 since
the coefficient is not statistically significant.
In 1997 and 2000, there were higher risks in earnings, which gave fewer incen-
tives to enter schooling. During these years, the economic crisis affected the schooling
decision. Given these findings, the return on education seems to have different im-
pacts in human capital investment for different periods. Based on Table 5.1, for the
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Table 5.2
Schooling and Earnings Risk
Column (1) indicates IFLS2, Column (2) indicates IFLS3, and Column (3) indicates
IFLS4. Province dummy is used to specify household’s location at the province
level, except for Column (2). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coeffi-
cients significant at the 10% level are denoted by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at
the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Source: author’s calculations from the IFLS data set.
Education (in years)
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 15.69∗∗ 14.00∗∗∗ 7.640∗∗∗
(4.768) (0.715) (1.203)
Earnings risk σ2,nei j −2.332∗∗ −2.738∗∗∗ −0.656
(0.736) (0.277) (0.343)
Age 0.0763 −0.0578∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.00800) (0.055)
Age2 −0.0016 −0.004∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.001)
Sex (male=1) −4.982 0.225 −1.374∗∗
(3.441) (0.614) (0.459)
Location (urban=1) 0.646
(0.399)
Household size 0.118 −0.049 −0.217∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.046) (0.052)
Dependency ratio −0.0103
(0.0102)
Observations 400 2040 2640
Adjusted R2 0.094 0.067 0.045
Province dummy Yes No Yes
period before the crisis in 1997, the return to schooling is relatively higher than the
return in 2000 and 2007 which is about 10 years after the crisis. It seems that before
economic crisis period, those who have made a higher investment tend to earn more
from their labour.
When the crisis occurred in 2000, the return to education and earnings risk de-
clined. In 2007, the return has slightly increased compared with figures for 2000.
However, the effect of earnings risk is different for 2000 and 2007. The investment
in human capital has decreased the effect of variability in labour income implied by a
lower coefficient of earnings risk. Based on the earnings risk estimates, this suggests
that there is more incentive in human capital investment since the economic crisis.
From the household characteristics in Table 5.2, the age is also inversely related
with the investment in human capital. As the person ages, the effect of education
may decrease. This implies that older people have fewer incentives for returning to
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education. Surprisingly, there is a shift in gender role in education in the last wave:
women seem to have a tendency to stay longer in education than men (see Table
5.2 Column (3)). Another implication of schooling can be found in household size.
Households that have more members find it difficult to invest in education, which
may be caused by inadequate resources.
Two other control variables do not seem to have any implications for the deci-
sion to enter education in the past. For IFLS3 and IFLS4, the inclusion of household
location and dependency ratio has caused heteroskedasticity problems in the estima-
tions. Moreover, these two variables do not have any impacts on the decision to invest
in education.
Therefore, it can be concluded from Table 5.2, there is a change in terms of re-
lationship between investment in education and occupational earnings risk between
1997 and 2007. The decision to enter education was initially influenced by earnings
risk where increase in earnings risk may lead to a decrease in the number of years
spent in education. However based in the results of IFLS4, this decision was deter-
mined by household-specific characteristics, not earnings risk.
To compare the findings in the previous analysis, another earnings risk measure
given in Equation (5.17) is calculated and estimated against education. Since the
decision was made in the past, it is possible to use all IFLS waves for this analysis,
except for IFLS1. The difference between previous specifications is that the earnings
risk given in Table 5.3 which is called the earnings range, should be interpreted as
one’s expectation over earnings in the future.
The log of earnings range is significantly related to the length in education. This
implies that as the range widens, the household would expect to invest more in human
capital by spending more time in schooling. As the coefficients are increased from
IFLS2 to IFLS4, this clearly suggests that more households put more attention to
their own education as they expect their earnings range to increase (Table 5.3 Column
(1), (2) and (3)). This result is quite close to Basu and Ghosh’s model (2001). This is
because the log of earnings range does not take account of occupational earnings into
its estimation, while the first measure of earnings risk is derived from earnings across
occupations within the observations.
There are slightly different results for age and gender of the head of households.
The age effect has a similar pattern as in the previous table. Similar to the results
given in the previous table, this effect in 1997 is not statistically insignificant while for
next waves it is statistically significant. However, the coefficients for IFLS3 in second
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Table 5.3
Schooling and Earnings Range
Column (1) indicates IFLS2, Column (2) indicates IFLS3 and (3) indicates IFLS4.
Earnings range is measured by calculating the difference between maximum and
minimum wage across the waves for each and every household. Province dummy
is used to specify household’s location at the province level. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by
∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Source: author’s calculations
from the IFLS data set.
Education (in years)
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 2.902 −3.108 −19.27∗∗∗
(6.075) (2.141) (3.775)
Log of earnings range 0.637∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗
(0.219) (0.071) (0.081)
Age 0.242 0.211∗ 0.783∗∗∗
(0.208) (0.089) (0.153)
Age2 −0.003 −0.003∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Sex (male=1) −6.717 −0.879 −0.593
(3.545) (0.900) (1.089)
Location (urban=1) 0.682 0.920∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗
(0.548) (0.204) (0.246)
Household size 0.056 −0.123 −0.329∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.069) (0.081)
Dependency ratio −0.012 −0.004 0.029∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.006) (0.007)
Observations 221 1329 1050
Adjusted R2 0.087 0.121 0.172
Province dummy Yes Yes Yes
row of Table 5.3 have positive values while in the previous table the coefficients are
negative. The positive age effect of IFLS2 and IFLS3 implies that older people would
expect to have more schooling years given the earnings range. Unlike in the results in
the previous table, the gender effect is consistently insignificant throughout the wave
in IFLS (see Table 5.3). This implies that there is no difference between woman and
men in the schooling decision, given the earnings range.
In terms of other household characteristics in Table 5.3, location and size have
better results compared to the results in Table 5.2. People who live in the city would
decide to stay longer education as a part of their expectation over earnings range.
This means that these people have invested more time in schooling compared to their
rural counterpart. The coefficient of household size is only statistically significant for
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the last wave. This implies that households with fewer members were able to invest
more time in education compared to households with more members.
Similar to household size, the dependency ratio is only significant in the last wave.
This suggests that households with more dependent members would expect a longer
duration in education given the expectation of earnings variability. By doing this, they
might be able to anticipate changes in their earnings and provide more resources for
their family members.
In summary, the effect of earnings risk to investment in human capital is equivocal
and depends on the household characteristics in different economic periods. There
are always incentives to spend more resources on human capital investment but it
may yield different effects on earnings risk. The estimation results using earnings
range seem to have more power in explaining the decision to invest in education. The
results using earnings range measure close to Basu and Ghosh (2001) and this also
consistently has positive coefficients across the waves. This means that households’
effort to invest in education may smooth their utility over future earnings.
5.4.5 The Implications of Earnings Risk to Savings
As explained in the theoretical framework, earnings variability which implies uncer-
tain consumption is equated by non random consumption Ĉ. Households consider
certainty equivalent earnings Q which implies their willingness to take risks for a
specific employment opportunity. This earnings risk is then associated with savings,
which serve as self insurance.
Table 5.4 provides estimation results of savings against earnings risk based on
Equation (5.11). The estimates are also controlled by adding demographic variables
such as age, gender, location, household size and dependency ratio into the empirical
specification. As previously explained in the theoretical model, the effect of earnings
risk on household saving is ambiguous.
Saving is negatively related to occupational earnings risk across IFLS waves. This
means that where there is higher earning risk exposure, households tend to dissave
and spend more. This may also include selling or liquidating some of their financial
assets. In this study, the asset also includes jewellry which is also considered as
a “buffer” by Indonesian households (see Frankenberg et al., 2003). The negative
coefficients for earnings risk show the impact of labour income risk on savings. It
can be said that IFLS households suffered from a large decrease in their savings in
2000. The possible explanation for this would be associated with the fact that the
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Table 5.4
Savings and Earnings Risk
Column (1) indicates IFLS2, Column (2) indicates IFLS3, and Column (4) indicates
IFLS4. Province dummy is used to specify household’s location at the province
level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the
10% level are denoted by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗.
Source: author’s calculations from the IFLS data set.
Log of savings
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 13.02∗∗∗ 11.30∗∗∗ 10.78∗∗∗
(1.161) (0.710) (0.670)
Earnings risk σ2j −0.549∗∗ −0.843∗∗∗ −0.481∗
(0.205) (0.192) (0.237)
Age 0.051 0.111∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.029) (0.031)
Age2 −0.00058 −0.0012∗∗∗ −0.0013∗∗∗
(0.00057) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Sex (male=1) −0.454 −0.0437 −0.295
(0.554) (0.279) (0.236)
Location (urban=1) 0.529∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.087) (0.084)
Household size 0.106∗∗ 0.055∗ 0.068∗
(0.035) (0.028)) (0.031)
Dependency ratio −0.013∗∗∗ −0.0058∗ −0.0094∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Observations 894 1609 1860
Adjusted R2 0.105 0.093 0.066
Province dummy Yes Yes Yes
effect of 1997 economic crisis is still carried forward to subsequent years. In this year,
households may find it difficult to anticipate and mitigate the effect of earnings risk
with saving as the only form of self insurance. That is why the coefficient of earnings
risk in 2000 is the highest compared to other waves (see Table 5.4). In 2007, the effect
is not as large as in 2000. Moreover, since the effect of the crisis has decreased. it is
possible that some households are able to cope with earnings risk only by using their
savings.
The constants can be interpreted as current earnings where these are significantly
positive. The coefficients of age confirm that savings increase as households grow
older. However, only the coefficient of age in IFLS2 is not statistically significant (see
Table 5.4 Column (1)). The coefficients of Age2, which are statistically significant, con-
firm that the relationship between age and savings are not linear. This may suggest
that the effect may increase at a decreasing rate when individuals are getting older.
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For other household-specific characteristics, there is no difference between house-
holds headed by males or females in the decision to save. Urban households have
more tendency to save despite the fact that the propensity to save is decreasing. This
also means that urban households are better off than rural households. The house-
hold size also has a role in explaining the saving pattern. It can be inferred that as
the size of a household grows, the household tends to save more in anticipating un-
certain future needs. The dependency ratio also tells us that when the dependents in
a household are lower than the productive ones, the household is able to save more.
Furthermore, the pure risk effect and utility smoothing effect should be taken
into consideration in analysing the earnings risk to saving. Since the coefficients of
earnings risk are negative, it can be inferred that the utility smoothing effect is less
dominant than the risk effect. This implies that earnings uncertainty decreases the
certainty equivalent earnings for a given labour supply. In this case, the earnings
uncertainty is related to the occupational earnings given by the decision in schooling
and its post-activities in the previous period. If we take a closer look at the decompo-
sition of Q, then it can be said that since the certainty equivalent income is lower, it
follows that savings would rise as predicted by the permanent income hypothesis.
Table 5.5 presents the results from alternative specifications of savings and earn-
ings risk measurements without taking occupational type into consideration. It is
interesting to see and evaluate the expectation of households towards their realised
earnings and savings accumulation. However, the interpretations here are very differ-
ent compared to the interpretation of the relationship between schooling and earnings
range.
In Table 5.5 Column (1) and (2), the log of savings for households are assessed
against the log of earnings range which is calculated by taking the maximum and
minimum value of earnings from three waves of the IFLS. Based on the earnings
range, it can be inferred that households would expect to save around 30% from the
realised changes of their earnings in the previous waves. These results can be also
interpreted as the degree of responsiveness of earnings to the change of household
savings. Since the values of the earnings range are significantly positive, it can be
inferred that the “pure risk” effect is less dominant than the utility-smoothing ef-
fect. This finding is close to Basu and Ghosh’s prediction (2001) where the positive
values imply that households tend to save more as the variability of earnings range
increases. This is also consistent with the results for earnings range and schooling
decision in the previous section. Therefore, this suggests that households will put
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Table 5.5
Savings and Earnings Range
Column (1) and (3) indicate IFLS2. Column (2) and (4) indicate IFLS3. Earnings
range is measured by calculating the difference between maximum and minimum
wage across the waves for each and every household. Province dummy is used to
specify household’s location at the province level. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses except for (3) and (4) which are estimated using OLS with robust
standard errors. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by ∗, at the
5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Source: author’s calculations from the
IFLS data set.
Log of savings Savings/earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 8.929∗∗∗ 6.559∗∗∗ 0.293 −0.323
(1.521) (1.068) (0.442) (0.300)
Log of earnings range 0.304∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.004 0.058∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.036) (0.016) (0.010)
Age 0.059 0.128∗∗ −0.006 −0.002
(0.059) (0.044) (0.015) (0.012)
Age2 −0.0007 −0.0013∗ 0.00002 0.00005
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.00017) (0.00015)
Sex (male=1) −1.325 −0.475 −0.182 −0.331∗∗
(0.739) (0.444) (0.216) (0.127)
Location (urban=1) 0.493∗∗∗ 0.141 0.107∗∗ 0.023
(0.134) (0.104) (0.036) (0.029)
Household size 0.096∗ 0.066 0.023 0.014
(0.044) (0.035) (0.016) (0.010)
Dependency ratio −0.012∗∗ −0.006 −0.001 −0.002∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 628 1065 819 1365
Adjusted R2 0.111 0.128 0.022 0.036
Province dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
more investment in schooling and save more in order to anticipate variability in their
earnings. The difference of the results is due to the nature of earning risk derivation.
Earnings risk is derived from the variability of earnings for one particular occupation
while earnings range is based on the variability of one’s earnings over the observation
periods.
The household-specific characteristics also provide some interesting information
with only the coefficients of gender being statistically insignificant across the waves.
It can be inferred from Table 5.5 Row (1), households in rural areas would expect
higher saving given the variability of earnings. This is also followed by the household
size and dependency ratio. Households with fewer members and dependents are able
to save more compared to those who have more members and dependents. However,
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only the coefficients for age and age-squared are positively significant in 2000. Given
the fact that this is a post-economic crisis, it can be inferred that older households
have more savings than younger households.
However, when the earnings range are assessed against the savings to earnings
ratio, only the results from IFLS3 show a significant relationship between saving to
earnings ratio and log of earnings range. The results are shown in Table 5.5 Column
(3) and (4). In year 2000, the households would anticipate the change in their savings
to earnings ratio at proportionally around 5.8% given their expectation of earnings
changes. From these assessments, earnings range is able to explain the variation in
the log of savings rather than the ratio of savings to earnings.
In summary, the evidence from IFLS data is consistent with the theory given in
Section 5.3.1. However, savings do not seem to provide adequate protection against
earnings risk. If savings can provide a “buffer” against earnings risk, then there is
no relationship between savings and earnings risk. Using different a specification of
savings, it can be shown that a relationship exists between savings and earnings risk.
Moreover given the fact that higher pure risk effect than utility smoothing effect,
households experience a decrease in their saving due to higher variability in labour
income based on occupational earnings risk. However, the results for earnings range
are close to the theoretical explanation provided in Basu and Ghosh (2001).
5.4.6 Robustness Checks
The study uses a range of robustness tests to check estimations results in the pre-
vious sections, mainly based on the post-estimation results: the Ramsey Regression
Equation Specification Test (or RESET) test is used to examine the model specifica-
tion where the null hypothesis is the model has no omitted variables. To check het-
eroskedasticity of the models, Breusch-Pagan test is used for models with standard
errors and Cameron-Trivedi’s decomposition of IM-tests for models with robust stan-
dard errors. To check whether the models suffer from multicolinearity problem, the
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test is usedwhere the mean value of VIF is presented
in the following tables.
Table 5.6 provides the summary of post-estimation tests for estimation results
given in Table 5.2 and 5.3. These tables present the regressions for schooling in-
dicated by the number of years spent in education against the earnings risk in Ta-
ble 5.2 and earnings range in Table 5.3 respectively. The results in these tables are
the optimal regression, which can be used to derive the earnings risk implication to
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Table 5.6
Post-Estimation Results for Schooling and Earnings Risk
Column (1), (2), and (3) indicate the post-estimation results for regres-
sion estimations in Table 5.2 Column (1), (2), and (3) respectively. Col-
umn (4), (5), and (6) indicate the post-estimation results for regression
estimations in Table 5.3 Column (1), (2), and (3) respectively. Source:
author’s calculations from the IFLS data set.
Table 5.2 Table 5.3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ramsey RESET test
F−value 1.77 19.84 1.11 0.65 11.11 5.07
Prob > F 0.153 0.000 0.343 0.585 0.000 0.002
Breusch-Pagan’s heteroskedasticity test
χ2(1) 2.59 1.66 2.71 1.74 0.02 3.01
Prob > χ2 0.108 0.198 0.100 0.187 0.892 0.083
Mean VIF 10.59 1.03 6.78 11.91 7.43 11.71
schooling given a set of variables. All regressions do not have any heteroskedasticity
problems as indicated by the Breusch-Pagan tests where the alternative hypotheses
are rejected. It can be concluded that all models have constant variance. All models
are also free from multicollinearity problems indicated by the mean VIF below 10.
However, it seems that the results of IFLS2 from both model specifications are
correctly specified (see Table 5.6 Column (1) and (3)). The model specification using
IFLS3 in Table 5.6 Column (2) and (4) may have omitted variables. However, if other
variables are added into the model specification, then the regressions suffer from
heteroskedasticity problem. Therefore, it can be concluded that the results provided
in Table 5.2 Column (2) and Table 5.3 Column (2) must be interpreted cautiously.
For IFLS4, the estimation results using occupational earnings risk do not have any
multicollinearity problem, but this is not so for earnings range. Overall, it can be
said that the model specifications using occupation earnings risk are more robust
compared to earning range.
Using the same tests, Table 5.7 provides the summary of post-estimation tests for
estimation results given in Table 5.4 and 5.5. All model specifications do not exhibit
multicollinearity problem as indicated by mean VIF for each model are below 10. This
means that there is no correlation between explanatory variables.
For all observations, the models do not suffered from heteroskedasticity problems
except for IFLS4. The estimation results for IFLS4 in particular using occupation
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Table 5.7
Post-Estimation Results for Savings and Earnings Risk
Column (1), (2), and (3) indicate the post-estimation results for regression esti-
mations in Table 5.4 Column (1), (2), and (3) respectively. Column (4), (5), (6)
and (7) indicate the post-estimation results for regression estimations in Table
5.3 Column (1), (2), (3), and (4) respectively. The heteroskedasticity test used
in the post-estimation is Breusch-Pagan test, except for Column (6) and (7) is
Cameron-Trivedi heteroskedasticity test. Source: author’s calculations from
the IFLS data set.
Table 5.4 Table 5.5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ramsey RESET test
F−value 1.46 1.24 3.52 1.99 7.57 3.78 8.51
Prob > F 0.223 0.295 0.015 0.115 0.000 0.010 0.000
Breusch-Pagan’s heteroskedasticity test
χ2(1) 0.00 2.16 3.85 0.89 0.00 112.18 173.19
Prob > χ2 0.957 0.141 0.050 0.345 0.969 0.283 0.020
Mean VIF 9.07 6.18 6.82 8.91 7.20 8.76 7.08
earnings in Table 5.7 Column (3) and using earning range as an explanatory variable
and savings-to-earnings ratio as the dependent variable in Table 5.7 Column (7), suf-
fer from heteroskedasticity problem at a certain level. Using different combinations
of explanatory variables, the results in Table 5.4 Column (3) and Table 5.5 Column
(4) are the optimal results. This is also the same case for the specification test using
Ramsey RESET test (see Table 5.7 Column (3), (5), (6) and (7)).
In summary, the saving to earnings ratio is not reliable in measuring earnings risk
anticipation, as the results are less robust compared to other specifications. Model
specifications with occupational earnings risk provide more robust results than mod-
els with earnings range specification.
5.5 Concluding Remarks
This study considers how Indonesian households anticipate earnings risk associated
with education and savings where the theoretical framework is adopted from Basu
and Ghosh (2001). Education is considered as the most important factor in human
capital investment. The definition of human capital investment is compatible with
Mincerian earnings function, which provides the earnings risk measure. This study
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has quantified the relative importance of earnings risk to schooling decisions and
savings for IFLS households. It also provides evidences from the IFLS households in
1997, 2000, and 2007.
Firstly, it examines the decision of human capital investment, which includes
schooling or education and post-schooling activities. This decision is made in the
previous period. This study finds that occupational earnings risk decreases with ed-
ucational level. However, this is not the case when the risk measure is defined by
earnings range, which is based on the maximum and minimum level of an individ-
ual?s earnings across the observation. The key finding here is that there are always
incentives to invest in education given the positive return across the waves. The ef-
fects of earnings risk may differ depending on the household-specific characteristics
and the situation of the economy. Given these results, it can be said that education
does decrease the variability over future income based on occupational earnings risk.
However, the results using earnings range may have more power in explaining the
schooling decision compared to occupational earnings risk; it is relatively less robust
than the results using occupational earning risk.
Secondly, the impact of earnings risk against savings is studied by using the same
earnings risk measures. Across the IFLS waves, this study finds the occupational
earnings risk is systematically larger for urban households, households with fewer
members and fewer dependents. This study also finds that the risk effect is higher
than the utility smoothing effect given by the negative relationship between occupa-
tional earnings risk and savings. If savings were completely able to anticipate the
earnings risk, one would expect that the coefficient of earnings risk to be zero. How-
ever, this does not completely mitigate the risk.
Thirdly, based on these findings, earnings range results are close to Basu and
Ghosh’s model, while earnings risk contradicts this theoretical model. This is due
to the risk measure derived from occupational earnings while earnings range is de-
rived from individual’s earnings. Earning range also provides more consistent results
throughout the IFLS waves compared to occupational earnings risk.
A natural expansion of this study would be related to the investigation of risk
aversion parameter, which may induce saving behaviour. Further studies can ex-
amine the heterogeneity of the decision making within households given particular
earnings risk measurements, which are not based on occupational sorting. Moreover,
if savings as self-insurance is inadequate, it becomes important for households to join
some insurance groups or find other means to mitigate earnings risk problems.
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Appendix 5.A Summary Statistics of Education, Earn-
ings, and Savings
Table 5.A.1
Summary of Education, Earnings, and Savings: All Samples
This table provides relevant statistics of all samples from the IFLS data set. The total
number of observations is given in Column (1). Column (2) shows the mean of the
number of years spent in education by the head of the households. Savings and earnings
in Column (3) and (4) are in annual value and thousand rupiah. The number of samples
which has complete information and used in the analysis is given in Column (5). Finally,
Column (6) provides the percentage of samples used in the analysis, which is calculated
by Column (5) divided by Column (1). Source: author’s calculations from the IFLS data
set.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cohort Total Education Savings Earnings Final Percentage
Observations (in years) Samples Samples Used
IFLS2 - 1997
25-29 288 9.14 1401.39 6967.05 96 33.33%
30-34 687 10.36 1552.69 22900.00 241 35.08%
35-39 812 9.32 2392.95 7633.85 277 34.11%
40-44 755 8.92 3016.80 8957.23 205 27.15%
45-49 671 9.15 2534.33 9415.19 179 26.68%
50-55 505 8.28 9182.09 9264.36 127 25.15%
>55 1244 7.49 5688.07 6361.37 90 7.23%
Total 4962 1215 24.49%
IFLS3 - 2000
25-29 612 9.57 993.29 4989.12 280 45.75%
30-34 830 10.12 1502.40 5879.98 418 50.36%
35-39 885 9.00 1957.88 6446.63 387 43.73%
40-44 888 8.41 1923.41 6112.91 380 42.79%
45-49 779 8.42 2563.76 6912.31 287 36.84%
50-55 544 8.62 3784.62 7764.21 188 34.56%
>55 1416 7.22 2391.92 3252.97 220 15.54%
Total 4538 2160 47.60%
IFLS4 - 2007
25-29 1030 10.36 1147.70 6099.34 496 48.16%
30-34 1060 10.08 1226.96 6831.54 536 50.57%
35-39 1042 10.20 1609.44 6823.64 529 50.77%
40-44 895 9.70 1940.90 7363.32 406 45.36%
45-49 849 8.51 1942.42 7440.32 302 35.57%
50-55 712 8.53 3857.20 8421.80 252 35.39%
>55 1398 7.73 2130.52 5070.67 190 13.59%
Total 5588 2711 48.51%
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Table 5.A.2
Occupation Classification and Earnings Risk
The estimations are based on the Mincer regressions. The number on the table heading in-
dicates employment type classification: (1) government worker, (2) private worker, (3) casual
worker in agriculture, and (4) casual worker not in agriculture. Agriculture includes forestry,
fishing and hunting. Mining includes quarrying. Wholesale includes retail, restaurants and
hotels. Transportation sector includes storage and communications. Finance includes insur-
ance, real estate and business services. Source: author’s calculations from the IFLS data set.
Sector Employment type Earnings risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) Total (1) (2) (3) (4)
IFLS2 - 1997
Agriculture 32 115 147 0.145 0.737
Mining and quarrying 5 15 20 0.045
Manufacturing 25 215 240 0.433 0.579
Electricity, gas, water 10 9 19 0.190 0.100
Construction 12 138 150 0.100 0.359
Wholesale 9 73 82 0.078 1.052
Transportation 20 84 104 0.211 0.736
Finance 8 13 21 1.392 0.275
Social services 272 155 427 0.236 0.616
Not classified 5 5 0.021
Total 393 822 1215
IFLS3 - 2000
Agriculture 37 336 373 0.264 0.710
Mining and quarrying 2 23 25 0.176 0.603
Manufacturing 27 327 354 0.449 0.432
Electricity, gas, water 9 6 15 0.398 1.217
Construction 13 251 264 1.217 0.344
Wholesale 4 140 144 2.634 0.563
Transportation 28 128 156 0.605 0.446
Finance 7 33 40 0.183 0.606
Social services 412 371 783 0.268 0.684
Not classified 4 4 0.091
Total 539 1619 2158
IFLS4 - 2007
Agriculture 20 170 159 33 382 0.269 0.571 0.575 0.996
Mining and quarrying 5 25 11 41 0.996 1.306 0.594
Manufacturing 22 435 9 28 494 0.744 0.411 0.782 0.485
Electricity, gas, water 11 13 1 25 0.594 0.441 2.330
Construction 9 127 1 204 341 0.441 0.413 0.408
Wholesale 4 222 1 20 247 0.485 0.460 1.035
Transportation 10 110 1 35 156 0.226 0.447 0.483
Finance 4 41 2 47 2.330 0.408 0.389
Social services 457 435 2 79 973 0.437 0.564 0.020 0.755
Not classified 5 5 0.097
Total 542 1583 173 413 2711
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Table 5.A.3
Mean Values of Relevant Variables
All figures are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah except for working hours. All figures are average value of
respective variables except the observations. N denotes the number of samples. Earnings risk in Col-
umn (6) is estimated from the Mincerian regression residuals, while in Column (7) are estimated from
earnings function that consists of working experience without considering education level. Savings
are calculated from savings/deposits in banks and jewellery. Earnings are compensation from primary
job and calculated as annual earnings in thousand rupiah. σ2j denotes cross-sectional occupational
earnings risk and σ2j denotes cross-sectional occupational earnings risk without considering educa-
tion. Earnings range is measured by calculating the difference between maximum and minimum wage
across the waves for each and every household. Source: author’s calculations from the IFLS data set.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cohort N Education Savings Earnings Savings Earnings Earnings Earnings
(in years) Earnings risk risk range
(σ2i j) (σ
2,ne
i j ) (Wrange)
IFLS2 - 1997, total samples = 1125
25-29 96 9.568 1253.59 7320.04 0.219 0.579 0.713 3741353
30-34 241 10.966 2052.89 30000.00 0.264 0.553 0.718 25100000
35-39 277 10.620 2164.93 8764.66 0.258 0.513 0.714 3647809
40-44 205 10.700 3398.18 10800.00 0.268 0.448 0.619 3465825
45-49 179 10.375 3892.89 11300.00 0.297 0.445 0.586 3817582
50-55 127 9.786 6765.86 11900.00 0.318 0.421 0.596 1765195
>55 90 9.416 5539.76 10800.00 0.233 0.483 0.655 1668294
All samples 10.204 3581.16 12983.53 0.265 0.492 0.657 6172294
IFLS3 - 2000, total samples = 1940
25-29 280 9.845 928.47 4939.29 0.178 0.529 0.726 2087646
30-34 418 10.813 1641.84 6099.16 0.268 0.514 0.692 15200000
35-39 387 9.970 1949.32 6385.53 0.246 0.500 0.670 3164790
40-44 380 9.767 2284.54 6492.95 0.274 0.477 0.642 3010283
45-49 287 9.535 2380.42 7356.03 0.272 0.481 0.648 3077750
50-55 188 10.088 3598.68 8294.80 0.381 0.449 0.610 2806790
>55 220 7.840 1613.96 3714.65 0.320 0.542 0.751 1159869
All samples 9.694 2056.75 6183.20 0.277 0.499 0.677 4358161
IFLS4 - 2007, total samples = 2521
25-29 496 10.513 1113.19 5914.07 0.1875 0.5136 0.6344 0
30-34 536 10.601 1045.56 6825.38 0.1586 0.5091 0.6291 327187
35-39 529 10.817 1332.99 7019.50 0.1760 0.4936 0.6061 11700000
40-44 406 10.787 2003.17 7754.08 0.2273 0.5060 0.6171 2599663
45-49 302 9.993 2275.68 7857.69 0.2768 0.5070 0.6093 3420887
50-55 252 10.142 4900.83 8886.47 0.3810 0.4890 0.6018 2898346
>55 190 9.024 2273.39 5714.33 0.3260 0.5114 0.6136 3656449
All samples 10.268 2134.97 7138.79 0.248 0.504 0.616 3514647
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Appendix 5.B Saving and Earnings Profiles
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Figure 5.B.1. Savings and Savings/Earnings Ratios Based on Education. The figures
are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah except for savings to earnings ratio. Earnings are in millions
rupiah. Savings includes saving, deposits, shares, and jewellery. Source: author’s calculations
from IFLS data set.
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Figure 5.B.2. Earnings and Savings to Earnings Ratio Based on Gender. The figures
are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah except for savings to earnings ratio. Earnings are in mil-
lions rupiah. Savings includes saving and deposits in the bank or other financial institutions,
shares, and jewellery. Source: author’s calculations from the IFLS data set.
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Figure 5.B.3. Earnings and Savings to Earnings Ratio Based on Location. The figures
are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah except for savings to earnings ratio. Earnings are in millions
rupiah. Savings includes saving, deposits, shares, and jewellery. Source: author’s calculations
from the IFLS data set.
Chapter 6
Insurance, Credit Access and Risk
Sharing Among Indonesian Households
6.1 Introduction
At a time of great uncertainty, it is important to understand how households as
economic agents can adequately cope with risk and uncertainty. Friedman (1957)
shows the importance of household or individual consumption in coping with nega-
tive shocks. This can be done by consumption smoothing or keeping one’s expenditure
stable overtime through appropriate timing of borrowing and lending. Friedman’s
seminal work of permanent income hypothesis (PIH) is an important paper, which in-
fluences economic theories, related particularly to consumption and related variables,
such as labour income or earnings. By performing transactions with others, economic
agents are able to protect themselves against uncertainty which would also affect
their economic well-being. The decision is based on a calculation of traded assets
and its payoff against uncertainty. The basic and most obvious example is through
insurance contracts. However, the facts show that not all risks can be protected by
insurance contracts: it depends on the nature of these risks. Other assets using insur-
ance principles include bonds and stocks, where economic agents can buy when they
are in good economic circumstances and sell when circumstances change. Another
mechanism that uses insurance principles is social security or unemployment benefit
which gives limited protection for household who are covered.
6.Insurance, Credit Access and Risk Sharing Among Indonesian Households 150
The risk mitigating mechanisms vary across countries which are dependent on
the development of their financial system and related institutions. Financial systems
in many developing countries are typically underdeveloped, and often mainly serve
large firms and wealthy individuals. As one of the emerging economies, Indonesia
has been struggling in developing financial systems: the majority of its population
still has difficulties in accessing financial services.
Households, particularly those who are working in the informal sector and ru-
ral areas possess no or limited insurance and are often not aware of any basic social
security provided by the government. These people are vulnerable not only to id-
iosyncratic or individual risks, but also to macroeconomic and financial risks. For
example, Thomas and Frankenberg (2007) show that the 1997 financial crisis has
affected the poorest, middle- and upper-income households in Indonesia. They also
found that there was a significant increase in levels of poverty and a decline in the
living standards as the crisis unfolded. The effects were indicated by lower levels of
consumption and income, a decrease in households’ assets and a reduction in human
capital investment.
Given little access to social security systems and formal insurance institutions,
households tend to form informal groups to overcome their needs and to alleviate their
problems. One of the important aspects that should be addressed is why there is a
lack of available insurance for these households. The second is how these households
are able to conduct informal arrangements and share their risk and uncertainty. Lo-
cal villages or communities play an important role in allocating resources and risks:
these include the villages’ internal resources and also transfers from government.
Government’s efforts to increase households’ welfare such as the poverty alleviation
program depend on the community’s response and management of the funds, since
formal guidelines may not be effective (for example see Chikako, 2010).
This chapter investigates how risk sharing groups form whenever barriers to
insurance exist. After literature reviews in Section 6.2, Section 6.3 describes the
methodology used to assess different types of insurance barriers and risk sharing
group formation. Section 6.4 describes the data which is employed in this study. Sec-
tion 6.5 the approach described in the previous section. Section 6.7 summarises em-
pirical findings and discusses their implications.
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6.2 Related Literature
The way to cope with uncertainty and to smooth consumption is by conducting eco-
nomic transactions through competitive and complete financial markets where prices
are determined by supply and demand mechanisms. Since households may face vari-
ous constraints in constructing their intertemporal choices, access to insurance mat-
ters. When formal insurance is inaccessible or not available, informal insurance such
as a risk sharing group is likely to emerge between households. Some early work on
risk sharing tests assumed complete market proposition in order to explain consump-
tion insurance across households. Moreover, the risk sharing hypothesis at household
level is calibrated and tested using very rich data sources such U.S. Panel Study of In-
come Dynamics (Cochrane, 1991), U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (Mace, 1991).
However, empirical investigation of risk sharing using micro data tends to reject the
efficient risk sharing hypothesis. Attanasio and Davis (1996) reject the risk shar-
ing using complete market proposition: they state that consumption risk sharing is
incomplete using consumption, labour supply and wage data in the United States.
However, things are very different for developing countries. A study by Beck et al.
(2008) shows that many households in low-income countries do not have adequate
access to the financial services that are taken for granted by many households in de-
veloped countries. They found that the barriers have strong linkages with economic
development and financial accession measures. Therefore, households need to find an
efficient way to smooth their consumption and to insure themselves against idiosyn-
cratic shocks.
Halliday (2006) classifies research on household risk management in developing
countries into two categories. The first category is the research that focuses on house-
hold behaviour in using and managing their asset accumulation as a self-insurance
mechanism. This category assumes that households are in autarky. The theoretical
framework can be traced back to Deaton (1991) and empirical studies can be found in
for example Paxson (1992) and Udry (1995).
The second category is related to research that investigates risk sharing arrange-
ment formed by households within the same unit, such as a village or a community.
Within a community, the mechanism may take place between families and friends
who facilitate risk sharing between economic agents, for instance between young
and old, and between families in specific regions. Simply, this can happen because
there is mutual assistance among them. This becomes important particularly for low-
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income and developing economies where access to finance is absent or limited and
risk becomes ubiquitous. The insurance mechanism is usually conducted via state-
contingent transfers such as in Townsend (1994) and Udry (1994).
From the theoretical point of view, informal risk sharing arrangements can be
modelled as altruistically motivated mechanisms (for example Altonji et al., 1992;
Cox and Fafchamps, 2007; Ravallion and Dearden, 1988; Witoelar, 2013) and game-
theoretical approach (for example Ambrus et al., 2014; Bloch et al., 2008; Bold, 2009;
Coate and Ravallion, 1993; Ligon et al., 2002). The literature shows how the connec-
tion of households was established and developed and how it culminated in networks
or groups.
Since the structure of the networks are not always stable, risk sharing arrange-
ments are not full insurance or perfect conditions. The sources of network stability
usually come from moral hazard, asymmetric information, and limited commitment.
Moral hazard may exist if one alters his behaviour and takes more risks where other
households may not known. Asymmetric information may occur due to the imperfect
instability of households’ income.
Since the structure of the networks is not always stable, risk sharing arrange-
ments do not provide full insurance or perfect conditions. The sources of network
stability usually come from moral hazard, asymmetric information, and limited com-
mitment. Moral hazard may exist if an individual alters his behaviour and take more
risks: furthermore, other households are unaware of these changes to behaviour.
Asymmetric information may occur due to the imperfect instability of households’
income.
Limited commitment is one aspect that uniquely characterises informal insurance
in low-income and developing economies. The transfers between households may not
occur perfectly if an individual does not comply with the group’s terms and agree-
ment. Another possible reason is that usually there is no collateral when the groups
emerge. Bold (2009) studies how risk sharing groups can be endogenously formed
among households under limited commitment. In her model, the consumption of con-
strained households is determined by the history of shocks and the interaction with
other constrained households in terms of the current income. The other property of
this model is the stability of groups given the deviation by subgroups. This model
provides an empirical test of endogenous group formation given the size of the group.
Bloch et al. (2008) study bilateral risk sharing arrangement across networks where
the transfers are influenced by social norms. Households engage in risk sharing ar-
6.3 Alternative Models of Risk Sharing 153
rangements if this exogenous enforcement is exogenously formed. The stability of the
network is enhanced by strong punishment. Their work shows how limited commit-
ment affects the structure of the networks. They argue that risk sharing networks
can emerge endogenously under different social norms.
Ambrus et al. (2014) build a risk sharing model based on a set of pre-existing re-
lationship between households such as family ties and friendship. Using Peruvian
household and community data, they examine the informal risk sharing where the
endogenous groups can be formed for each realisation of network uncertainty. The
size and location of the risk sharing networks is endogenously determined by the
social structure and the realisation of income shocks. A household’s consumption
will experience co-movement with close neighbours. Barr et al. (2012) also find sim-
ilar results in term of group structure. Using experimental survey, they examine
the group formation in rural Zimbabwe by focusing on the enforcement mechanisms
which households use when entering risk sharing arrangement. They use three treat-
ments which assess perfect external enforcement, intrinsic incentives such as trust
and altruism, and external enforcement such as social punishment. They conclude
that the group formation is likely to happen when members share characteristics like
gender, or belong to the same organisation or community.
For the Indonesian context, Ravallion and Dearden (1988) study risk sharing in
terms of private transfers between Javanese households in Indonesia using 1981
Susenas data. They find a difference between rural and urban households in terms of
transfer behaviour. Okten and Osili (2004) utilise IFLS1 and IFLS2 data set to inves-
tigate how consumption smoothing may occur from accessing the credit market. They
find that social and community networks are important in gaining access to credit
markets. Witoelar (2013) study how risk sharing emerges within families using IFLS
data set. However, there is little or no literature that study the barriers to insurance
and group formation specifically for Indonesian households.
6.3 Alternative Models of Risk Sharing
The main objective of this study is to investigate risk sharing at the micro level with
specific characteristics where the condition of imperfect markets exist in many de-
veloping economies, particularly in Indonesia as a case study. Therefore this study
contributes to the existing literature by providing empirical evidence for credit ac-
cess, barriers to insurance and risk sharing groups specifically in Indonesia.
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As suggested by many studies, the presence of endogenous group formation is very
important to risk sharing arrangement. To examine the informal risk sharing groups,
it is also important to assess the barriers to insurance for Indonesian households. The
first question to be addressed is about the presence of efficient risk sharing between
Indonesian households.
The second question is related to the barriers to insurance such as moral hazard,
limited commitment, and hidden income. Through lending and borrowing mecha-
nisms, perfect financial markets should have a significance impact on households’
consumption smoothing. By taking account of the uncertainty of consumption be-
haviour, different types of barriers may have important implications for consumer
behaviour particularly in limiting households’ ability to smooth their consumption.
The third question is related to informal insurance within endogenous risk shar-
ing groups. If the endogenous groups exist, what will be the implications for efficient
risk sharing?
How groups share risk and smooth consumption can be understood through dif-
ferent models. In next section, the specific framework for examining risk sharing will
be discussed. The first part will discuss a full risk sharing hypothesis, followed by a
partial risk sharing model, which includes moral hazard, limited commitment, and
hidden income frameworks. I include a borrowing saving model in the latter model.
The last part will discuss how a coalition could be formed given inaccessible financial
market conditions.
6.3.1 Theoretical Framework
The perfect risk sharing model is based on the assumption of complete markets given
in Arrow (1964); Arrow and Debreu (1954); Debreu (1959), from now on it is referred
as A-D model. Let yi,t be household i’s income at date t where the future income yi,t+1
is unknown with probability piS and S denotes state of nature. Suppose that state of
nature S has two realisations of r and s. The consumption utility can be written as
U =U (ci,t)+β[pirU (cri,t+1)+pisU (csi,t+1)] (6.1)
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subject to
yi,t = ci,t+ p
r
1+R F
r
i,t+1+
ps
1+R F
s
i,t+1 (6.2)
yri,t+1 = cri,t+1−F ri,t+1 (6.3)
ysi,t+1 = csi,t+1−F si,t+1 (6.4)
where F rt+1 and F
s
t+1 denote the financial asset of state r and s at date t+1 respec-
tively, pr and ps denote the price of security for state 1 and 2 which pays one unit of
consumption if one particular state occurs, R is the real interest rate, and pir+pis = 1.
(6.2) and (6.3) denote budget constraint at date t and t+1 respectively.
The first-order condition is given by
U ′
(
ci,t
) pr
1+R =pi
rβU ′
(
cri,t
)
(6.5)
U ′
(
ci,t
) ps
1+R =pi
sβU ′
(
csi,t
)
(6.6)
In A-D world, the market is competitive where A-D securities exist for every state s.
Household i who owns A-D security will be compensated with 1 unit of output if state
S takes place and 0 otherwise. (6.5) implies
(
pr+ ps)U ′ (Ci,t)= (1+R)[pirβU ′ (cri,t+1)+pisβU ′ (csi,t+1)]
which can be written as
U ′
(
ci,t
)= (1+R)βE tU ′ (ci,t+1) . (6.7)
Therefore, the expected marginal rate of substitution is equal to the relative price of
consumption in date t+1.
Now, suppose there exists a community made up of two households with consump-
tion c1,t for household 1 and c2,t for household 2 at date t. Their income is defined by
y1,t and y2,t. In equilibrium, they have
c1,t+ c2,t = y1,t+ y2,t. (6.8)
At date t+1, the equilibrium can be written as
cS1,t+1+ cS2,t+1 = yS1,t+1+ yS2,t+1 (6.9)
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for all S . The community total income is given by ykt = y1,t+ y2,t. Following Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1996), the utility function is assumed to be constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA). Both households are assumed to have the same risk aversion parameter,
γ. The Euler equation in (6.5) shows that for household 1 and 2 will have cS1,t+1 =
[piS β(1+R)/pS ]1/γc1,t and cS2,t+1 = [piS β(1+R)/pS ]1/γc2,t respectively. Using these
properties, (6.8) and (6.9), the community income at date t+1 can be written
ySk,t+1 =
[
piS β (1+R)
pS
] 1
γ
ykt (6.10)
and the price of financial asset at date t is
pS
1+R =pi
S β
[
ySk,t+1
ykt
]−γ
. (6.11)
In complete markets, all households will equate their marginal rate of substitution of
consumption between date t and t+1 to the financial asset prices.
The consumption level is given by
pS
1+R =
piS βU(cS1,t+1)
U(c1,t)
=
piS βU(cS2,t+1)
U(c2,t)
(6.12)
and
pr
ps
=
pirU(cr1,t+1)
pisU(cs1,t+1)
=
pirU(cr2,t+1)
pisU(cs2,t+1)
. (6.13)
Using (6.11), (6.12) and (6.13), the equilibrium condition is given by
cr1,t+1
cs1,t+1
=
cr2,t+1
cs2,t+1
=
yrk,t+1
ysk,t+1
. (6.14)
Equation (6.14) implies the implication of efficient risk sharing within a community.
This is also characterised by Borch’s rule which implies this as the first-best risk shar-
ing. The consumption growth rates are the same across households in each state and
date. These are also equal to the total growth rate of community income. Therefore,
household income ceases to play any role in determining household consumption.
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6.3.2 Full Risk Sharing Hypothesis
Under the first-best allocation, household consumption does not move with income,
and community consumption moves with average household consumption. To exam-
ine this, I use Townsend’s standard test of full insurance (1994) using IFLS data set
from Wave 1 until Wave 3 which is given by
ln ci,t =α ln yi,t+θi+εi,t (6.15)
where ci,t is household i’s consumption at date t, yi,t is household i’s income at date t
and θi is a household-fixed effect. Following Kinnan (2010), to capture the changes in
households’ consumption due to changes in aggregate resources, I add a community-
wave dummy variable δkt in the following estimation
ln cik,t =α ln yik,t+θik+δkt+εik,t. (6.16)
Under full risk sharing hypothesis, the term α should be equal to zero meaning
that the changes in household income do not track the change in consumption. This
means that each household’s consumption is independent of their own income under
the absence of information or a commitment problem.
Since households attempt to insure their consumption against income fluctuation,
any effects from the shock can be fully mitigated by risk sharing networks. If the term
α is significant, it implies that household i’s income tracks consumption. Households
are affected by the changes in their income.
6.3.3 Consumption Smoothing
To some extent, consumption smoothing relates to risk sharing. However, this exist
across time, while risk sharing is consumption smoothing across state. If full risk
sharing breaks down, there is a possibility that households may have borrowing con-
straints. If this happens, then their consumption pattern is sensitive to income or
driven by their income. Therefore, risk sharing is connected to borrowing constraints.
Given the break down in full risk sharing, another component that should be con-
sidered is household saving. Saving can be regarded as “self-insurance” while risk
sharing can be considered as “co-insurance” (see Coate and Ravallion, 1993). Saving
determines a household’s ability to give or to transfer since risk sharing arrangements
depend not only current income but also previous saving.
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Households can manage their finance by saving and borrowing at rate R and dis-
counting the future income at rate β; their marginal utility of consumption follows a
random walk pattern (see Hall, 1978). The relationship can be written as
U ′ (i, ct)=βRE t−1U ′
(
ci,t
)
. (6.17)
This means that previous marginal utility of consumption is able to sufficiently cap-
ture information at date t−1 in forecasting today’s marginal utility of consumption.
Following Garcia et al. (1997), the test is given by
ln ci,t =α0+α1 ln ci,t−1+θi+δt+εi,t (6.18)
where δt is a time-fixed effect (or specification dummy).
However, when households are only able to save but not to borrow, the standard
Euler equation will not be applicable because of liquidity constraints (see Deaton,
1991). This leads to a saving model where income in the previous period may contain
information that cannot be captured by consumption in the same period. The model
can be examined by
ln ci,t =α0+α1 ln yi,t−1+θi+δt+εi,t. (6.19)
Under the saving-only model, current consumption should be negatively correlated
with income in the previous period given the consumption at that time. The negative
relationship here is due to liquidity constraints.
When consumption equals income, liquidity constraint is likely not binding. At
some point income will be higher than consumption, then households will have a
condition to save. In this model, past income may include some information that
is not captured by past consumption. When past income was low, it suggests that
households may face liquidity constraints which have caused past consumption is
lower than expected by households. The impact is current consumption will be higher
than predicted from the past consumption due to low income.
6.3.4 Hidden Income
Suppose all households agree to form a risk sharing group. The households’ effort is
observable but not their income. In this case, households have private information
about income realisation and asset status. The information emerges when household
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income cannot be observed directly by a community, then a barrier to insurance is
likely to emerge. Households may hide their wealth in terms of physical goods such
as gold, jewellery or in terms of saving and other financial deposits. However, they
may not be able to borrow secretly (see Cole and Kocherlakota, 2001).
In order to examine the hidden income hypothesis, I utilise household i’s con-
sumption and income in two-step tests. Following Kinnan (2010), the first step is to
regress the consumption against its lag in which the specification is given by (6.18).
The second step is to derive residuals which are estimated from
εˆi,t ≡ ln ci,t− ϕ̂ ln ci,t−1− δ̂t
and then regress it against previous log income yi,t−1 as follows
εˆi,t ≡ϕ0+ϕ1 ln yi,t−1+ui,t. (6.20)
Under hidden income hypothesis, ϕ1 should not be different than zero. The sign of ϕ1
have different implication. If the value of coefficient is negative, it implies borrowing
constraint. If the value of coefficient is positive, it implies hidden income. If the
household hides information about his income, residuals of the results in consumption
smoothing should be correlated with past income.
6.3.5 Limited Commitment and Moral Hazard
Risk sharing with moral hazard models is widely used to explain household behaviour
in developing economies. When households join an informal group and agree to exert
effort, the efforts are likely to be unobservable. This circumstance tends to make
households not fully commit their effort. In other words, they tend to shirk, given
such circumstances.
This condition also implies that households may hide their commitment and full
effort under the risk sharing arrangement. The non existence of commitment prob-
lems or asymmetric information will lead to an independent relationship between
households’ consumption and income realisation given the aggregate resources within
that particular village.
Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2009) show that under the incomplete market model,
the non-central moment of the cross-sectional distribution of consumption at a partic-
ular date can be used to estimate moral hazard models. When households’ consump-
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tion grows at different rates, it cannot satisfy optimality conditions given by standard
Euler equation. Kocherlakota and Pistaferri also show that it is possible to use the
inverse Euler equation as an alternative restriction.
Using the inverse Euler equation, I compare two moral hazard and limited com-
mitment models. In this particular test, moral hazard and limited commitment are
empirically difficult to distinguish. In the first model, I consider the raw moment or
uncentered definition of community consumption k as follows:
ln
(∑N
i=1 1/c
−γ
ik,t
N
)
=α0+α1 ln
(∑N
i=1 1/c
−γ
ik,t−1
N
)
+α2 ln yik,t−1+θi+εik,t (6.21)
where cik,t is household i’s per capita consumption in community k at date t, γ denotes
cross sectional moment of consumption, yik,t denotes household’s i income in commu-
nity k at date t, θi denotes household-fixed effect, and εik,t denotes error terms. N is
different from community to community.
Following Kinnan (2010), an alternative empirical model for this is using level
regression for community consumption ck as follows:
ln ckt =α0+α1 ln ck,t−1+α2 ln yk,t−1+δk+εkt (6.22)
where δk is community fixed effect. For (6.21) and (6.22), the coefficient α1 should
be close to unity and the coefficient α2 is close to zero. The intuition of both models
is the income should be observable and therefore it should not change as the whole
community’s consumption change.
6.3.6 Endogenous Group Formation
In a complete market world, all individuals in a community perfectly share risk. This
is explained in the earlier section, where I show that regardless of its income history,
a household in a community consumes a constant fraction of the community income.
This means that consumption growth of two households in a community will be per-
fectly correlated. For illustration, take two households in a community and let their
consumption be c1,t and c2,t at date t. The perfect risk sharing with a homothetic
preference means that c1,t/c2,t is either a constant over time or serially uncorrelated.
Individual history of income of 1 and 2 does not determine their income. All income
risks are pooled through security market. I have explained in earlier section, how
this can be accomplished using Arrow-Debreu markets.
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The implicit assumption here is that all financial contracts are honoured and there
is no reneging from the individuals after a contract is agreed and signed. In a world
with extreme form of incompleteness of markets, this kind of risk pooling is impos-
sible. Therefore, if households are unable to access the formal insurance markets in
order to smooth their consumptions, they should look for another type or mechanism
of insurance. The alternative to market completeness is to form groups in the com-
munity where members within the group will have an implicit contract to help each
other to insure against individual specific idiosyncratic shocks. In many developing
countries, this can be done by forming a risk sharing group or coalition through a
contractual agreement between them: the contract may be implicit or explicit. This
kind of group formation is fragile because a subgroup of individuals can defect any-
time from the group and form a coalition to defeat the risk sharing arrangement. I
use Bold’s model (2009) to examine risk sharing arrangement between households.
Bold (2009) derives conditions for coalition proof group formation where it is not
incentive compatible for agents to defect from a group and form coalition of this na-
ture. The basic principle is that the past history of relative consumption of groups
must influence current consumption. In addition, individual income should also in-
fluence the current c1,t/c2,t. There are two conditions of contracts considered in Bold’s
model: a sub-game perfect contract and a coalition-proof contract. Consider a sub-
game perfect contract of three players with two possible outcomes: high-income real-
isation yh and low-income realisation y`.
In date t, household 2 and 3 agree to support household 1 who has y`. If this ar-
rangement is an equal-sharing allocation and is not self-enforced, then household 2
and 3’s consumption and payoffs should be indifferent between cooperating or defect-
ing. These households will cooperate as long as the payoff to cooperate is at least the
same as they would have in autarchy. In a sub-game perfect contract, the “second-
best” stays the same as in equal-sharing allocations since a player’s autarchy payoff
is determined by this player’s income realisation, and is not based on the history of
the game.
In a coalition-proof contract, consider the same number of players or households
where up to date t, the history in this contract is similar to the one described in a
sub-game perfect contract. Now suppose household 1 and 2 have yh in date t+1 and
agree to support household 3 who has low-income realisation y`. In a coalition-proof
contract, household 1 and 2 are better off in risk sharing rather than in an autarchy
condition. Therefore, their consumption should be adjusted to the level where they
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are indifferent to cooperating or defecting jointly. A summary of Bold’s model (2009)
is provided in Appendix 6.A.
Bold’s model for endogenous group formation can be empirically examined using
specifications as follows:
c1,t
c2,t
= φ0+φ1
c1,t−1
c2,t−1
+φ2 log y1,t+φ3 log y2,t+φ4 logYt+εt (6.23)
c1,t
c2,t
= φ0+φ1
c1,t−1
c2,t−1
+φ2 log y1,t+φ3 log y2,t+φ4 logYt
+φ5
(( c1,t−1
c2,t−1
−1
)2
× log y2,t
)
+εt.
(6.24)
where c1,tc2,t denotes the ratio between household 1’s consumption and household 2’s
consumption at date t, c1,t−1c2,t−1 denotes the ratio between household 1’s consumption
and household 2’s consumption at date t−1, log y1,t and log y2,t denote log income of
household 1 and 2 at date t respectively, and logYt denotes log income for respective
community at date t.
Both equations estimate relative change in shares between household 1 and 2. I
calculate the income change or growth from IFLS2 and IFLS3 and then classify the
households into two groups: household 1 is a group that has low-income growth and
household 2 has high-income growth.
The regression given by (6.23) examines whether constrained households’ past
history given by the past marginal utility ratio is statistically adequate to explain
their own consumption. If the groups are exogenously formed, then the coefficient for
c1,t−1/c2,t−1 is statistically insignificant.
If otherwise, then the groups are endogenously formed where there is an increase
in c2,t−1 followed by relative increase in c1,t−1. In this case, household 2 is expected to
have a higher payoff than household 1 due to the binding of enforcement constraints.
Therefore, the coefficient is expected to be positively significant.
In the second regression (6.24), the interaction term
(
c1,t−1
c2,t−1 −1
)2× log y2,t is intro-
duced to examine the effect between consumption shares and household two’s current
income. The effect of household two’s income changes on the current marginal ratios
is determined by the marginal ratio of household 1 and 2 from the previous date under
endogenous group formation.
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6.3.7 Summary
Based on the discussions of the previous sections, the alternative models of risk shar-
ing is summarised in Table 6.3.1 where a specific test is given for each model. In this
table, the empirical analysis starts with different type of barriers to insurance, which
impede formal insurance for the IFLS households, and then examines the endogenous
group formation of risk sharing networks.
6.4 Data
The data are gathered from the Indonesia Family Life Survey. These longitudinal
surveys consist of two levels: community and household surveys where the latter
can be decomposed into individual and family level. There are four waves so far:
IFLS1 in 1993, IFLS2 in 1997, IFLS3 in 2000, and IFLS4 in 2007. In IFLS, around
90% of sample households are retained from the first wave until the latest which is
considered the advantage of using this data set to make an economic analysis of risk
sharing and related testable implications. For this study, I only use IFLS data up
until Wave 3. I cannot utilise IFLS4 data due to inadequate information to convert
consumption data so it can be spatially and temporally adjusted.
Furthermore to conduct the empirical analysis, the data should fulfil some con-
ditions: (1) all necessary information regarding household variables are available,
meaning that only households who exist for all waves are considered, (2) these vari-
ables, particularly consumption and income, do not take extreme values; any extreme
values will have five percentiles trimmed from the top and bottom of the respected
distribution, and (3) households stay within their villages for the whole period.
To test coalition among households as formulated in (6.23) and (6.24), I use com-
munity data that consist of at least three households. The descriptive statistics for
relevant analysis are given in Table 6.4.1. The consumption is measured by per capita
expenditure (PCE) and the income is also measured by per capita income (PCI). This
means that the consumption and income for each household is divided by the number
of people living in that household.
However, two potential problems may arise if Least Squares estimators are ap-
plied to the estimate equation that includes consumption and income, namely the
endogeneity of income change and income measurement error.
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To address these potential problems, I use two instruments for household level
tests: asset and health measures. The first instrument is household assets, which
include current and fixed assets. In the IFLS, household assets include the house,
vehicles, appliances, savings, jewellery, furniture and utensils. I also include assets
that are used by households for farming and non-farming businesses.
The second instrument that can be utilised is activities of daily living or ADLs
(from now it will be referred as ADL or ADLs). ADL is a measure that indicates
the physical ability of an individual to perform daily living activities. The reliability
and validity of ADLs have been tested extensively, mainly in the United States and
Southeast Asia (see Gertler and Gruber, 2002). The ADLs is transformed into an
index as follows
Score−Min. Score
Max. Score−Min. Score .
The ADL index takes on values from 0 to 1, where zero is when the individual cannot
perform any ADLs at all and one is when the individual can easily perform all of the
ADLs.
In IFLS, the ADLs are divided into 10 components. These are ability to carry
a heavy load for 20 metres, ability to walk for 5 kilometres, ability to walk for 10
kilometres, ability to bow, squat and kneel, ability to sweep the house floor, ability to
draw a pail of water from a well, ability to stand up from sitting on the floor without
help, ability to stand up from sitting position in a chair without help, ability to bathe
without help, and ability to dress without help. The first four activities are classified
as intermediate ADLs, while the last five activities are classified as the basic ADLs
(see Nguyet and Mangyo, 2010).
For community or village level tests, the instruments are rainfall and the avail-
ability of financial institutions. Rainfall or precipitation rate is commonly used for
income at community level. Since most of the regions in Indonesia are dominated
by agricultural occupation, it is feasible to use rainfall as an instrumental variable
(for example see Arezki and Brückner, 2012; Fichera and Savage, 2015). The daily
rainfall data are obtained from the Indonesian Agency for Meteorological, Climatolog-
ical and Geophysics (BMKG). I use the last year average precipitation for each IFLS
wave respectively, then match these data using community data using altitude and
longitude to nearest BMKG weather station. The data from 25 BMKG stations are
matched with 310 IFLS communities. The matching process is done by calculating a
community location to the nearest station.
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Table 6.4.1
Summary Statistics of Key Variables
Per capita income and per capita consumption figures are
in monthly and in 2000 Indonesia rupiah. The values are
transformed into logarithmic values. ADLs denote activities
of daily living index. Log of household assets are calculated
from total value of assets for each household in 2000 Indone-
sia rupiah. Source: author’s calculations from IFLS data set.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
IFLS1 − 1993
log(Asset) 2983 16.4163 1.8059 9.1528 22.6116
log(PCE) 3014 11.9606 0.7678 9.4761 15.6449
log(PCI) 3014 10.4283 2.0057 0.9641 18.6922
ADLs 3014 0.7593 0.0697 0.1667 1
IFLS2 − 1997
log(Asset) 2824 16.9993 1.8739 7.6834 23.2693
log(PCE) 3014 12.3732 0.7711 9.9135 17.2958
log(PCI) 3014 11.5175 1.41564 −1.5757 18.8558
ADLs 3014 0.9679 0.0846 0 1
IFLS3 − 2000
log(Asset) 2897 16.9239 1.8724 6.2146 22.4968
log(PCE) 3014 12.3829 0.7116 10.2886 15.5103
log(PCI) 3014 11.5690 1.1714 5.6268 17.2419
ADLs 3014 0.9607 0.0976 0 1
The second instrument for income at community level is the presence of formal
financial institutions in that village or community. IFLS provides some relevant in-
formation with respect to formal financial institutions such as the presence of formal
financial institution within the village or community, the distance to nearest bank
or other formal financial, mode of transportation and transportation cost to reach
the institution. These are relevant and possible instruments that can be used for
community-level analysis in particular related to financial market variables.
As of 2000 or in IFLS3, the majority of people in the IFLS are working in the agri-
cultural sector: this comprises 35% of the total sample. Furthermore, in rural areas
51% of the IFLS samples are working in the agricultural sector (see Table 3.B.6 for
more detail). Most of these households also live in rural area. Based on the commu-
nity data, more than 55% of the IFLS communities are located in rural area.
In this study, community is considered as a risk sharing unit. To assess risk shar-
ing within communities, the IFLS provides information on community participation
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such as Roscas (rotating saving and credit associations) for each respondent along
with individual social and economic characteristics. For endogenous group analysis,
I use the data from IFLS3 and IFLS2. IFLS1 however do not provide information
about Roscas.
6.5 Analysis and Discussions
Roscas characterise many aspects in finance development in Asia including Indone-
sia. Therefore, the discussion of finance is incomplete if this informal finance is not
included. Such institutions mobilise financial resources in local community or village,
where this will enable to foster economic development in the community.
Arisan or Roscas have long been known in Indonesia as a part of the social and
economic tradition. Indonesian households use various forms of Rosca to share their
risk. With diverse demographic characteristics, Roscas are generally formed by group
of people who usually have weekly gathering and rotate part of the pooled assets in
certain ways using random pot or systematic rotation. Since Roscas are a simpler
approach to conducting financial contract than formal financial institutions, a lot of
people, especially those who are credit constrained, prefer to use Roscas: this is par-
ticularly the case for short-term needs.
Roscas depend on social factors such as family relationship and social ties. This
factor may also limit other people to join the group if they do not have the common
factor. Cole and Slade (1996) describe common features that usually exist in Roscas.
It requires certain contribution payment in a regular basis for its members based
on mutual trust between them and usually no interest rate is specified or paid. The
payment is then pooled and distributed accordingly to certain mechanisms.
The Rosca members agree to have periodic meetings or gatherings where the
pooled fund is rotated and rotated between members. The members will get back
their contribution based on the amount they put in. Some people may join more than
one Rosca to diversify their risk. Some people may also contribute and pay more than
average members. The money is usually used for special expenditures such as wed-
ding, education expenses or unanticipated events. The cycle of the rotation depends
on the number of members.
The book keeping is usually managed at least by one member who keeps records
of the fund and its distribution. In some groups, the distribution is based on initial
agreement between members and others may have random order. In some urban area
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where the members consist of higher income people, the groups may turn into a social
club where the distribution is usually random and to some extent may exhibit gam-
bling aspects. Roscas may fail if the members do not make an adequate contribution.
Other community-based arrangements that operate based on the same principles
as Roscas can be found in village level. For example, Seibel (2008) studies LPD (Lem-
baga Perkreditan Desa) or a village credit institution in Bali which is integrated fully
with local culture. This study provides a comprehensive framework of LPD as a finan-
cial institution which is owned and organised by the customary village (desa adat).
It is strongly influenced by cultural and religious value. It has also several advan-
tages in reaching people who do not have access to formal institutions. With regard
to risk sharing arrangement, some of these institutions succeed but some are not suc-
cessful. Although it manages substantial amount of funds, these institutions are not
supervised by the central bank.
Based on these facts, this section presents and discusses the testable implica-
tions of several risk sharing hypothesis and related empirical tests as given in Table
6.3.1. The main research question is identifying different type of barriers to insur-
ance, which lead to endogenous group formation.
6.5.1 Full Risk Sharing Tests
If full risk sharing exists, household’s consumption should not move with the changes
in income, but should move with the average consumption within a community. How-
ever this is not the case for the IFLS households because of the barriers to insurance
that exist.
I undertake tests given in (6.15) and (6.16) are employed. The results are pre-
sented in Table 6.5.1. For regression with a household-fixed effect, there is a change
in income is associated with 11.4% change in per capita consumption (see Column
(1)). This measure also explains the magnitude of household consumption smoothing
without taking community into consideration. Then by adding the community effect,
the correlation between per capita income and expenditure decreases to 5.4% (see
Column (2)).
The potential problem that could arise from these regressions is the classical mea-
surement errors which lead the estimated α to decrease toward zero. The results also
show that indeed the α is close to zero in particular for the first result. The problem
exists because the income estimation is correlated with the measurement error, which
is the case for the second result.
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Table 6.5.1
Full Risk Sharing: Individual and Community Level
The household consumptions and incomes are deviations from means of respective house-
hold variables. All variables are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah. In Column (3) and (4), ADLs of
the household’s head and log of household assets are use as instruments and passed the en-
dogeneity test for final estimation (Column (4)). See Appendix 6.B for full results. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by
∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Source: author’s calculations from IFLS
data set.
Log of per capita expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of per capita income 0.114∗∗∗ 0.0535∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0050) (0.0140) (0.0465)
Households 3014 3014 2946 2946
Observations 9042 9042 8644 8644
Community-wave fixed effect No Yes No Yes
Sargan statistic 17.290 0.2940
p-value 0.000 0.5877
R2 0.090 0.236 −0.324 0.185
To address this problem, I instrument ADLs and log of household asset with re-
spect to log per capita income. These variables are relevant to provide explanation of
the changes in per capita income, which are calculated from deviations of per capita
income. Moreover, there is correlation between health and income where this is sup-
ported by Fichera and Savage (2015). Household assets may also provide some pro-
tection against shocks since households usually accumulate their wealth in terms of
physical assets.
Tests for the instrumental variables along with first-stage estimation results for
Table 6.5.1 are given in Appendix 6.B (Table 6.B.4 and 6.B.5). The instruments are
valid indicated by the values of Sargan test statistics. For the third regression, these
instruments are weak since it appears to invalid. After adding community-wave
dummy, these two instruments are valid and passed the Sargan endogeneity tests in
particular for estimation in Column (4) where the test of over identifying restrictions
cannot reject its null hypothesis. To test the joint significance of community-wave ef-
fects, F−statistics are statistically significant. This also provides a strong indication
that indeed communities play important role in providing insurance mechanisms for
households.
From Table 6.5.1 Column (3), the coefficient of log per capita income changes into
35.5%. Since the coefficients are statistically significant, there is indirect evidence
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that community level (indicated by community-wave indicators) is providing insur-
ance to households. This is indicated by the correlation between income and con-
sumption, which has decreased to 10.2% (see Column (4)). However, the risk sharing
is incomplete. The remaining questions are on what kind of barriers limit risk sharing
and the way households can smooth their consumption.
6.5.2 Consumption Smoothing Tests
Credit markets may have important impacts as insurance markets or mechanisms:
they are less effective in providing protection for households. The purpose of this
section is to investigate the availability of the insurance mechanisms provided by
credit markets.
Table 6.5.2 provides results for the borrowing-saving, and saving only tests. These
two tests are to some extent related to the existence of credit or financial markets.
Column (1) provides the results from borrowing-saving test given by (6.18). The
results show that the current consumption for IFLS households is associated with
the lag of consumption indicated by per capita expenditure in the previous waves by
35.8%. Since the past marginal utility of consumption is sufficient to predict cur-
rent marginal utility, IFLS households are able to conduct borrowing and saving to
smooth their consumption. This means that households can partially smooth their
consumption by performing transactions with the credit markets.
Table 6.5.2 Column (2) provides the results for the saving only model as given in
(6.19). Under the saving only model, the hypothesis is rejected since there is posi-
tive correlation between current consumption and past income. Given the condition
where households are not able to borrow, this means that the IFLS households cannot
sufficiently mitigate risks by using only their own resources. They must have other
mechanisms for risk mitigation: self insurance is insufficient. The result can be also
used to support the need for risk sharing.
6.5.3 Hidden Income Test
Another problem, which probably caused the full risk sharing test to fail, is hidden
income. Households who engage in risk sharing groups may not fully reveal their
actual income.
To identify this problem, a hidden income test as given in (6.20) is conducted and
the results are presented in Table 6.5.3. It can be inferred from the results that
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Table 6.5.2
Borrowing-Saving and Saving Only Tests
All variables are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah. PCE is per capita ex-
penditure which represents per capita consumption for each house-
hold. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients
significant at the 10% level are denoted by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗,
and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Source: author’s calculations from IFLS
data set.
(1) (2)
Log of PCE Log of PCE
Constant 7.881∗∗∗ 12.46∗∗∗
(0.291) (0.0633)
Lag of log per capita expenditure 0.358∗∗∗
(0.0118)
Lag of log per capita income −0.00678
(0.00541)
Households 3014 3014
Observations 6028 6028
Community fixed effect Yes Yes
Overall R2 0.3782 0.0009
Table 6.5.3
Hidden Income Test
All variables are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah. PCE is
per capita expenditure which represents per capita con-
sumption for each household. Standard errors are re-
ported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the
10% level are denoted by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at
the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Source: author’s calculations from
IFLS data set.
Residuals
Constant −0.261∗∗∗
(0.0413)
Lag of log per capita income 0.0238∗∗∗
(0.0460)
Households 3014
Observations 6028
Community fixed effect No
Overall R2 0.0055
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the residuals are correlated with income from the previous wave. The significantly
positive coefficient of lag income indicates some of IFLS households do not fully reveal
their income. This suggests that the failure of full risk sharing can be explained by
hidden income indicated by a positive and significant income coefficient. Since the
value is small at 2.38%, this means the correlation effect between hidden income and
predicted consumption is small.
Moreover, the test does not clearly explain variations within the observation since
the explanatory power is relatively small. This suggests that additional information
from the previous period provides a less predictive power of previous history. There-
fore, the result of this test provides an explanation of why efficient risk sharing does
not occur between IFLS households.
6.5.4 Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment Tests
Moral hazard implies a hidden type of household. Limited commitment implies hid-
den commitment from households, which also means that households may leave the
risk sharing group.
Under limited commitment or moral hazard, the current marginal utility of con-
sumption should depend on the previous marginal utility. In this case, the parameter
of α1 should be different than zero and α2 should be zero given by (6.21) and (6.22).
Parameter α2 provides any information from the previous date which is captured in
the income component. Table 6.5.4 and 6.5.5 provide the results for moral hazard and
limited commitment tests. The estimation results of (6.21) are given in Table 6.5.4
and the results in Table 6.5.5 are based on (6.22) respectively.
In the first part, I investigate the risk preference at community level which is
given by parameter γ that denotes the degree of risk aversion. In Table 6.5.4, setting
the value of parameter γ range between one and two, the lag consumption moments
are decreasing, while the average log income is increasing. When parameter γ equal
to 1 or risk neutral, the coefficient for lag consumption moment is significantly nega-
tive but has a higher value when γ> 1. The average of the log of the previous income
coefficient and the value of the constant are significantly positive. However, when
communities are willing to take more risk, indicated by the value of parameter γ is
greater than one, their current consumption can be predicted by the previous con-
sumption. Given different parameter values, the results imply that neither limited
commitment or moral hazard is not able to explain the failure of full risk sharing in
the community.
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Table 6.5.4
Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment Tests
Using Raw Moments
This table presents simulation results based on (6.21). All variables are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah.
The constants and coefficients for log income are increasing as the parameters of γ are decreasing.
Robust OLS estimation with fixed-effects are employed. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level
by ∗∗∗. Source: author’s simulation using IFLS data set.
Consumption moment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
γ value (simulated) 1.00 1.20 1.40 1.60 1.80 2.00
Constant 17.93∗∗∗ 21.98∗∗∗ 26.01∗∗∗ 30.01∗∗∗ 33.98∗∗∗ 37.93∗∗∗
(0.526) (0.642) (0.758) (0.878) (1.000) (1.127)
Log of previous −0.577∗∗∗ −0.609∗∗∗ −0.628∗∗∗ −0.638∗∗∗ −0.644∗∗∗ −0.646∗∗∗
consumption moment (0.0537) (0.0539) (0.0538) (0.0535) (0.0534) (0.0533)
Average log of 0.174∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗
previous income (0.0231) (0.0292) (0.0358) (0.0429) (0.0504) (0.0583)
Community 310 310 310 310 310 310
Observations 620 620 620 620 620 620
Adjusted R2 0.480 0.508 0.520 0.522 0.518 0.512
F−statistic 57.72 63.69 68.17 71.06 72.68 73.46
p−value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 6.5.5
Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment Tests
at the Community Level
This table presents estimation results based on (6.22). All variables are in 2000
Indonesian rupiah. The OLS method is used in (1) which suffers from endogene-
ity problem. In Column (2), the average log community income is instrumented
using rainfall rate in the previous year and the presence of formal banking in
the community. The instruments passed the endogeneity test. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are de-
noted by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Source: author’s
calculations from IFLS data set.
(1) (2)
Consumption Consumption
level level
log(Lag of community consumption) −0.167∗∗∗ −0.132∗
(0.0343) (0.0609)
log(Lag of community income ) 0.0409∗ −0.105
(0.0178) (0.204)
Community 310 310
Observations 620 620
R2 0.079 −0.122
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To confirm the results presented in Table 6.5.4, the second test given by (6.22)
is conducted. The results are presented in Table 6.5.5 where the consumption and
income level are calculated based on the total per capita consumption and per capita
income for each community respectively. The first column of Table 6.5.5 shows the
results derived from the OLS method which suffers from the classical measurement
errors indicated by the correlation between residuals and dependent variables (for
complete results, see Table 6.E.1).
To overcome this problem, I use two instrumental variables at household level: the
previous year?s rainfall rate and the presence of formal banking within the commu-
nity. Rainfall rate is a variable that is commonly used to instrument income variable.
However, for village-level regressions, this is not adequate because the result of over-
identifying restrictions is not valid or in other words it is exactly identified. At least
one instrument should be added which in this case is the presence of formal financial
institution: this is measured by the distance to nearest bank or other formal financial
institutions. With these two instruments, the test of overidentifying restrictions can-
not reject its null hypothesis as indicated by the Sargan statistic. Table 6.E.2 provides
the results along with the first-stage regression.
The results are summarised and given in the second column of Table 6.5.5. Based
on this table, it can be inferred that the previous period of consumption at community
level is able to predict current consumption while the coefficient of the log of previ-
ous income level cannot be distinguished from zero. This may suggest that limited
commitment or moral hazard may explain the failure of full risk sharing. This result
is different from the results in Table 6.5.4. One possible explanation for this, is that
the risk preference parameter may not be sufficient to distinguish the information
captured by previous community income.
6.5.5 Endogenous Group Formation Tests
Given that α < 1 in Equation (6.16) implies full risk sharing failure between IFLS
households, the next question is how consumption smoothing may take place. The
common explanation for this is that households have access to informal credit or in-
surance instruments that lead to risk sharing group formation. The results in Table
6.5.1 also provide evidence that communities play an important role in consumption
smoothing. The risk sharing mechanisms may take place in various groups such as in
the workplace or in the village. Therefore, this section examines how a risk sharing
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group or network can be formed. The risk sharing is examined at community level.
In addition, this section also assesses Roscas as a case study of risk sharing groups.
The model assumes that constrained and unconstrained households can be prop-
erly distinguished. Under endogenous group formation, the consumption of con-
strained households is determined by the history or past information relatinf to shocks,
as well as the interaction of current income with other households who are also con-
strained. According to Borch’s rule, the ratio of marginal utility of consumption is a
sufficient statistic to capture the history of the game.
Therefore, to estimate the existence of endogenous group formation, the samples
are divided into two groups: low and high-income growth. The low-income group
consists of households who experience a change of income below or equal to one and
greater than one for the high-income group. The households then are paired with
their respected counterpart within their community according to (6.23) and (6.24).
There are 311 communities used in the full sample analysis after treatment. By
filtering the subsamples based on the Roscas participation, there are 36 communities
used in the third analysis.
The empirical tests of endogenous group formation is the complement to the risk
sharing model with moral hazard and limited commitment since it is based on the
assumption of imperfect enforceability. Similar to the full risk sharing hypothesis,
Equation (6.23) and (6.24) also assume that households exhibit constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA).
Table 6.5.6 presents the results of endogenous group formation test of the IFLS
households. As indicated in Column (1) and (2), if there is no treatment on the data,
the heteroskedasticity problem arises for both tests. Therefore, I conducted several
simulations to get the optimal value for c1,t−1/c2,t−1 which is 1.8. Then, the observa-
tions above this value are dropped.
The results in Column (3) show that endogenous group formation exists in IFLS
households indicated by positive and significant coefficients for c1,t−1/c2,t−1. In ex-
plaining the change in their own consumption, this test examines the importance of
the past history of constrained households, provided by the past marginal utility ra-
tio. However, it the nonlinearity problem in the regression residuals should be noted,
as indicated by the Ramsey RESET test. However, by adding the interaction effect(
c1,t−1
c2,t−1 −1
)2×y2t as given by (6.24), this problem is alleviated. This interaction term can
be also interpreted as the difference of initial consumption between household 1 and
household 2. Under endogenous group formation, the effect of this interaction term
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is expected to be low as the difference of initial consumption is high. The coefficient
of this interaction term is significantly negative with small value. This implies that
when the interaction term is imposed, it provides more evidence for the importance
of past information in explaining the group formation.
Table 6.5.6 Column (3) presents the results for (6.23) that show a small value of
c1,t−1 relative to c2,t−1 implies a minimum payoff for household 1 which is optimal to
deter a deviation. But when c1,t−1 is higher than c2,t−1, then household 2 will have
a continuation payoff which is also the minimum payoff and household 1 will get the
maximum payoff. Under exogenous group formation, the coefficient of c1,t−1/c2,t−1
implies that the optimal punishment path will lead to autarchy conditions.
The income coefficients of household 1 and 2, which have different signs, confirm
that there is transfer between them as stipulated under risk sharing networks. The
higher value of income coefficient for household 1 tells us that the benefit exists un-
der this arrangement. Household 2 experiences a relatively small change in their
income. The coefficient of community income also implies that there is correlation
between households with overall income in that community. This is consistent with
risk sharing hypothesis.
To observe participation in risk sharing groups, the study uses the information
about Rosca participation given in IFLS. Table 6.5.6 Column (5) and (6) provide
the results from subsamples based on Rosca participation. Since the coefficient of
c1,t−1/c2,t−1 in this regression is lower than the coefficient in Column (3), the benefits
of risk sharing are not fully captured by Rosca participation. This is also supported
by the coefficient of community income, which is statistically insignificant. Although
there is an income transfer between household 1 to household 2 as indicated by the
value of respected variables, the potential of risk sharing is not fully achieved by
Roscas as an insurance mechanism.
In summary, the estimations in Table 6.5.6 Column (3) and (4) provide stronger
evidence of the existence of endogenous group formation compare to the results of full
samples in Column (1) and (2). This is indicated by a significantly positive coefficient
of φ1. Furthermore, this result also confirms that the past history of constrained
household can be used to explain current consumption.
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6.6 Robustness Results
The panel regressions results presented earlier are subject to a limitation because of
the limited number of waves. There are three waves of IFLS1 (1993), IFLS2 (1997),
and IFLS3 (2000) which are three and two years apart respectively. For full risk
sharing tests this is not a problem because left hand side and right hand side variables
are both contemporaneous. However, for other test results where lagged variables are
introduced as an explanatory variable, a legitimate concern is about the consistency
of the series across waves. It is possible that a household surveyed in one wave might
have changed its occupation or profession in the subsequent wave because several
years have passed between two waves. Therefore, the risk sharing arrangement of
households across different waves might not represent the risk sharing arrangement
portrayed by the theoretical model, which assumes identical households. This is a
problem which is endemic to any panel study with a limited number of waves (for
example see Fichera and Savage, 2015; Frankenberg et al., 2003).
6.6.1 Robustness Results for Consumption Smoothing
To deal with this problem, this study conducts two types of robustness checks for
consumption smoothing tests. Firstly, households? occupations are classified and the
same battery of tests is run for each occupation and see whether a similar result holds.
Secondly, weights are attached to observations in different waves, with greater weight
to the latest wave and smaller weights to the earlier wave. These weights are of course
arbitrarily chosen. and so alternative weights are used and the results examined,
which provides the optimal goodness-of-fit measures. The results are reported in the
Appendix 6.C. For robustness checks, it is found that agriculture and forestry accord
well with earlier risk sharing result for both robustness checks. This means that on
average people who are working in agriculture, forestry, and fishery sector tend to
conduct transactions with banks and other credit institutions than the rest. Given
that agriculture and forestry comprise about 76% of the sample, the study considers
this as an adequate robustness check of my basic test results.
Since the value of consumption in the previous period is lower than in the full
test, this suggests that the impact would not be higher than the overall households.
Table 6.C.3 provides the same regressions using industry category for the saving only
model. The results are quite similar across the occupational sectors or industry. This
supports findings given in the full test where households across different occupation
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may not be able to protect against risks using their own savings (see Table 6.C.4).
Therefore, using this robustness checks, only the results for households who work
in agriculture, forestry, and fishery sector are consistent with the initial findings for
borrowing -saving and saving only tests.
For the second robustness check, the results using pooled estimation are not close
to the results in Table 6.5.2. Moreover, giving more weight to the recent data increases
the coefficients of lag consumption, which is not theoretically sufficient. Another rea-
son is that the log of consumption for IFLS3 are correlated with the interpolated
values of weighted variables in the pooled regressions. Therefore, a robustness check
is conducted using interpolated values derived from IFLS1 and IFLS2 data, and then
regress it to IFLS3 data.
The results of the second robustness check for borrowing-saving and saving only
tests are given in Table 6.C.5 and 6.C.6 respectively. However, the results may not
be as strong as in the previous robustness: a number of observations should dropped
to gain optimal results and to achieve similar coefficients in Table 6.5.2. For both
borrowing-saving and saving only test, the observations in the second robustness
check are dominated by households who work in agriculture, forestry and fishery
sector. This comprises 76.85% of all observations in this robustness check. Therefore,
based on the second robustness check it can be inferred that the results in Table 6.5.2
are consistent for households who work in agriculture, forestry and fishery sector.
6.6.2 Robustness Results for Hidden Income Tests
Since the hidden income test is quite similar to the borrowing-saving and saving only
tests, the year gap may also become a problem to the estimation results due to the na-
ture of IFLS data. Therefore, the study uses two types of robustness check, which are
similar to the previous section: regressions based on occupational sector or industry
and weighted values of lagged variables. The results are provided in Appendix 6.D.
Table 6.D.2 provides the results for the first robustness check. There are two
occupation or industry classifications that have similar results in the initial hidden
income test: (1) agriculture, forestry, and fishery, (2) social services. As expected,
households who work in agriculture, forestry, and fishery may exhibit similar charac-
teristics as in the initial results. In this category, household income is quite volatile
and is determined by factors that are not easily predictable such as weather and other
environmental-linked variables. This may affect some households who may not fully
disclose information about their true income. This also implies that these households
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may not fully rely on their risk-sharing group. The other reason is possibly their
educational background: most people who work in this industry have lower level of
education than in other sectors.
On the other hand, households who work in social or community services have
different characteristics compared to those who work in other industries. However,
they exhibit similar patterns as in the initial result of hidden income test. This is
probably due to the nature of the social sector, which is not a profit-oriented service.
People who work in this sector may have less commitment in their risk-sharing group
since they may have less cohesiveness. Therefore, they may not fully disclose their
income to their group.
In the second robustness check, the similar procedure is applied as in the previ-
ous section. The results are given in Table 6.D.2. However, the second robustness
check for hidden income test employs “two-step” regression. The first regression is
intended to derive residual values from consumption regression against interpolated
values of previous consumption values using arbitrary weights. The aim of the sec-
ond regression is to infer hidden income information by using residuals from the first
regression and regress it against the interpolated values of previous income values
using arbitrary weights.
Since the optimal weights are already known from the previous section, the next
step is to simulate possible regression with different values to get similar results in
Table 6.5.3. The closest result is when the observation values for log of per capita
income higher than 11 are dropped. Therefore, the cut-off point for log of per capital
income to get a similar result in the initial regression is 11, which is higher than the
cut-off points for robustness check of borrowing-saving and saving only tests. Hidden
income may take place when households have higher per capita income than in the
case of borrowing-saving or saving only test. In other words, the explanation that the
failure of the full risk sharing test due to hidden income exists when households have
higher income if they do not fully use credit markets or their own savings.
Although many observations have been excluded , the results can be used to sup-
port the initial findings of the hidden income test. Moreover, the households’ occu-
pations that are used in the second robustness check for the hidden income test are
dominated by agriculture, forestry, and fishery. This is consistent with the first ro-
bustness check and also with the results for borrowing-saving and saving only tests.
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6.7 Concluding Remarks
This study starts by examining whether full risk sharing exists between IFLS house-
holds. Under the full risk sharing hypothesis, this study finds that IFLS households
do not have efficient risk sharing within their communities. This finding leads to
the implications of barriers to insurance. By testing the barriers, the failure may be
caused by hidden income, meaning that some households keep private information
about their resources. However, the impact of hidden income is relatively low. An-
other possible explanation is that the failure of full risk sharing may be caused by
limited commitment or moral hazard. This implies that households are either able to
leave the network when they experience income growth or communities may not be
able to detect deviation from risk sharing arrangements.
Given the fact that limited commitment and moral hazard tend to characterise
risk-sharing networks, the issue is investigated further by examining endogenous
group formation in order to smooth household consumption. The power of the tests
depends on the identification of constrained and unconstrained households. The study
finds that endogenous group formation emerges between the IFLS households within
their community. Furthermore, the effect of group formation is higher when the es-
timation is based on Rosca participation. The interaction between households is the-
oretically explained by endogenous group formation between three households. The
IFLS households are staying in the formation as long as enforcement constraints are
binding. This finding gives important insights into how risk-sharing groups facilitate
their members in facing consumption fluctuations.
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Appendix 6.A A Summary of Bold’s Endogenous Group
Formation (2009)
Let Usn be a risk sharing group with size n which the Pareto frontier is to be solved
by the constrained dynamic programming. A social planner solves this problem by
promising utility Us,1, ...,Us,n−1 to household 1, ...,n−1. Households must decide their
consumption and continuation utilities in the first date in order to maximise house-
hold n’s payoff with respect to self-enforcing constraints.
Each household consumes his own income, csi,t = ysi,t at date t and state s. Within
the group, all households are able to transfer [τst ]
n
i=1, which therefore the consumption
will be csi,t = ysi,t − τsi,t for i = 1, ...n, and otherwise will be csi,t = ysi,t. For any date
t≥ 0, the infinitely repeated game G is characterised by a set of t−histories Ht where
Ht = {Ht−1, st} and H0 = {s0, [τs0t ]ni=1}.
Suppose that following history ht and the constrained-payoffs on the equilibrium
path for household 1 and 2 are
U r1 ≥ u
(
yr1
)+ V˜1 (A.1)
U r2 ≥ u
(
yr2
)+βV2 (V˜1) . (A.2)
These payoffs are in a risk sharing group with size n which maximise a set of utility
U rn(U
r
1 ,U
r
2 , ...,U
r
n−1) and supported by V˜ . The problem of finding constrained-efficient
contract can be divided into two stages.
The first stage is to solve the optimal penal code V˜ after history ht is known.
This optimises the household’s continuation payoff on the equilibrium path which
equates with the discounted punishment payoffs from autarchy condition when the
enforcement constraints are binding.
The second stage is to choose consumption and continuation payoffs which are sup-
ported by the punishment path derived in the first stage. Therefore, the optimisation
can be written as follows
U sn
(
U s1, ...,U
s
n−1
)=maxu (csn)+β S∑
r=1
pirU rn
(
U r1 , ...,U
r
n−1
)
(A.3)
subject to promise-keeping, aggregate resource, and enforcement constraints.
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The objective is to optimise [(U ri )
S
r=1]
n−1
i=1 which denotes a set of utility for household
1, ...,n−1 in each state 1, ...,S , (csi )ni=1 denotes household i−th consumption at date
1, ..., t in each state 1, ...,S .
The term {[(V˜ rjg,J)
m(k)
g=1 ]J∈J}
S
r=1 denotes a set of optimal penal code for each coali-
tion J after history ht in repeated game g, ...,m(k) and each state 1, ...,S , V∗[m(k)]
denotes payoff for the largest stable group size not exceeding k, β denotes common
discount factor, and pir denotes the probability of state r takes place.
A set of promise-keeping constraints is
U
(
csi
)+β S∑
r=1
pirU ri ≥U si ∀i 6= n (A.4)
The aggregate resource constraint is given by
n∑
i=1
ysi ≥
n∑
i=1
csi .
The set of enforcement constraints for each coalition J ∈ J and each state r =
1, ...,S for the next date is given by
U rj1 ≥U
(
yrj1
)
+βV˜ r1,J (A.5)
U rj2 ≥U
(
yrj2
)
+βV˜ r2,J (A.6)
...≥ ... (A.7)
U jm(k) ≥U jm(k) +βV˜ rm(k),J (A.8)
...≥ ... (A.9)
U rjk ≥U
(
yrjk
)
+βV˜ rk,J . (A.10)
In this setting, V˜ = {V˜ r1 , ..., V˜ rk } is ordered based on increasing payoff value for
element of coalition J. After state r has occurred, the expected punishment pay-
off V rg is chosen. The a set of payoff V
r
m(k),J , ...,V
r
k,J is set to have same values to
Vm(k)(V1,J , ...,Vm(k)−1) and U rjg =U rjg (U1, ...,U rn−1) when jg = n.
The first order conditions for this problem are
U ′
(
csn
)
U ′
(
csi
) =µi ∀i 6= n (A.11)
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and
∂U rn
∂U ri
=µi
1+ηri
1+ηrn
∀r ∈S , ∀i 6= n (A.12)
where
(
µi
)n−1
i=1 are non negative multipliers associated with the promise-keeping and
enforcement constraints and
(
βpirµ jgη
r
jg,J
)k
g=1 for every coalition J ∈ J and each state
r = 1, ...,S . The envelope conditions for n−1 are given as follows
µi =−
∂U sn
∂U si
∀i 6= n. (A.13)
The envelope conditions for next period are
µi =−
∂U rn
∂U ri
=µi
1+ηri
1+ηrn
= U
′ (cnr )
U ′
(
cir
) ∀r ∈S , ∀i 6= n. (A.14)
From (A.13) and (A.14), µi can be interpreted as a trade-off measure between house-
hold n’s and household i’s discounted lifetime utility at date t and µri as trade-off
measure for the next period at state r. In dynamic contract setting, (A.13) can be in-
terpreted where the ratio of marginal utility stay constant when the previous date has
been a constrained optimum. This means that the contract which is constrained and
efficient is history-dependent and it is “first best” when the game history is revealed.
Now let Ct be the set of constrained household i when the enforcement is binding
and let U ri be the payoff for household i when this household’s enforcement constraint
is binding. This is not necessarily payoff for autarkic condition and depends only on
the household’s own income realisation in a sub-game perfect contract.
While in the coalition-proof, this payoff depends on the history of the contract and
the realisation of other constrained households. Therefore, the consumption cri of a
constrained household in is given by
u′
(
crn
)
u′
(
cri
) = −∂U rn
∂U ri
(A.15)
under the sub-game perfect contract and the coalition-proof contract.
The continuation values are determined by the previous history indicated by the
marginal utilities ratios in the previous dates and by the current income realisations.
Therefore (A.15) can be written in terms of the previous period’s marginal ratios. The
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Euler equation for the ratio of marginal utilities over time is
U ′ (cnt)
U ′
(
ci,t
) = (µi,t)i∈Ct = g[(µm,t−1)m∈UCt ,(yk,t)k 6=i∈Ct , yi,t,Yt] (A.16)
where Yt is aggregate income. In the coalition-proof contract, the marginal utility of
constrained households today is determined by the marginal utility ratio last period
and all households’ income today where k ∈Ct.
The effect of income will be higher if the two constrained households’ marginal
utility ratios in date t−1 are similar, which can be determined as follows,
(
µi,t
)
i∈Ct = g
{(
µm,t−1
)
m∈UCt ,
(
µk,t−1
)
k∈UCt ,
[
yjt,
(
µi,t−1
µ j,t−1
−1
)2
× yjt
]
j 6=i∈Ct
, yi,t,Yt
}
(A.17)
Equation (A.17) implies implications on the sub-game perfect and coalition-proof con-
tract. In a sub-game perfect efficient contract, a constrained bys marginal utility
ratio µi,t is independent of the other households’ past shock history indicated by
(µk,t−1)k∈UCt . The effect emerges from the constrained households’ income realisation
(yjt) j 6=i∈Ct on the constrained household’s marginal utility ratio is also independent of
the past shock history.
In a coalition-proof contract, a constrained household’s marginal utility ratio µi,t
depends on the other households’ past shock history (µk,t−1)k∈UCt . The effect which
emerges from the constrained household’s income realisation (yjt) j 6=i∈Ct on the con-
strained household’s marginal utility ratio also depends on the past shock history.
If the groups are exogenously formed, the coefficient for c1,t−1/c2,t−1 should be sta-
tistically insignificant. The interaction effect, (c1,t−1/c2,t−1−1)2× y2,t, implies differ-
ential effect of household 2’s current income y2,t under endogenous versus exogenous
group formation.
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Appendix 6.B Full Risk Sharing Tests
Table 6.B.1
Summary of Total Observations and Samples Used
This table provides highlights of key variables used in this study. Column (1) gives information about
all household observations in IFLS. Column (2) provides information about samples used in full risk
sharing, borrowing-saving, saving only and hidden income tests. This also includes endogenous
group formation tests. Column (2) can be compared to observations in Column (1). Column (4)
provides information about samples used for moral hazard and limited commitment tests which are
based on consumption in community level. This can be compared with information given in Column
(3), which gives information about the number of community in IFLS. N denotes the number of
samples used in the tests. Total expenditure, total income, per capita income (PCI) and per capita
expenditure (PCE) figures are in monthly and in 2000 Indonesia rupiah. Household assets are in
2000 Indonesia rupiah. ADLs (activities of daily living) is an index which has values between 0 and
1 for each head of the household. Source: author’s calculations from IFLS data set.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total household Samples used in Total community Samples used in
observations full risk sharing observations moral hazard
other household- and limited
based tests commitments
(N = 3014) (N = 310)
N Mean Standard Mean Standard N Mean Standard Mean Standard
deviation deviation deviation deviation
IFLS1 – 1993
Total expenditure 7136 937446 1174976 967050 1110809 31221400000 12400000 16600000 11000000
Total income 7185 785204 7646235 3071341 26700000 31256900000 134000000 57200000 134000000
Per capita expenditure 7136 226340 323472 219087 281850
Per capita income 7184 742186 6826075 744799 6860007
IFLS2 – 1997
Total expenditure 7536 1487939 5030252 1590827 5702683 80212700000 2200000 28800000 28400000
Total income 6868 1057141 8119044 1209823 11700000 802 9029415 26700000 20200000 40100000
Per capita expenditure 7536 370856 1083243 365533.4 968622
Per capita income 6868 243059 1971027 277861.6 2870812
IFLS3 – 2000
Total expenditure 10229 1251246 1501540 1324453 1355169 244611900000 16700000 27800000 12500000
Total income 9590 725643 1241060 809671 1156538 244613100000 53200000 15500000 8565246
Per capita expenditure 10229 344916 451654 320096 350270
Per capita income 9590 192046 476065 200336 608888
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Table 6.B.2
Estimation Results for Table 6.5.1 Column (1)
The household consumptions and incomes in this table are deviations from means of respec-
tive household variables. All variables are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah. Source: author’s
calculations from IFLS data set.
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 9042
Group variable: hhid Number of groups = 3014
R-sq: within = 0.0900 Obs per group: min = 3
between = 0.0021 avg = 3.0
overall = 0.0900 max = 3
F(6027) = 596.18
corr(ui, Xb) = −0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000
Log of PCE Coef. Std. Err. t P > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
Log of PCI 0.1139 0.0047 24.42 0.000 0.1048 0.1231
Constant 2.9e-9 0.0056 0.00 1.000 -0.0110 0.0111
σu 2.616e-07
σe .53581821
ρ 2.383e-13 (fraction of variance due to ui)
F test that all ui = 0 : F(3013, 6027) = 0.00 Prob > F = 1.0000
Table 6.B.3
Estimation Results for Table 6.5.1 Column (2)
The household consumptions and incomes in this table are deviations from means of respec-
tive household variables. All variables are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah. Source: author’s
calculations from IFLS data set.
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 9042
Group variable: hhid Number of groups = 3014
R-sq: within = 0.2363 Obs per group: min = 3
between = 0.0000 avg = 3.0
overall = 0.0565 max = 3
F(253,6135) = 7.36
corr(ui, Xb) = −0.8723 Prob > F = 0.0000
Log of PCE Coef. Std. Err. t P > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
Log of PCI 0.0535 0.0049 10.80 0.000 0.0438 0.0632
Constant -0.2806 0.0299 -9.37 0.000 -0.3394 -0.2219
Community-wave dummy coefficients are not shown
σu 0.3977
σe 0.5010
ρ 0.3866 (fraction of variance due to ui)
F test that all ui = 0 : F(3013, 5785) = 0.05 Prob > F = 1.0000
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Table 6.B.4
Estimation Results and Endogeneity Tests for Table 6.5.1 Column (3)
The household consumptions and incomes in this table are deviations from means of respec-
tive household variables. All variables are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah. Source: author’s
calculations from IFLS data set.
First-stage results
Number of groups = 2946 Obs per group: min = 2
avg = 2.9
max = 3
OLS estimation, Fixed-effects Number of obs = 8644
F( 2, 5696) = 583.15
Prob > F = 0.0000
Total (centered) SS = 12388.2435 Centered R2 = 0.1700
Total (uncentered) SS = 12388.2435 Uncentered R2 = 0.1700
Residual SS = 10282.7734 Root MSE = 1.3440
Log of PCI Coef. Std. Err. t P > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
Log of assets 0.1250 0.0144 8.69 0.000 0.0968 0.1532
ADLs 4.0879 0.1351 30.27 0.000 3.8231 4.3526
Included instruments: Log of assets, ADLs
Group variable: = 2946 Obs per group: min = 2
avg = 2.9
max = 3
IV (2SLS) estimation, Fixed-effects Number of obs = 8644
F( 1, 5697) = 646.30
Prob > F = 0.0000
Total (centered) SS = 1766.7367 Centered R2 = −0.3238
Total (uncentered) SS = 1766.7367 Uncentered R2 = −0.3238
Residual SS = 2338.8176 Root MSE = 0.6407
Log of PCE Coef. Std. Err. t P > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
Log of PCI 0.3549 0.0139 25.42 0.000 0.3276 0.3824
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic): 968.416
χ2(2) P-val = 0.0000
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic): 583.148
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size 19.93
15% maximal IV size 11.59
20% maximal IV size 8.75
25% maximal IV size 7.25
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 17.290
χ2(2) P-val = 0.0000
Instrumented: Log of PCI
Excluded instruments: Log of assets, ADLs
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Table 6.B.5
Estimation Results and Endogeneity Tests for Table 6.5.1 Column (4)
The household consumptions and incomes in this table are deviations from means of respec-
tive household variables. All variables are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah. Source: author’s
calculations from IFLS data set.
First-stage results
Number of groups = 2946 Obs per group: min = 2
avg = 2.9
max = 3
OLS estimation, Fixed-effects Number of obs = 8644
F(227, 5471) = 7.44
Prob > F = 0.0000
Total (centered) SS = 12388.2435 Centered R2 = 0.2359
Total (uncentered) SS = 12388.2435 Uncentered R2 = 0.2359
Residual SS = 9465.7106 Root MSE = 1.315
Log of PCI Coef. Std. Err. t P > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
Log of assets 0.1131 0.0146 7.74 0.000 0.0845 0.1417
ADLs 0.6737 0.2780 2.41 0.016 0.1249 1.2226
Community-wave coefficients are not shown
Included instruments: Log of assets, ADLs, community-wave (not shown)
Group variable: = 2946 Obs per group: min = 2
avg = 2.9
max = 3
IV (2SLS) estimation, Fixed-effects Number of obs = 8644
F( 237, 5806) = 6.46
Prob > F = 0.0000
Total (centered) SS = 1766.7367 Centered R2 = 0.1850
Total (uncentered) SS = 1766.7367 Uncentered R2 = 0.1850
Residual SS = 1439.9714 Root MSE = 0.4935
Log of PCE Coef. Std. Err. t P > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
Log of PCI 0.1452 9.0466 3.12 0.002 0.0539 0.2366
Community-wave coefficients are not shown
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic): 74.159
χ2(2) P-val = 0.0000
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic): 36.062
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size 19.93
15% maximal IV size 11.59
20% maximal IV size 8.75
25% maximal IV size 7.25
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 0.2940
χ2(2) P-val = 0.5877
Instrumented: Log of PCI. Included instruments: community-wave (not shown)
Excluded instruments: Log of assets, ADLs
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Appendix 6.C Consumption Smoothing Tests
Table 6.C.1
Estimation Results for Table 6.5.2 Column (1)
The household consumptions in this table are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah and in per capita.
Source: author’s calculations from IFLS data set.
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 6388
Group variable: hhid Number of groups = 3194
R-sq: within = 0.1124 Obs per group: min = 2
between = 0.6684 avg = 2.0
overall = 0.3837 max = 2
Wald χ2(526) = 3345.50
corr(ui, X ) = 0 (assumed) Prob > χ2 = 0.0000
Log of PCE Coef. Std. Err. t P > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
Lag of log(PCE) 0.3664 0.0113 32.33 0.0000 0.344 0.3886
Constant 7.7886 0.2870 27.13 0.0000 7.2261 8.3513
Community dummy coefficients are not shown
σu 0.102
σe 0.447
ρ 0.049 (fraction of variance due to ui)
Table 6.C.2
Estimation Results for Table 6.5.2 Column (2)
The household consumptions and income in this table are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah and in
per capita. Source: author’s calculations from IFLS data set.
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 6388
Group variable: hhid Number of groups = 3194
R-sq: within = 0.0121 Obs per group: min = 2
between = 0.3614 avg = 2.0
overall = 0.2813 max = 2
Wald χ2(526) = 1600.76
corr(ui, X ) = 0 (assumed) Prob > χ2 = 0.0000
Log of PCE Coef. Std. Err. t P > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
Lag of log(PCI) .04718 .004534 10.41 0.000 .0382974 .0560703
Constant 11.52069 .3244611 35.51 0.000 10.88476 12.15662
Community dummy coefficients are not shown
σu .4108139
σe .4904337
ρ .4123402 (fraction of variance due to ui)
6.C Consumption Smoothing Tests 191
Ta
bl
e
6.
C
.3
B
or
ro
w
in
g-
Sa
vi
ng
M
od
el
s:
Te
st
s
B
as
ed
on
In
du
st
ry
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
ti
on
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
pr
ov
id
es
th
e
fir
st
ro
bu
st
ne
ss
ch
ec
k
fo
r
es
ti
m
at
io
n
re
su
lt
s
of
bo
rr
ow
in
g-
sa
vi
ng
te
st
in
Ta
bl
e
6.
5.
2.
T
he
co
lu
m
n
nu
m
be
r
re
pr
es
en
ts
th
e
fie
ld
of
w
or
k
or
in
du
st
ry
w
he
re
th
e
he
ad
of
th
e
ho
us
eh
ol
d
w
or
ks
:
(1
)
ag
ri
cu
lt
ur
e,
fo
re
st
ry
,a
nd
fis
he
ry
,
(2
)
m
in
in
g
an
d
qu
ar
ry
in
g,
(3
)
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
,
(4
)
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y,
ga
s,
an
d
w
at
er
,
(5
)
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
,
(6
)
w
ho
le
sa
le
,
re
ta
il,
re
st
au
ra
nt
s
an
d
ho
te
ls
,(
7)
tr
an
sp
or
ta
ti
on
,s
to
ra
ge
an
d
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n,
(8
)
fin
an
ce
,i
ns
ur
an
ce
,r
ea
le
st
at
e,
an
d
bu
si
ne
ss
se
rv
ic
es
,a
nd
(9
)s
oc
ia
ls
er
vi
ce
s.
S
ou
rc
e:
au
th
or
’s
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
fr
om
IF
L
S
da
ta
se
t.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
C
on
st
an
t
8.
96
1∗
∗∗
10
.8
2∗
∗
13
.5
9∗
∗∗
18
.7
9∗
∗
14
.0
5∗
∗∗
11
.6
9∗
∗∗
13
.4
8∗
∗∗
13
.2
6∗
∗∗
13
.1
3∗
∗∗
(0
.4
74
)
(3
.2
96
)
(0
.8
57
)
(6
.1
64
)
(1
.0
54
)
(0
.6
80
)
(1
.0
31
)
(2
.7
04
)
(0
.7
45
)
L
ag
of
lo
g
P
C
E
0.
28
5∗
∗∗
0.
14
5
−0
.0
67
−0
.5
23
−0
.1
22
0.
07
1
−0
.1
55
−0
.0
99
−0
.0
48
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.2
69
)
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.5
06
)
(0
.0
79
)
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
84
)
(0
.2
13
)
(0
.0
47
)
H
ou
se
ho
ld
83
0
6
14
9
6
91
36
7
79
3
29
1
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
16
60
12
29
8
12
18
2
73
4
15
8
6
58
2
O
ve
ra
ll
R
2
0.
34
9
0.
28
1
0.
67
2
0.
93
8
0.
72
1
0.
43
0
0.
80
3
0.
90
4
0.
58
3
6.C Consumption Smoothing Tests 192
Ta
bl
e
6.
C
.4
Sa
vi
ng
-O
nl
y
M
od
el
s:
Te
st
s
B
as
ed
on
In
du
st
ry
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
ti
on
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
pr
ov
id
es
th
e
fir
st
ro
bu
st
ne
ss
ch
ec
k
fo
r
es
ti
m
at
io
n
re
su
lt
s
of
sa
vi
ng
-o
nl
y
te
st
in
Ta
bl
e
6.
5.
2.
T
he
co
lu
m
n
nu
m
be
r
re
pr
es
en
ts
th
e
fie
ld
of
w
or
k
or
in
du
st
ry
w
he
re
th
e
he
ad
of
th
e
ho
us
eh
ol
d
w
or
ks
:
(1
)
ag
ri
cu
lt
ur
e,
fo
re
st
ry
,a
nd
fis
he
ry
,
(2
)
m
in
in
g
an
d
qu
ar
ry
in
g,
(3
)
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
,
(4
)
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y,
ga
s,
an
d
w
at
er
,
(5
)
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
,
(6
)
w
ho
le
sa
le
,
re
ta
il,
re
st
au
ra
nt
s
an
d
ho
te
ls
,(
7)
tr
an
sp
or
ta
ti
on
,s
to
ra
ge
an
d
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n,
(8
)
fin
an
ce
,i
ns
ur
an
ce
,r
ea
le
st
at
e,
an
d
bu
si
ne
ss
se
rv
ic
es
,a
nd
(9
)s
oc
ia
ls
er
vi
ce
s.
S
ou
rc
e:
au
th
or
’s
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
fr
om
IF
L
S
da
ta
se
t.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
C
on
st
an
t
12
.1
1∗
∗∗
11
.1
2∗
∗∗
12
.5
0∗
∗∗
13
.9
3∗
∗∗
12
.5
8∗
∗
12
.9
3∗
∗∗
12
.3
8∗
∗∗
13
.7
6∗
12
.7
7∗
∗∗
(0
.1
08
)
(0
.5
30
)
(0
.2
41
)
(0
.7
33
)
(0
.2
53
)
(0
.2
29
)
(0
.3
72
)
(2
.2
60
)
(0
.1
73
)
L
ag
of
lo
g
P
C
I
0.
00
8
0.
12
2
−0
.0
10
−0
.0
84
−0
.0
27
−0
.0
31
−0
.0
08
−0
.0
81
−0
.0
02
(0
.1
01
)
(0
.0
50
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
19
)
−0
.0
33
(0
.1
78
)
(0
.0
15
)
H
ou
se
ho
ld
83
0
6
14
9
6
91
36
7
79
3
29
1
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
16
60
12
29
8
12
18
2
73
4
15
8
6
58
2
O
ve
ra
ll
R
2
0.
00
6
0.
15
2
0.
00
6
0.
04
0
0.
01
5
0.
00
5
0.
03
4
0.
12
5
0.
00
4
6.C Consumption Smoothing Tests 193
Table 6.C.5
Robustness Check for Borrowing-Saving Tests Using Weighted Values
This table provides the second robustness check for estimation results of borrowing-
saving test in Table 6.5.2. The interpolated values are calculated by giving certain
weights to the previous observations so that the results are similar to the results in
Table 6.5.2 Column (1). After several simulations, the optimal weighted values of PCE
in this particular case are wpce1 = 0.1 and wpce2 = 0.9. For this particular case, the
coefficient of PCE is close to the initial results in Table 6.5.2 and this does not exhibit
heteroskedasticity problem. When wpce1 > 0.1, the results exhibit more heteroskedas-
ticity. The simulations also include several cut-off points for per capita income where
in this table the observations with log of per capita income above 10.35 are dropped.
Source: author’s calculations from IFLS data set.
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 119
Model 5.221 1 5.2206 F(1,117)= 25.13
Residual 24.307 117 0.2077 Prob > F = 0.0000
Total 29.528 118 0.2502 R-squared = 0.1768
Adj R-squared = 0.1698
Root MSE = 0.4558
Log of PCEIFLS3 Coef. Std. Err. t P > t [95% Conf. Interval]
Weighted PCE 0.323 0.0643 5.01 0.000 0.1951 0.4499
Constant 7.931 0.7488 10.59 0.000 6.4475 9.4135
Cameron & Trivedi’s decomposition of IM-test
Source χ2 df p
Heteroskedasticity 2.66 2 0.2649
Skewness 2.04 1 0.1530
Kurtosis 0.85 1 0.3571
Total 5.55 4 0.2357
Ramsey RESET test
F(3, 114) = 1.44
Prob > F = 0.2351
Variable VIF 1/VIF
Weighted PCE 1.00 1.0000
Mean VIF 1.00
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Table 6.C.6
Robustness Check for Saving-Only Tests Using Weighted Values
This table provides the second robustness check for estimation results of
saving-only test in Table 6.5.2. The interpolated values are calculated by giving
certain weights to the previous observations so that the results are similar to
the results in Table 6.5.2 Column (2). In this case, the weighted values of PCI
provided in this table is the optimal weights where wpci1 = 0.1, and wpci2 = 0.9.
The simulations also include several cut-off points for per capita income where
in this table the observations with log of per capita income above 10.35 are
dropped. Source: author’s calculations from IFLS data set.
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 119
Model 0.280 1 0.2804 F(1,117)= 1.12
Residual 29.248 117 0.2499 Prob > F = 0.2918
Total 29.528 118 0.2502 R-squared = .4999
Adj R-squared = 0.1698
Root MSE = .4558
Log of PCEIFLS3 Coef. Std. Err. t P > t [95% Conf. Interval]
Weighted PCI −0.075 0.0708 −1.06 0.292 −0.2151 0.0652
Constant 12.389 0.6722 18.43 0.000 11.0574 13.7197
Cameron & Trivedi’s decomposition of IM-test
Source χ2 df p
Heteroskedasticity 3.59 2 0.1660
Skewness 0.22 1 0.6381
Kurtosis 0.09 1 0.7626
Total 3.90 4 0.4192
Ramsey RESET test
F(3, 114) = 1.42
Prob > F = 0.2410
Variable VIF 1/VIF
Weighted PCE 1.00 1.0000
Mean VIF 1.00
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Table 6.C.7
Robustness Checks for Borrowing-Saving Tests
Using Different Weighted Values
This table provides the results of different weights used in
saving-only tests as given in (6.18). Although the result using
w1 = 0.1 and w2 = 0.9 does not have the minimum MSE, the
regression coefficients are close to the results in Table 6.5.2
Column (1). Moreover, it does not exhibit heteroskedasticity
problem compare to the results using w1 > 0.1. Source: au-
thor’s calculations from IFLS data set.
w1 0.1 0.2 0.3
w2 0.9 0.8 0.7
R-square 0.1768 0.1871 0.1980
Root MSE 0.4558 0.4529 0.4505
MSE 0.2078 0.2051 0.2029
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
χ2(1) 3.01 3.49 3.69
Prob > χ2 0.0826 0.0618 0.0548
Table 6.C.8
Robustness Checks for Saving-Only Tests
Using Different Weighted Values
This table provides the results of different weights used in
saving-only tests as given in (6.19). The results using w1 = 0.1
and w2 = 0.9 are more robust where it is close to the results
in Table 6.5.2 Column (2) and also it has the lowest MSE.
Source: author’s calculations from IFLS data set.
w1 0.1 0.2 0.3
w2 0.9 0.8 0.7
R-square 0.0095 0.0064 0.0034
Root MSE 0.4999 0.5008 0.5015
MSE 0.2499 0.2508 0.2515
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
χ2(1) 1.11 1.44 1.76
Prob > χ2 0.2913 0.2299 0.1841
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Appendix 6.D Hidden Income Tests
Table 6.D.1
Estimation Results for Table 6.5.3
The household income in this table are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah and in per capita. The
residuals are derived from the results in Table 6.C.1. Source: author’s calculations from
IFLS data set.
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 6388
Group variable: hhid Number of groups = 3194
R-sq: within = 0.0172 Obs per group: min = 2
between = 0.0728 avg = 2.0
overall = 0.0055 max = 2
Wald χ2(526) = 35.33
corr(ui, X ) = 0 (assumed) Prob > χ2 = 0.0000
Residuals Coef. Std. Err. t P > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
Lag of log(PCI) 0.0237 0.0040 5.94 0.000 0.0159 0.0315
Constant −0.2595 0.0443 −5.86 0.000 −0.3462 −0.1727
Community dummy coefficients are not shown
σu 0
σe 0.6015
ρ 0 (fraction of variance due to ui)
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Table 6.D.3
Robustness Check for Hidden Income Test Using Weighted Values
This table provides the second robustness check for estimation results of hid-
den income test in Table 6.5.3. The interpolated values are calculated by giving
certain weights to the previous observations so that the results are similar to
the results in Table 6.5.3 Column (1). Following the results in Table 6.C.5, the
optimal weighted values of PCE are wpce1 = 0.1 and wpce2 = 0.9. The residuals
are derived from this regression. The residuals then are regressed against the
optimal weighted values of PCI are wpce1 = 0.1 and wpce2 = 0.9. The simula-
tions also include several cut-off points for per capita income where in this table
the observations with log of per capita income above 11 are dropped. Source:
author’s calculations from IFLS data set.
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 406
Model 19.0697 1 19.0697 F(1,404)= 65.49
Residual 117.6374 404 0.2912 Prob > F = 0.0000
Total 136.7071 405 0.3376 R-squared = 0.1395
Adj R-squared = 0.1374
Root MSE = 0.5396
Log of PCEIFLS3 Coef. Std. Err. t P > t [95% Conf. Interval]
Weighted PCE 0.3445 0.0426 8.09 0.000 0.2612 0.4288
Constant 7.7602 0.5021 15.45 0.000 6.7731 8.7473
Source SS df MS Number of obs. = 119
Model 0.1223 1 0.1223 F(1,404)= 0.42
Residual 117.5151 404 0.2909 Prob > F = 0.0010
Total 117.6375 405 0.2904 R-squared = 0.0010
Adj R-squared = −0.0014
Root MSE = 0.5393
Residuals Coef. Std. Err. t P > t [95% Conf. Interval]
Weighted PCI 0.0233 0.0360 0.65 0.517 −0.0474 0.0941
Constant −0.2313 0.3576 −0.65 0.518 −0.9342 0.4717
Cameron & Trivedi’s decomposition of IM-test
Source χ2 df p
Heteroskedasticity 4.06 2 0.1316
Skewness 4.67 1 0.0307
Kurtosis 3.93 1 0.0476
Total 12.65 4 0.0131
Ramsey RESET test
F(3, 114) = 1.62
Prob > F = 0.1832
Variable VIF 1/VIF
Weighted PCI 1.00 1.0000
Mean VIF 1.00
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Table 6.D.4
Robustness Checks for Hidden Income Tests
Using Different Weighted Values
This table provides the results of different weights used in
hidden income tests as given in (6.20). The results using
w1 = 0.1 and w2 = 0.9 are close to the results in Table 6.5.6.
The results also show that the regressions do not have het-
eroskedasticity problem. Source: author’s calculations from
IFLS data set.
w1 0.1 0.2 0.3
w2 0.9 0.8 0.7
R-square 0.0200 0.0173 0.0137
Root MSE 0.4512 0.4490 0.4474
MSE 0.2036 0.2016 0.2001
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
χ2(1) 1.56 1.6 1.66
Prob > χ2 0.2119 0.2054 0.1973
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Appendix 6.E Moral Hazard and Limited Commit-
ment Tests
Table 6.E.1
Estimation Results for Table 6.5.5 Column (1)
The consumption and income in this table are at community level where each variable are sum of
households’ consumption and income. All variables are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah and in per capita.
Source: author’s calculations from IFLS data set.
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 620
Group variable: hhid Number of groups = 310
R-sq: within = 0.0792 Obs per group: min = 2
between = 0.5336 avg = 2
overall = 0.1229 max = 2
F(2,309) = 4.55
corr(ui, Xb) = −0.5448 Prob > χ2= 0.0000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 310 clusters in commid)
log(Comm. consumption) Coef. Std. Err. t P > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
log(Lag of comm. consumption) −0.1665 0.0693 −2.40 0.017 −0.3028 −0.0302
log(Lag of comm. income) 0.0409 0.0185 2.21 0.028 0.0045 0.0772
Constant 19.1259 1.1460 16.69 0.000 16.8709 21.3808
σu 0.5032
σe 0.3280
ρ 0.7018
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Table 6.E.2
Estimation Results for Table 6.5.5 Column (2)
The consumption and income in this table are at community level where each variable are sum of
households’ consumption and income. All variables are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah and in per capita.
Source: author’s calculations from IFLS data set.
First-stage results
Number of groups = 310 Obs per group: min = 2
avg = 2
max = 2
OLS estimation, Fixed-effects Number of obs = 620
F(3, 307) = 2.52
Prob > F = 0.0581
Total (centered) SS = 343.9227 Centered R2 = 0.0240
Total (uncentered) SS = 343.9227 Uncentered R2 = 0.0240
Residual SS = 335.6584 Root MSE = 1.046
log(Comm. consumption) Coef. Std. Err. t P > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
log(Lag of comm. consumption) 0.1842 0.1131 1.63 0.104 −0.0384 0.4067
log(Lag of comm. income) 0.1076 0.0733 1.47 0.143 −0.0367 0.2518
Lag of distance −0.0618 0.0695 −0.89 0.374 −0.1985 0.0748
Included instruments: lag of comm. consumption, lag of rainfall, lag of distance
Group variable: = 310 Obs per group: min = 2
avg = 2
max = 2
IV (2SLS) estimation, Fixed-effects Number of obs = 620
F( 237, 5806) = 8.83
Prob > F = 0.0002
Total (centered) SS = 35.9904 Centered R2 = −0.1223
Total (uncentered) SS = 35.9904 Uncentered R2 = −0.1223
Residual SS = 40.3937 Root MSE = 0.361
Comm. consumption Coef. Std. Err. t P > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
log(Lag of comm. consumption) −0.1321 0.0609 −2.17 0.030 −0.2514 −0.0128
log(Lag of comm. income) −0.1055 0.2039 −0.52 0.605 −0.5050 0.2941
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic): 2.869
χ2(2) P-val = 0.2383
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic): 1.434
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size 19.93
15% maximal IV size 11.59
20% maximal IV size 8.75
25% maximal IV size 7.25
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 0.247
χ2(2) P-val = 0.6195
Instrumented: log(Lag of community income)
Included instruments: log(Lag of community consumption)
Excluded instruments: lag of rainfall, lag of distance
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Directions for Future
Research
7.1 Summary
Access to financial markets is believed to have significant impact on household wel-
fare. Besides providing capital for production or investment, the function of finan-
cial institutions is to provide protection for households against risk and uncertainty.
Moreover, this will also help households to strengthen their livelihood and economic
capabilities. However, in many developing countries, these institutions may not be
able to perform its functions effectively. Access to finance may become problem for
some households which affect their welfare.
The objective of this study is to investigate household welfare when access to fi-
nance is absent or limited. It also establishes a set of characteristics to identify house-
hold welfare from three dimensions: human capital, barriers to insurance, and risk
sharing group formation.
Chapter 2 sets the foundation of this research by examining existing literature on
household economy, in particular the way they manage their risks. Chapter 3 high-
lights financial development in Indonesia and puts this research into context: it is
related to two main data set utilised throughout the study. Building on these chap-
ters, the subsequent chapters take a closer look at household welfare in contemporary
Indonesia in terms of financial and labour markets.
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Chapter 4 estimates household welfare loss due to credit constraints that are iden-
tified by using Direct Elicitation Methodology (DEM) as proposed by Boucher et al.
(2009). Households’ credit status can be classified based on their notional and effec-
tive demand for loans, and loan supply. This happens because of asymmetric infor-
mation between lenders and borrowers. Households can be considered unconstrained
when they are not affected by this problem. Those who are affected can be said to
be constrained households: this condition can also be caused by transaction cost, per-
ceived risk, and lender’s credit rule.
Chapter 5 investigates the impacts of earnings risk on schooling and saving. I
discuss the theoretical framework when the decision on schooling and work in the
first period affects human capital in the next period. This may also have implications
for the saving made by the households for a precautionary reason.
Whereas the previous two chapters focus on households which are represented by
their breadwinner, Chapter 6 incorporates analysis not only at the household level
but also at the community level. This chapter studies informal groups as a substi-
tute for formal insurance and also measures the efforts of households to overcome
economic hardship. If households are constrained and barriers to insurance exist,
then the question is how households are able to form risk sharing groups. I examine
endogenous group formation as proposed by Bold (2009) to examine whether efficient
risk sharing would exist between households. Whenever credit and insurance mar-
kets are inaccessible, this condition brings households to find a way to smooth their
consumption by forming risk sharing group. If the groups are endogenously formed,
then efficient risk sharing may exist. In exogenous group formation, households may
find the enforcement constraints are not binding and this may lead to autarchy.
7.2 Findings
This study employs two dataset. The first data set is the A2F (Access to Finance)
survey in 2007 that comprises detail credit information on the sample households.
This information is very useful for investigating credit constraints. The second data
set is IFLS (Indonesia Family Life Survey), which consists of four waves: 1993, 1997,
2000, and 2007.
The first empirical chapter contributes to the existing literature by providing the
empirical study of impacts of access to finance on household welfare. First, the classi-
fication is established by using opinions from the A2F households’ credit status par-
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ticularly considering the reasons to stop borrowing. The study divides credit con-
straints based on the demand and supply of credit markets. Using DEM method, the
households can be classified into: price constrained, risk constrained, transaction-cost
constrained, and quantity constrained. Other households who do not fall into these
categories are either non-borrowers or unconstrained. It can be inferred that most
households who stop borrowing do so because of price-related reasons. The price con-
strained and transaction-cost constrained households cannot be inferred due to inad-
equate observations. For unconstrained borrowers, financial literacy has the highest
marginal effect compare to other variables. This shows how important financial liter-
acy in accessing services from formal financial institutions. Furthermore, welfare loss
is calculated using matching methods; where the control is unconstrained borrowers
against constrained households as the treated observations. This study finds that the
welfare loss due to risk- constraints would significantly result in a decrease in annual
income between 16 millions and 19 millions.
In the second empirical study, I investigate the sensitivity of earnings risk toward
investment in education and household saving. I adopt a theoretical framework from
Basu and Ghosh (2001) and use it to explain the relationship between these variables
using a simple two-period model. This study also finds that education does decrease
the variability over future income. Given the positive return on the investment of hu-
man capital across the waves, the effects of earnings risk may differ depending on the
household characteristics and its related factors such as economic condition. Across
the IFLS waves, savings are inversely related to occupational earnings risk due to
pure risk effect. This means that savings would rise since the certainty equivalent
income is lower. The results across the IFLS waves are also show that savings tend
to increase for households in urban area, with fewer members, and fewer dependents.
This study finds that earnings range measurement provides close results to Basu and
Ghosh’s model since it does not take occupational earnings into account.
In the third empirical chapter, I intend to contribute to the current literature in
risk sharing by providing understanding of several barriers to insurance and endoge-
nous group formation using Indonesian households as a case study. I also propose a
raw moment approach to examine moral hazard and limited commitment. This study
provides evidence of the failure of the full risk sharing hypothesis for IFLS house-
holds. It also finds that risk sharing in Indonesia is characterised mainly by limited
commitment and moral hazard. Given these facts, I investigate how the dynamic of
risk sharing between IFLS households by testing endogenous group formation within
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the community. The results also reiterate the importance of risk sharing networks
to provide consumption smoothing for households. By adding interaction terms in
the specification that allows for the difference of initial consumption between house-
holds, this study provides evidence of endogenous group formation using full samples
of IFLS households and subsamples based on Rosca participation.
For empirical implications, policymakers who wish to engage in community de-
velopment should pay more attention to financial constraints and networks between
households. The barriers to financial markets, which are highly related to credit and
insurance, may affect the sustainability of household finance. Understanding vari-
ous type of barriers may give better knowledge towards evaluation of related policies
which aim to increase households’ access to finance: these include social security, mi-
cro insurance, micro finance and credit penetration in rural economy.
7.3 Limitations of the Research
Like any other empirical research, this study has some caveats since it is constrained
by the data set, which is used to investigate several issues in its respective chapter.
The models in the first empirical study in Chapter 4 are not derived from any
structural model of credit constraints. Therefore, the analysis really depends on the
nature of the data employed in the research. For the same reason, the analysis cannot
be extended to the households who are constrained due to transaction costs. Another
limitation in this chapter is that it only investigates the failure of formal financial in-
stitutions without looking at the role of informal institutions. Since it is also based on
the elicitation method, which comes from the demand side, the supply side of financial
markets is not widely covered in this study.
In Chapter 5, the incomplete information of household characteristics in education
and income, reduced the number of observations for panel data estimations. There-
fore, the findings are interpreted specifically based on that respective year. Further-
more, given the definition in IFLS data set, the earnings risk estimation is based on
the occupation type and sector. The estimation can be extended if the information
about primary duty is consistently provided throughout the survey waves.
In Chapter 6, based on the reduced forms given in the literature, the study is able
to find the constraints that characterise risk sharing group formation between IFLS
households. However, it comes with some caveats. First, it is empirically difficult
to distinguish between moral hazard and limited commitment. Secondly, the time
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observation and the nature of data in the IFLS give limitations on empirical analysis
since some theoretical approaches in the study argue with the time series framework.
Thirdly, it also assumes that households exhibit constant relative risk aversion in
order to empirically examine the risk sharing hypothesis. This can be elaborated
more by using different specification of utility function.
For Chapter 5 and 6, data have become the main constraint of the empirical part
since there is no data on Indonesian households that would fit to the theoretical
models in each chapter. Currently there is none or similar data on the Indonesian
households that would have the same structure and survey design such as the British
Household Panel Survey or the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The IFLS would be
the optimal data set that can be found since it retain most of household samples from
the first survey wave until the last one. It also contains a lot of information about
Indonesian households, which can be ensured its validity and reliability. However,
the longitudinal design of IFLS may give some empirical complexity on this research.
Moreover, different time interval between one way to another may add to this com-
plexity.
7.4 Directions for Further Research
The work on credit constraints in Chapter 4 have some interesting findings which can
be used for further research. The positive results on quantity constraint using match-
ing methods can be taken further into investigation of the spillover effect between
formal and informal financial institutions. There is the possibility that consumption
smoothing using informal institutions has a greater effect than using formal institu-
tions. Household surveys on financial behaviour such A2F can be employed to inves-
tigate these questions. Another possibility is to look further at the transaction costs
of conducting transactions with different types of financial service provider.
This study also examines one particular risk which arises due to variability of
earnings or labour income. From a household survey perspective, the possibility to
investigate various sources of risk affecting household welfare is still open using the
IFLS or A2F data set. For example, disaster risk, climate risk, and health shocks cam
all be studied with regard to financial market conditions in Indonesia. A2F survey,
which contains significant information about remittances, is another option. At macro
level, remittances constitute a significant amount of capital inflow to Indonesia. At
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micro level, it has long term impact on household circumstances: it also improves
household livelihood.
Some theoretical issues that can be incorporated are the heterogeneity and risk
preferences among households. Since full risk sharing assumes that households fol-
low constant relative risk aversion, there is the possibility to empirically study risk
preferences among IFLS households. Therefore, the welfare loss under homogenous
and heterogeneous risk preference can be compared. However, this may need more
time observations.
From the theoretical framework given in Chapter 5, the model can be developed
by separating household decision between school and work. In this study, work ex-
perience is regarded as a post-schooling activity, which can have an influence on hu-
man capital investment. Further study can be carried out by looking into working
and schooling as separate decisions and investigating the impact of these decisions
on earnings risk and saving. Another possible topic is to use different definitions
of earnings risk, for example by looking at the subjective probability of earnings or
distribution of earnings based on hours worked and the geographic base.
Based on the standpoint of social security, risk sharing groups which are regarded
as traditional insurance systems may not be adequate to cover households’ needs at
large. For example, some economic events, which have large impacts on households
such as an economic crisis, may affect the community as a whole. Therefore, this
study can be extended to the linkages between informal group risk sharing and gov-
ernment policies toward community development. Such studies may also include the
interaction between formal and informal insurance for example the crowding out ef-
fect between these insurance mechanisms or the cooperation between informal groups
and formal financial institutions.
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